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A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
OF THE FOUNDERS OF
INSTITUTIONALIZED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANCY
Abstract. This paper examines the social relations of the founders of the
first institutions of modern public accountancy in Scotland. The study
uses archival data to construct social networks prior to 1854. Individual
founders in the networks are identified as potentially significant sources
of influence in the foundation events.
The paper reports the social network analysis in several parts. First,
relations between the founders of The Institute of Accountants in
Edinburgh (IAE), renamed The Society of Accountants in Edinburgh
(SAE), are networked. Second, a similar analysis is made of the foundation of The Institute of Accountants and Actuaries in Glasgow (IAAG).
Third, social links between individual founders of the IAE/SAE and IAAG
are identified.
The research results are generally consistent with prior studies but
reveal significant matters not identified by other researchers. The social
network analysis of the IAE/SAE founders confirms the existence of a
cohesive and elite community and the presence of an elite within an
elite. There is evidence of strong links to lawyers and landowners, as
well as significant links to the insurance industry.
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The IAAG network analysis demonstrates the Glasgow community to
be elite but more cohesive than its Edinburgh counterpart. The IAAG
founders had more significant links to merchants and farmers than to
lawyers and were a social group distinctly different from that of the
IAE/SAE. Nevertheless, relations existed between individual founders in
the two communities that have the potential to explain why the foundations took place at about the same point in time.
The study involves the first use of social network analysis in an
accounting history project. This methodology has been used extensively over several decades in sociology and social history. The major longterm contribution of the paper therefore can be argued to be the introduction of social network analysis to accounting historians.

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine various social relations between individuals directly or indirectly involved in the
founding of the IAE/SAE in 1853-1854 and the IAAG in 1853-1855.
Much has been written about the Scottish founders and the foundation events [e.g.; Brown, 1905; Stewart, 1977; Macdonald, 1984;
Briston and Kedslie, 1986; Walker, 1988b, 1995; Kedslie, 1990a, b;
Shackleton, 1995; Lee, 1996]. However, little has been reported
about the personal and business relations that existed between
the founders. Such relations are signals of potential influence
within the foundation communities and offer means of identifying potentially major players in the foundation events.
The paper reports detailed archival searches and analyses of
individual relations that indicate well-established social structures
of potential communication and influence within the IAE/SAE
and IAAG foundations. By means of these structures, it is possible
to identify those Edinburgh and Glasgow accountants with the
greatest access to their colleagues in their foundation communities and, therefore, with the most potential to influence foundation events. Although personal attributes of the founding
accountants are reported, they are used only to provide an interpretable context for analysis and a means of statistically validating
the more fundamental aspects of the social structures that were
the foundation communities.
The study reports that, respectively, there were 75 Edinburgh
men and 51 Glasgow men directly or indirectly involved in the
IAE/SAE and IAAG foundations. Each group constitutes an identifiable community based on individual relations or ties that
evolved over a number of decades in school, at university, in training and practice, and as a function of the geographic proximity of
Published by eGrove, 2000
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business and domestic addresses. In addition, there were connections between the founders through family, marriage, and
friendship ties. In combination, these relations form social networks for further analysis of potential influence by individual
founders.
The independent variables (personal attributes) that best
explain variations in the degree of potential influence of the
IAE/SAE founders are practice type; land, legal, and insurance connections; and geographic origins. More specifically, the most-connected members of the Edinburgh founding group w e r e those
founders born and raised in Edinburgh with the most links to
landowners, lawyers, and insurance companies. Other attributes,
such as paternal occupation, age, professional experience, and
marital status, did not explain variations in relations in the foundation network. The most significant attribute to explain network
influence in the IAE/SAE community is insurance connections.
Most of the IAE/SAE findings are consistent w i t h prior
research of a broader nature. Studies such as Brown [1905],
Stewart [1977], Macdonald [1984], Walker [1988b], Kedslie
[1990a, b], and Walker [1995] emphasized the strong relations in
Edinburgh in 1853 between accountants and lawyers; lawyers and
landowners; and accountants, lawyers, and insurance companies.
Most researchers in this area believe London-based political and
economic threats to court-related work to be the main reason for
the institutionalization of Edinburgh accountants in 1853 and
1854. This professional service depended on close relations
between accountants and lawyers and focused on property ownership (including land). In addition, Edinburgh in the first half of
the 19th century was a major location for insurance companies.
With the protection of property owners as their major objective,
lawyers and accountants typically managed these companies.
What is surprising in this study is the dominance of insurance connections over other variables available to explain the social structure of the IAE/SAE foundation community. Also of interest are a
n u m b e r of founders w h o w e r e well c o n n e c t e d w i t h i n the
Edinburgh foundation community, as well as to landowners,
lawyers, and insurance companies apparently uninvolved in the
foundation events.
Total network differences for the IAAG founders are best
explained by a combination of parental occupation, legal connections, and marital status. Differences within subgroups of the
Glasgow community are related to factors such as age, practice
type and experience, and marital status. Overall, the most persishttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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tent explanation of differences in IAAG ties is marital status.
Explanations of differences in the IAE/SAE community generally
do not apply to the IAAG group. On the other hand, a comparison
of the personal attributes of the IAE/SAE and IAAG founders
reveals differences noted by previous researchers [e.g.; Stewart,
1977; Macdonald, 1984]. In particular, the Glasgow founders were
socially more connected to commerce than to law.
A social network analysis of IAE/SAE and IAAG founders w h o
were socially connected by 1853 reveals potential for the separate
foundation debates, decisions, and actions to have been k n o w n
within each community. For this reason, it is unsurprising that the
IAE/SAE and IAAG foundations took place at approximately the
same time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, a
brief review is made of previous research to provide theoretical
bases for using archival data to look for explanations of differences in the social relations of both the IAE/SAE and IAAG communities. The main expectations of the study are stated, prior to
explanations of the archival sources and the research methodology applied to the databases constructed from the archives. Data
collection procedures are outlined. The founders are designated
in terms of defined subgroups applicable to each of the IAE/SAE
and IAAG foundations, and the personal characteristics of the two
groups of founders are explained and compared. The social network analyses are described, first in relation to IAE/SAE founders,
then to IAAG founders, and finally with respect to linked founders
from the two communities. The data analyses incorporate linear
regression models in which the degree of influence of the
founders is the d e p e n d e n t variable and personal attributes are the
independent variables. These models are used to explain individual network differences. The implications of the main findings
are discussed, as are statements of study limitations and a need for
further research.
PRIOR RESEARCH OF THE IAE/SAE AND IAAG FOUNDATIONS
Brown [1905] is the earliest commentator on the IAE/SAE and
IAAG foundations. He identified the main foundation events and
provided brief biographical details of the IAE/SAE and IAAG
founders and o t h e r early public a c c o u n t a n t s in Scotland.
However, he did not attempt explanatory analyses of the foundations. Brown's brief biographical notes on early accountants were
the basis for more detailed biographical research by Stewart
Published by eGrove, 2000
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[1977] of all Scottish chartered accountants between 1853 and
1879. Stewart's biographies were used in Macdonald [1984] to
describe and contrast the IAE/SAE and IAAG foundations.
Stewart [1977] made several claims about the Scottish foundations in 1853. In relation to the IAE/SAE, he stated the existence
in 19th century Edinburgh of strong connections between
landowners and the legal profession, as well as between lawyers
and accountants. He related these connections to the IAE/SAE
foundation as a threat to the monopoly of court-related services
by Scottish accountants. Stewart's biographical material identified some of these connections and revealed that several of the
IAE/SAE founders were legally trained. He also argued that
Glasgow accountants were socially different from their Edinburgh
counterparts. He cited several reasons for this conclusion (e.g.,
close links to merchants and stockbrokers rather than to lawyers
and a general lack of association with leading Glasgow schools
and its main university).
Other researchers have come to similar conclusions about the
IAE/SAE and IAAG founders. Macdonald [1984], for example,
examined the foundations through the theoretical lenses of collective social mobility and market control. He cited early Scottish
chartered accountancy as an example of both constructs, and
relied on Stewart's [1977] biographical data to demonstrate his
arguments. In particular, Macdonald described the IAE/SAE as the
creation of an elite club in which the link between lawyers and
accountants was crucial to its success. He also agreed with
Stewart regarding the commercial and stockbroker backgrounds
of the IAAG founders.
Walker [ 1988b] stated that Edinburgh accountants in the first
half of the 19th century were classed as an adjunct to the legal profession and accepted as such by the leading professional bodies of
law. Kedslie [1990a, b] contrasted the IAE/SAE and IAAG
founders' practice preferences and social origins. She reported
that the Edinburgh founders had strong connections to other professions, particularly law, while the IAAG founders were linked to
mercantile activity, including stockbrokers. She also argued that
both communities were involved in court-related and insurance
services.
Lee [ 1996] outlined the IAE/SAE foundation events and identified each of the founders. He classified these accountants as
either active or inactive in the foundation, dependent on their
attendance at known foundation meetings. From this classification, Lee identified an inner cabinet of active and inactive men,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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elected to the IAE/SAE Councils of 1853 and 1854, and an outer
cabinet of active founders. The Lee classification offered an initial
focus on potentially influential founders. With one exception, the
cabinet members were elected to SAE committees in 1854. Lee
concluded that this pattern suggests the existence of an elite within an elite in the IAE/SAE. Fifty-four of the 75 Edinburgh founders
did not belong to the designated cabinets.
RESEARCH EXPECTATIONS
Research outlined in the previous section permits several general expectations to be stated prior to the social network analyses.
The archival data are quantifiable, reasonably objective, and useful
for empirical testing. The study therefore offers explanations as
well as descriptions of the IAE/SAE and IAAG networks.
The first expectation is that the IAE/SAE and IAAG founders
were members of cohesive elite groups within their professional
communities. For example, the IAE/SAE founding group did not
contain 57 Edinburgh accountants publicly listed in 1853, while
99 Glasgow public accountants were not involved in the IAAG
foundation in 1853. In addition, previous research on the IAE/SAE
founders indicated an upper-middle-class grouping of men with
landowning and/or legal or other professional origins. In relation
to the IAAG founders, prior studies have suggested their strong
presence in mercantile affairs, including several business leaders
of Glasgow [see also Maclehose, 1886]. It is therefore expected
that identifiable networks for each foundation community identify the cohesive elite nature of the IAE/SAE and IAAG groups.
A second expectation relates to the composition of the foundation communities. First, the formation of the IAE/SAE involved
22 individuals employed as insurance company managers rather
than public accountants. They were introduced to the foundation
at the creation of the IAE in 1853. However, ten of the group
resigned from the IAE shortly before it received its royal charter as
the SAE in 1854. Second, the IAAG foundation consisted initially
of two groups. In 1853, 15 experienced Glasgow accountants
(requisitionees) w e r e petitioned
by 27 less-experienced
accountants (requisitionists) to form a professional body.
According to Kedslie [1990b], the senior accountants w e r e primarily engaged as stockbrokers while their junior colleagues provided public accountancy services. All of these factors suggest
that the IAE/SAE and IAAG foundation communities contained
accountants w h o were not in public practice but were important
Published by eGrove, 2000
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to the credibility of the foundations. It is therefore expected that
these individuals were well connected within and outside the
foundation communities.
The third expectation relates to founder characteristics that
gave credibility to the IAE/SAE and IAAG as reputable institutions
of public accountancy. In the case of the IAE/SAE, previous
research suggested that social connections to landowners and
lawyers were persistent and important characteristics of the
founders. In the case of the IAAG, on the other hand, the equivalent connections were to leading merchants, stockbrokers, and
other participants in commerce and trade rather than to lawyers
and landowners. Thus, in the case of the IAE/SAE foundation, it is
expected that the potential influence of individual founders is
positively associated with the n u m b e r of pre-1853 links they had
to landowners and lawyers. In the case of IAAG founders, on the
other hand, it is expected that this relation will hold true with
respect to mercantile and similar links.
A fourth expectation extends the previous argument to associations with the insurance industry. Previous research demonstrated strong c o r p o r a t e managerial and g o v e r n a n c e links
between Edinburgh accountants and insurance companies in the
first half of the 19th century. Glasgow accountants, on the other
hand, w e r e typically involved in insurance agency [Kedslie,
1990a]. It is therefore expected that, in the case of the IAE/SAE
foundation, the potential influence of the individual founders is
positively associated with the n u m b e r of pre-1853 insurance connections. In the case of IAAG founders, this relation is not expected to hold true.
The overall model prescribed above suggests that the most
influential IAE/SAE and IAAG founders were significantly connected to social groups important within their respective business communities. Other models based on factors such as parental occupation, age, practice experience, and marital status are not consistent
with any prior research or argument.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD
Of specific interest in this study are the social ties between
IAE/SAE and IAAG founders that constitute social network structures. These ties are described by means of archival material gathered from various sources. These include census enumerator
books; baptism, birth, marriage, and death certificates; school and
university matriculation lists; university graduation books; postal
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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and trade directories; membership records of professional bodies;
histories of professional, commercial, and charitable organizations; and published biographies and obituaries. Most of the data
are original, but some are secondary. Where possible, secondary
data w e r e audited for accuracy by reference to original data
sources.
The concept of individual ties forming a defined social network, such as the founders of the IAE/SAE or the IAAG, is a significant o n e for social historians. The research focus moves from
individual attributes [e.g.; as in Macdonald, 1984; Kedslie, 1990a,
b] to a network of ties that define potential communication, influence, and resource transfers [Rogers and Kincaid, 1981;
Wasserman and Faust, 1994]. A tie between two individuals is a
unit of measurement to assist in explaining human behavior within a defined community. A collection of measured ties forms a
social network that empowers and constrains h u m a n action
[Wasserman and Faust, 1994].
The focus of this study is the identifiable relations between
individuals in the IAE/SAE and IAAG foundation communities. As
Emirbayer and Goodwin [1994] argued, analyses of networks constructed from measurable ties between individuals look at overall
structure rather than specific content because social systems rest
on defined social relations and not on the cognition of humans.
Social relations are independent of personal attributes and can be
measured at individual or group levels. Emirbayer and Goodwin
[1994] also argued that network analysis has the potential to identify the cohesion necessary to provide collective identity in a
group or community. Thus, social network analysis is not a theory of sociology; rather, it is a paradigm or perspective on social
behavior. The analysis can objectively reveal social structure without necessarily requiring subjective insights into individual
beliefs, values, and normative commitments.
There is a basic principle of measurement within a defined
social network. It states that the greater the n u m b e r of ties associated with an individual, the greater is his/her potential to communicate, influence, or transfer resources with or to other individuals in the network [Rogers and Kincaid, 1981; Wasserman and
Faust, 1994]. Ties are channels for communication or resource
transmission and, once formed and identified, are analyzed to
reveal those individuals in the structure with the greatest potential influence, as well as to derive measures of prestige. A social
Published by eGrove, 2000

17

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 13
Lee: Founders of Public Accountancy

9

network can be conceptualized graphically, with nodes signifying
individuals and lines connecting nodes representing defined ties.
Networks can be decomposed into connected blocks based on the
structural equivalence of individuals. 1
The primary aim of social network analysis in the current
study is to comprehend 19th century public accountancy in
Scotland as a cohesive elite structure of social relations. This is in
contrast to the conventional approach of categorized attributes
independent of these relations.
Social network analysis has been used by sociologists and
social historians since the early 1950s.2 It is typically thought of
as a graph-based methodology in which ties between individuals
in a network are visually presented in an optimal manner that
helps to identify key individuals with large numbers of directed or
undirected ties signifying network activity; subgroups of individuals with c o m m o n ties to one another as well as to others (i.e.,
cliques of defined minimum size and a requirement for at least
one related pair of individuals); isolated individuals with few or
n o ties; individuals w h o act as bridges between one network and
another; and subgroups (blocks) comprising individuals with
structurally equivalent ties that are not necessarily linked to one
another (e.g., individuals w h o w e n t to the same school or university but at different times). Directional ties indicate individuals of
greatest prestige in the network because of the ties directed to
them. Ties can also be valued if such data are available (e.g., a dollar amount of resources).
For many years, the use of social network analysis was limited
to relatively simple manual sociograms. The reason for this was
the computational restriction on researchers attempting to find
an optimal set of relations from even a small n u m b e r of ties.
However, with advances in computer processing and programming, it is n o w possible to calculate speedily measures that accurately describe relations in a network. The computer program
used in this study is UCINET [Borgatti et al., 1992]. It produces
matrices constructed from a spreadsheet that records specific ties
1

See, for example, Bearman [1993] in which the prediction of kinship in the
English Civil War is not based on the traditional attributes of status and land ownership but, instead, on the structural equivalence of occupational and religious
affiliations.
2
Social network analysis is fully explained in Wasserman and Faust [ 1994]. An
earlier explanatory text is Rogers and Kincaid [1981].
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between individuals. Matrices are symmetrical for purposes of
calculating network measures.
Many types of measure of influence are possible in social network analysis [Wasserman and Faust, 1994]. Degree centrality is
the main measure used in the current study as it is relevant and
simplest to comprehend. 3 In its most fundamental form, a centrality measure describes the number of ties in the foundation network associated with each founder. The more ties there are to a
founder, the more potential influence he has in the network. The
degree centrality of a founder is normalized to a percentage by
dividing his ties by the maximum possible number of ties in the
network. This percentage measure, which describes the proportion of other founders in the network to which the specific
founder is linked, is reported in this study's appendices and tables.
The higher the percentage, the more central or potentially influential the founder is presumed to be in the network.
The centrality of the foundation networks is also reported in
the appendices. This measure is the dispersion between the most
and least-related founders in a network. Group degree centrality
is a percentage datum with the numerator being the sum of the
differences between the actual ties and the maximum possible
ties for each founder, and the denominator being a similar
measure assuming one completely dominant founder. The
measure ranges from 100% (if one founder potentially dominates
all others) to 0% (if all founders have identical ties and equal
potential influence).
Social network analysis computes and reports network
cliques. By definition in this study, a clique is a group of at least
three founders with mutual links. No other founder in the network can be added to a defined clique once all mutual relations
are exhausted. Mutual relations therefore define cliques, and the
founders can be members of more than one clique. In fact,
founders can be members of numerous cliques and thereby link
subgroups in the network without the use of direct ties. The size
of a clique is specified for purposes of analysis depending on the
3
Other measures of centrality are described in Wasserman and Faust [1994]
and Borgatti et al. [ 1992 ]. "Closeness" measures h o w close an individual is to each
of the other individuals in the network. "Betweenness" is a measure of h o w many
times other individuals in the network have to go through a specific individual in
order to communicate. "Eigenvector" is a measure of the total n u m b e r of ways an
individual can relate to all other individuals in the network. Each of these
measures was computed in this study, but the results are identical to those using
the simpler degree centrality and clique measures.
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size of the network. In this study, clique size is set at a minimum
of five founders.4
Empirical explanations of differences between centrality
measures are presented by means of multivariate models of linear
regression. In each linear model, the degree centrality scores of
the relevant founders define the dependent variable. Selected
founder attributes (based on theoretical arguments regarding
expectations) are the independent variables. The constant term is
set at zero, and the robustness of the regression is tested by means
of a form of bootstrapping involving 1,000 random regression calculations for each independent variable. The percentage of random regression coefficients larger (assuming a positive relation)
or smaller (assuming a negative relation) than the actual coefficient is reported.
DATA COLLECTION
Data were gathered for 75 IAE/SAE founders listed in
Appendix 1 and 51 IAAG founders listed in Appendix 2. The data
are of two types. The first type concerns the ties between
founders prior to the foundation events in 1853. These are structured on a career time line for each founder; i.e., beginning with
school relations, followed by university ties, and completed by
training and employment or partnership links. In addition, data
were collected on social ties such as family, marriage, close friendships, and nonbusiness relations (e.g., in charitable organizations). Finally, business and home addresses in 1853 were identified to determine those founders living within reasonable proximity of one another. In order to qualify as proximate, individuals
had to be living or working in the same or an adjacent street, a
conventional approach in this type of research.
The second type of data concerns the personal attributes
of the founders. These include age and practice experience by
1853; geographical origins and paternal occupation; marital status
in 1853; practice type; legal, insurance, and bank connections;5
and membership in the Institute of Actuaries [Davidson, 1956] (in

4
The minimum number is three. Five appears to be a reasonable size given
the overall network of 75 individuals.
5
I n s u r a n c e and banking connections are defined in terms of directorships,
appointments as auditor, or management of the insurance company. Insurance
agencies are not included as these were c o m m o n features of public accountancy
in Scotland in the 19th century and do not relate to the overall management or
governance of an insurance company.
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the case of IAE/SAE founders) and the Glasgow Stock Exchange
Association [Glasgow Stock Exchange Association, 1927] (in the
case of IAAG founders).
The bibliography identifies the various sources accessed to
obtain data on relations and personal attributes. Baptismal, birth,
marriage, and death certificates were analyzed, but certain
founder names such asW.Smith and J. Watson were impossible to
match with any degree of accuracy. Census enumerator books
were examined. However, occasionally a founder and/or his family members were absent on the day of the count. Information
about leading Edinburgh schools was available from primary and
secondary sources. These schools included George Heriot's
Hospital [Bedford, 1872; Gunn, 1901]; the Royal High School
[Trotter, 1911]; the Edinburgh Academy [Edinburgh Academy,
1914]; and the Edinburgh Institution [Young, 1933]. No records
were found for comparable Glasgow schools. University of
Edinburgh [University of Edinburgh, various dates; University of
Edinburgh, 1858] and University of Glasgow [Kirkpatrick, 1889;
Addison, 1898, 1913] matriculation lists and graduation books
were searched. So, too, were graduation books of the University
of Aberdeen [Johnston, 1906] and matriculation lists of the
University of St. Andrews [Anderson, 1905]. However, identifying
the correct founder in school and university records (e.g., J.
Mackenzie or W. Smith) was again occasionally difficult or impossible.
Postal and trade directories of Edinburgh and Glasgow were
used for identifying practice firms and addresses, and business
and other appointments [e.g., the New Edinburgh Almanack, various]. Membership records were examined of significant
Edinburgh and Glasgow business, professional, and social organizations to which the founders and their relations and friends
belonged. These include the Dialectic Society [Dickson, 1887];
the Edinburgh Academical Club [Edinburgh Academy, 1914];
Edinburgh and Glasgow City Councils [Tweed, 1883; Constable
and Constable, 1932]; the Faculty of Actuaries [Davidson, 1956];
the Faculty of Advocates [Grant, 1944; Walker, 1988a]; the
Glasgow Atheneum [Lauder, 1897]; the Merchants Company of
Edinburgh [Heron, 1903]; the Paul and Mackersey Club in
Edinburgh [records held by ICAS]; the Royal Company of Archers
[Paul, 1875; Hay, 1951]; the Royal Society of Edinburgh [Royal
Society of Edinburgh, undated]; the Solicitors of the Supreme
Court [Barclay, 1984]; the Society of Writers to the Signet [Society
of Writers to the Signet, 1936]; and the Speculative Society
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[Watson, 1905; Guild, 1968]. Various church histories (e.g.; the
Church of the Canongate [Wright, 1956], St. George's Church
[MacLagan, 1876], and St. Steven's Church [Sands, 1927]) provided useful data, as did histories of leading Scottish banks
[Anderson, 1910; Munro, 1928; Rait, 1930; McCulloch and Stirling,
1936; Reid, 1938; Malcolm, 1945, 1950; Munn, 1988; Saville, 1996].
Obituaries and major texts [e.g.; Douglas, 1882; Eddington and
Pike, 1904; Maclehose, 1886] that include researched data relating
to the founders were used as additions to original data.
THE IAE/SAE FOUNDERS
Lee [1996] has described the IAE/SAE foundation. His
analysis began with an initial set of 15 men involved with the first
meeting and revealed a growing number of accountants attending
each subsequent meeting. The original 15 accountants were
established public accounting practitioners in Edinburgh and represented nine partnerships. For purposes of the current study, the
sequencing of the foundation is defined at each stage as including
closely connected individuals to the known participants. This permits inclusion of partners and senior employees who did not
attend specific meetings but who undoubtedly would have been
aware of them. This definition has the advantage of not restricting each subset of the foundation group at each point of time to
those actually attending a meeting. In Table 1, therefore, the 75
founders are identified in relation to specific stages in the IAE/SAE
foundation. These are the bases for the social network analysis
measures in Appendix 1.
There are a number of factors to consider in Table 1. First,
with respect to the structure of the paper, the items marked
relate to the social network analysis in Appendix 1 and the regression models in Table 5. Second, the initial foundation group predominantly comprised public accountants. It is approximately
twice the size conventionally recorded by researchers such as
Kedslie [1990a]. This is due to expanding the group to include
partners and significant employees of the initial invitees. Third,
the initial planning group contains the most prominent
Edinburgh public accountancy firms in 1853, as well as courtbased accountants closely connected to the work of public
accountants (e.g., the accountant and assistant accountant of the
Court of Session). Fourth, the second group of participants contains 18 insurance company managers who were IAE members.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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TABLE 1
The Foundation of the IAE/SAE
January 17 and 22,1853:preparatory
meetings
J.M. Baillie & W. Moncreiff; A. Borthwick & S. Raleigh (with H. Callender); J. Brown & C.
Pearson (with J.A. Brown); J.J. Dickson & A. Horne; T.G. Dickson & H.G. Watson; R.
Gordon; A. Jamieson & J.M. Macandrew; D. Lindsay & G.A. Esson (with G.A. Jamieson);
T. Martin; K. Mackenzie & G. Todd *; G. Meldrum; J.S. Moncrieff; J.S. Ogilvy; A.W.
Robertson *; T. Scott; J. Maitland ** & W. Wood (with J.C. Fraser **) (a total of 29, columns
1 and 2 of Appendix 1).
January 31,1853:.formation of IAE
R. Balfour *; J. Barron **; C.M. Barstow; J. Borthwick *; F.H. Carter; T.R. Chaplin & D.R.
Souter; R. Christie snr. *; R. Christie jnr.*; D. Cormack **; H.D. Dickie *; C.H. Douglas (with
D. Marshall); G. Dundas; G.L. Finlay *; J. Fraser *; A. Gibson; T. Grant ***; J. Grieve; J.
Howden *; J. Hunter *; H. Ivory *; W. Low *; J. Mackenzie *; D. Maclagan *; T. Mansfield &
R. Spottiswoode; G.T. Mitchell; G. Murray; J.J. Ogilvy; D.S. Peddie; G. Ramsay *; W. Russell;
R.E. Scott *;W.Smith *; C.W.W Thomson; W.T. Thomson *; J. Watson *; and J. Wilkie (a further 39 and a total of 68,6 columns 3 and 4 of Appendix 1).
April 8, 1853, February 1, 1854, May 29, 1854: petition for SAE royal charter
J. M. Liddell *; P. Morison; A.M. Paterson; A.T. Niven * (four new members); J. Borthwick;
R. Christie snr.; H.D. Dickie; G.L. Finlay; J. Fraser; J. Grieve; H. Ivory; J. Mackenzie; W.
Smith; W.T. Thomson; and J. Watson (11 resignations from the IAE) (a royal charter petition total of 61; columns 5 and 6 of Appendix 1).
December 29, 1854: presentation of royal warrant of incorporation to SAE Council
members
C.H. Douglas (resigned); J. Moinet *; D. Murray; and W. Myrtle ** (Lord Advocate's petitioners) (giving an initial SAE membership of '63).
Overall Summary
Initial planning ~
IAE meeting ~
Additions
SAE petition ~
SAE charter
Resignation
Gross totals ~
Net totals

Public
Accountants
25
19

3
1
1
48

47

Insurance
Managers
2
18
1
10
1

22
12

Lawyers

Total

2
2

29

-

39
4

1
1

11

5
4

1
75!

3

63

Cumulative
Total
29
68
72
61

64
63
75
63

*manager of insurance company; ** lawyer; *** bank manager; ! columns 7 and 8 of
Appendix 1.

6
Histories of the IAE/SAE formation [e.g., Lee, 1996] stated that 65 m e n were
suggested for membership of the IAE in 1853. However, three others (J.C. Fraser,
G.A. Jamieson, and D. Marshall) were connected to events at this point through
their employment as senior accountants with, respectively, the firms of Maitland &
Wood, Lindsay & Esson, and C.H. Douglas.

Published by eGrove, 2000

23

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 13
Lee: Founders of Public Accountancy

15

Other movements in the IAE/SAE foundation numbers in
Table 1 are relatively small and relate to either young accountants
joining the IAE after its formation, resignations prior to the SAE
royal-charter petition, or the Lord Advocate's recommendations.
In total, 64% of the 75 founders can be classified as public
accountants. Ten of the 12 resignations from the IAE/SAE were
insurance managers. This means that 16 of the 61 founding SAE
members were not public accountants in terms of their main professional service focus.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IAE/SAE FOUNDERS
Prior to analyzing the social network of the IAE/SAE founders,
it is appropriate to examine their personal attributes that are the
basis for the independent variables used in the regression analyses. Several attributes are completely identified (i.e.; birthplace,
age, practice type, insurance and bank links, business and private
addresses, and membership in the Institute of Actuaries). Other
attributes are identified as much as the available archives permit
(i.e.; father's occupation, school and university attendance, practice experience by 1853, legal links, and marital status in 1853).
Thus, there are missing data in the analyses.
Three attributes (i.e.; school, university, and address) are the
basis for determining ties between founders (e.g., founders in the
same school or university class). They are therefore not used as
independent variables in the regressions. To do so would result in
specific attributes being part of both sides of the linear equation,
thereby creating spurious correlation. Schooling was determined
in a majority of cases. These involve the two most prestigious
Edinburgh schools of the time (37 founders attended Edinburgh
Academy and/or the Royal High School of Edinburgh, suggesting
they were typically from upper-middle-class families) [see also
Walker, 1988b]. Eighty-one percent of the founders attended the
University of Edinburgh to take arts or law classes. A small number attended the Universities of Aberdeen and St. Andrews.
Although many founders attended university for several years,
only G.A. Jamieson received a degree (University of Aberdeen).
Founders' addresses were almost totally located in Edinburgh's
most prestigious residential and business area, the New Town.
Seventy-two of the 75 founders had either a business or domestic
address in this small area. The full range of attributes other than
those used for ties is disclosed in Table 2.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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TABLE 2
The IAE/SAE F o u n d e r s ' Attributes b y 1853*
Father's
Occupation

Birth
Place

%

Landowner
and/or lawyer 35
Other
professions
35
Merchant
or other
18
Unknown
12
Total
100
Legal
Links

%

n
5,6,7
3,4
1,2
0

Edinburgh
Region
Other

%

56

13
31

Years
20-39
40-59
60+

%

32

Accountancy
Insurance
Legal and
banking

53
15

Bank
Links

%

12

3,4,5

14

17
46

1,2
0

59
27

Type

100

100
Insurance
Links
n

Practice

Age

n
2,3
1
0

%

68
24

Practice
Experience
Years
%
<10

8

100

100

Institute
of Actuaries

%

Marital
Status

%

Yes
No

8
17
75

17

10-29
65
30-49
11
Unknown 7

%

28
72

Married
58
Unmarried 37
Unknown 5

100

100

25

Total

100

*A11 data are
Appendix 1.

100

expressed

as

100

percentages

of

the

75

founders

listed

in

There is evidence in Table 2 of a bias to upper-middle-class
background. Seventy percent of the founders had fathers w h o
were landowners and/or lawyers (26) or other professionals (26).
This is consistent with previous research [e.g., Kedslie, 1990a].
The n u m b e r of links to lawyers is separately disclosed; 75% had at
least one connection to a lawyer through family, marriage, or
employment ties. These data exceed previous calculations. For
example, Kedslie [ 1990a] stated 18% of the 61 SAE charter petitioners had lawyer fathers (23% in this study). 7
Table 2 reports the birthplace of more than two-thirds of the
founders was Edinburgh or its surrounding region, suggesting a
reasonably cohesive geographical group. The founders were well
established and experienced in practice. The average age in 1853
was approximately 44 years, and the equivalent experience datum
was approximately 16 years. The predominant practice type was
public accountancy [consistent with Kedslie, 1990a, b], with a
sizeable minority of 24% in insurance management [again consistent with Kedslie, 1990a, b; Macdonald, 1984]. The insurance

7

Other comparisons are difficult to make as previous writers either covered
Scottish chartered accountants from 1853 to 1879 [e.g.; Stewart, 1977; Macdonald,
1984; Briston and Kedslie, 1986] or segments of the foundation groups [Kedslie,
1990a, b ] . Nevertheless, each of these studies suggests an understatement compared to the current study.
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links are magnified by related data; i.e., 73% of the founders had at
least one actuarial, directoral, or managerial link to insurance
companies, and 28% were members of the London-based Institute
of Actuaries by 1853. Twenty-five percent of the group had
observable managerial or governance relations with banks. Most
of these links took the form of executive or non-executive
appointments with leading institutions. Approximately six of
every ten founders were married by 1853. In total, 20% of the
group died unmarried, consistent with Walker's [ 1988b] review of
the SAE membership to 1914.
MEASURES OF DEGREE CENTRALITY FOR
THE IAE/SAE FOUNDERS
To determine the social network of the IAE/SAE foundation
community in 1853, it is necessary to identify social ties between
individual founders. This is completed in five distinct stages, each
approximating a period in a founder's time line. The first stage is
school attendance, followed by classes at the University of
Edinburgh. The third stage concerns apprenticeship, employment, and partnership associations. The fourth stage involves
social relations, including family, marriage, and close friendships.
The last covers geographic proximity in terms of addresses in the
same or adjacent streets in the New Town. In each stage, extreme
care was taken to match dates for individuals. In n o case is a tie
weighted to proxy for actual communication (e.g., as in a partnership or close friendship). In addition, in no case is a tie labeled as
directed to one individual from another. Weight and direction of
ties are impossible or exceedingly difficult to determine in most
cases.
Identified ties were recorded in a spreadsheet database. The
networks constructed from these data focus solely on links
between one individual and another. Multiple relations are
recorded as a single tie, resulting in a symmetrical matrix with cell
values of either one (there is a tie) or zero (there is no tie). This
approach avoids the problem of subjective weighting, although it
can be argued to understate the influence of founders with multiple relations. However, social network researchers argue that
multiple relations do not magnify the link between two individuals [Rogers and Kincaid, 1981].
Degree centrality and clique measures are r e p o r t e d in
Appendix 1. As previously stated, degree centrality is measured as
a percentage of the maximum ties available to each accountant in
the founder group, and cliques are measured with a minimum
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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n u m b e r set according to the network size (i.e., five). Mean degree
centrality is also reported in Appendix 1, as are the mean n u m b e r
of cliques per individual and the group centrality score. For example, in the initial founding group, J. Maitland is connected to 43%
of the other 28 founders in the group and is a member of six
cliques of five or more individuals. The group has a centrality
score of 32%, suggesting no particular dominance in it. Degree
centrality and clique measures are reported in Appendix 1 for the
initial planning group (29 members), the expanded group at the
IAE foundation (68), the SAE royal-charter petition group (61),
and the total group in the foundation (75).
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES OF THE IAE/SAE SOCIAL NETWORK
Combining measures of degree centrality and clique membership for each founder as a proxy for potential influence, the ten
most connected founders in each group are ranked in Table 3 in
descending order of connection.
TABLE 3
Most-Connected IAE/SAE F o u n d e r s
Initial Group
K. Mackenzie
T.G. Dickson
C. Pearson
H.G. Watson
J.A. Brown
A. Horne
A. Borthwick
J.J. Dickson
J. Brown
J. Maitland

IAE Group
K. Mackenzie
C. Pearson
T.G. Dickson
R. Balfour
J.J. Dickson
H.G. Watson
J. Maitland
J. Mackenzie
A. Horne
A. Borthwick

Petition Group
K. Mackenzie
T.G. Dickson
C. Pearson
J. Maitland
H.G.Watson
J.J. Dickson
R. Balfour
A. Borthwick
A. H o m e
W. Wood

Total Group
K. Mackenzie
C.Pearson
T.G. Dickson
H.G. Watson
J.J. Dickson
A. Horne
J. Maitland
A. Borthwick
R. Balfour
W. Wood

The initial planning group's individual degree centrality
scores range from 64%, reflecting connections to nearly twothirds of the group, to four percent, linked to one twenty-fifth of
the group. Equivalent percentage ranges for the IAE, petition, and
total groups are, respectively, 52 to 6%, 52 to 0%, and 49 to 3%.
These ranges suggest that, despite UCINET determining the 75
founders were directly or indirectly tied to one another in a single
block (i.e., this was a closely networked group), there is sufficient
variation within the group to support Lee's [ 1996] argument of an
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elite within an elite. For example, disclosures in Table 3 and
Appendix 1 suggest T.G. Dickson, C. Pearson, and K. Mackenzie
had ties to a considerable proportion of each group in which they
were networked.
More generally, and based on the four rankings in Table 3, the
ten most potentially influential individuals are, in descending
order of connection: K. Mackenzie, C. Pearson, T.G. Dickson, H.G.
Watson, J.J. Dickson, A. H o m e , J. Maitland, A. Borthwick, R.
Balfour, and W. Wood. The remaining three founders in Table 3
are J. Brown, J.A. Brown, and J. Mackenzie. Of these 13 men, five
(A. Borthwick, J. Brown, A. H o m e , K. Mackenzie, and H.G.Watson)
were elected to the 1853 IAE Nominating Committee of 17 and the
first IAE Council of 11. With respect to Lee's [1996] analysis of
most active founders, only A. Borthwick, J. Brown, J.J. Dickson, K.
Mackenzie, and W. Wood in Table 3 are classed as active.
These results suggest that the IAE/SAE foundation and its initial management were not based solely on factors such as the magnitude of individual network ties or the level of organizational
involvement. For example, two of the most-connected IAE/SAE
members, R. Balfour and J. Maitland, were never involved in the
management of the institution. One other, J. Mackenzie, resigned
as an IAE m e m b e r p r i o r to the SAE royal-charter petition.
However, J.J. Dickson, T.G. Dickson, C. Pearson, and W. Wood
eventually became SAE Council members, with Wood serving as
SAE treasurer between 1879 and 1892 and T.G. Dickson (18891892) and Pearson (1876-1879) elected to its presidency.
An additional means of determining the potential influence of
individual IAE/SAE founders is network cliques. For example, in
the total founder group in Appendix 1, the most-connected
founders, K. Mackenzie, C. Pearson, and T.G. Dickson, are, respectively, members of 67, 60, and 56 of the 169 cliques of five or more
founders. In other words, each of these men are members of more
than one-third of the largest cliques in the network, thus taking
their potential influence beyond the direct, one-on-one relations
measured by degree centrality data. Even apparently uninvolved
founders are members of a large number of five-man cliques. R.
Balfour and J. Maitland are, respectively, members of 49 and 42
cliques and joint members of 17.
These data reflect the intricate nature of a social network such
as the IAE/SAE foundation and reinforce earlier data about the
group's interconnectedness and elite nature. The data for the 75
founders were analyzed by the UCINET program to identify clusters
or blocks of founders with ties that denote structural equivalence
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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2

13

2
2

2
Source: *Lee [ 1996]

3
2

2

3
4

First IAE/SAE Council*

Founders on Nominating

Active founders in cluster*

Committee*

1
1
1

1

2 • -

1

1

2

3

14
1
2
2

3

1

75
4
5
5
6
8
6
6
7
5
8
Total founders in cluster

mean in Appendix 1

number of ties below total

1

9
Founders in cluster with

mean in Appendix 1

number of ties above total

Founders in cluster with

10

5

6
3
5

4

5
2
4

2

1
3
6

5
5

8
7

Clusters

6
5

4
3
2
1
Founders

TABLE 4
The IAE/SAE Network Clusters

9

10

5

11

2

3

12

4

-

43

32

Total

and, thus, to test Lee's [ 1996] suggestion of an elite within an elite.
To illustrate, if founders A, B, and C each have ties to founders D and
E, they are defined by UCINET as structurally equivalent and forming a cluster.
Using a search method that divides the total network into a
defined number of partitions, the aim is to identify founders with
identical relationships that form a cluster. An optimal solution to
the partitioning starts from a random partition by the program and
proceeds through multiple iterations of the data until a fit is
achieved. In addition to clustering the founders, the program provides a correlation coefficient R-squared of the partitioned network
compared to an ideal structure constructed from mean measures of
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the data. In this case, the fit is 0.854 w h e n the network is divided
into 12 clusters. 8
Table 4 emphasizes the complexity of the IAE/SAE network.
Clusters 1,5,8, and 9 have a majority of founders with ties greater
than the group mean in Appendix 1. This involves 24 of the
founders. Cluster 1, however, has no active founder as defined by
Lee [1996], and clusters 5, 8, and 9 contain an aggregate of six such
men. In contrast, clusters 2, 6, 7, 10, and 12 contain no founders
with network ties above the group mean but have a total of five
active founders, again as defined in Lee [1996]. Similar contrasts
can be seen with the Nominating Committee and the first IAE
Council. For example, cluster 1 has no active founder but has four
men on the Nominating Committee and two on the Council. By
contrast, despite a 50% proportion of well-connected founders,
cluster 3 has no Nominating Committee or Council members.
Cluster 4 has a minority of well-connected accountants and three
individuals on each of the Nominating Committee and the first
Council.
The overall pattern in Table 4 is therefore difficult to interpret. Well-connected and structurally equivalent founders w e r e
not necessarily active in the foundation or involved in the initial
IAE/SAE management. For example, cluster 3 contains one of the
most-connected founders, J. Maitland, w h o was the Accountant of
Court; R. Christie and J. Watson, both insurance company managers w h o withdrew from IAE membership; and C. Douglas, J.
Howden, D. Marshall, and A.M. Paterson, w h o were among the
youngest members of the Edinburgh public accountancy community in 1853. None of these men was active in the foundation or
the initial management of the IAE/SAE. However, W. Wood, one of
the most-connected and active founders, completes the cluster.
By contrast, in cluster 4, despite a relatively few members with significant connections within the foundation group, there w e r e a
n u m b e r of older and well-respected E d i n b u r g h p u b l i c
accountants w h o gave the IAE/SAE leadership and credibility (i.e.;
CM. Barstow, J. Brown, T.R. Chaplin, and D.R. Souter). Cluster 11
has a mix of founders—J.M. Liddell and P. Morrison, both with relatively few connections and no foundation activity; W. Moncreiff
and A.W. Robertson, well connected, active, and involved in insti-

8
A perfect fit gives an R-squared of 1.00. The robustness of the statistic was
tested by running the data through the program several times to ensure consistent
results based on different random seed starts.
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tutional management at each stage of the foundation; and W.
Myrtle, one of the Lord Advocate's petitioners.
What this part of the analysis suggests is that, IAE/SAE foundation activity and later management were determined by factors in
addition to potential influence within the network (e.g.; by age
and practice experience, professional reputation, and practice
type). Nevertheless, structurally equivalent founders did reach
the highest positions in the IAE/SAE (e.g.; D. Lindsay and H.G.
Watson from cluster 1; CM. Barstow, J. Brown, and D.R. Souter
from cluster 4; A. Horne and T. Mansfield from cluster 5; A.
Borthwick and T. Scott from cluster 8; K. Mackenzie and R.E. Scott
from cluster 9; and W. Moncreiff and A.W. Robertson from cluster
11). In other words, the initial IAE and SAE Councils included five
pairs and one trio of structurally equivalent founders from six separate clusters. This suggests a reasonable degree of interconnection in the institutional leadership of 1853 and 1854.
FINDING EXPLANATIONS FOR THE IAE/SAE NETWORK
Generalized comments on the foundation and the founders of
the IAE/SAE are appropriate at this point. First, the social network
analysis indicates that the number of ties and cliques (and the
structural equivalence of ties in the network) are not good predictors of activity in the foundation or its subsequent institutional
management. However, certain individuals may have had an invisible role in facilitating the foundation. For example, R. Balfour, an
insurance company manager, became a SAE member but never
participated directly pre or post-foundation. J. Maitland was also
an inactive SAE member but in the strategically significant position of Accountant of Court. J. Mackenzie, manager of the Scottish
Widows Fund, resigned from the IAE, did not participate directly
in its foundation, and became Treasurer of the Bank of Scotland a
decade later. A study that focuses on this social network feature is
Padgett and Ansell [1993]. They demonstrated the hidden domination and influence of the Medici family in 15th century
Florence. The Medicis "invisibly" arranged strategic marriages,
business affairs, and financial funding through their deliberately
constructed network of direct and indirect connections with
other families. Given the nature of the IAE/SAE network, founders
such as Balfour, Maitland, and Mackenzie may have served a similar role in the foundation.
Second, following on from the previous point, several of the
most-connected founders appear to have been useful to the
Published by eGrove, 2000
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IAE/SAE foundation as much for their social or business connections as their public accountancy reputations. For example, R.
Balfour was the Edinburgh manager of a Glasgow insurance company and, by 1853, had numerous family connections to advocates
and Writers to the Signet, and a lifetime connection to K.
Mackenzie, the first IAE/SAE secretary. A. Borthwick's father was
the first manager of the National Bank of Scotland and worked
closely with several of the managers of large insurance companies.
T.G. Dickson had numerous family connections to Writers to the
Signet, and his father was the senior partner of one of Edinburgh's
leading law firms. J. Maitland not only had strong legal and landowning connections, but was the first Accountant of the Court of
Session at the time of the IAE/SAE foundation, a position of considerable relevance to the Edinburgh founding accountants, w h o
believed their court-related services were under attack from
Parliament [Walker, 1995].
W.. Moncreiff was well connected to the legal profession. His
father was an advocate, judge, and landowner, and his brother was
Lord Advocate for Scotland at the time of the IAE/SAE foundation,
a position of considerable importance to the SAE royal charter and
also the troubling bankruptcy and insolvency legislation of the
time. J. Mackenzie came from a distinguished family of landowners and lawyers, and his brother was married to the daughter of
the Solicitor General of Scotland during the foundation period. K.
Mackenzie belonged to one of Scotland's most distinguished families of lawyers and landowners, and his family was linked through
marriage to T. Mansfield, later to become the second SAE president. C. Pearson's father and grandfather were senior executives
in the Scottish Board of Excise and had numerous legal connections. He was partner to J. Brown, the first IAE/SAE president,
w h o was arguably the senior public accountant in Edinburgh in
1853. One of Pearson's sons became Solicitor General and Lord
Advocate of Scotland during the early history of the SAE. A.W.
Robertson's father and grandfather were Writers to the Signet and
his uncle was a Scottish judge. H.G. Watson's brother was president of the Royal Society of Painters, and Watson himself was secretary to the Royal Company of Archers in 1853. Eleven other
founders were Company members at that time.
In other words, many of the IAE/SAE founders came from leading families in the upper-middle-class of Edinburgh. They not only
had strong professional reputations and connections, but were
also members of organizations involving royalty and nobility in
their membership and management. This undoubtedly provided
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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valuable social connections in addition to professional credibility.
The most obvious direct connections were to the landowning
community, the legal profession, and the insurance industry.
These are matters investigated in the later empirical analysis of
Table 5. Indirect connections, however, are much more difficult
to analyze. In this study, they are attributed to board and individual memberships of organizations involving individuals from the
highest social classes. These memberships involve boards of
directors of major banks, such as the Bank of Scotland [Saville,
1996]; significant clubs and institutions, such as the Speculative
Society at the University of Edinburgh [Watson, 1905] and the
Royal Society of Edinburgh [Royal Society of Edinburgh, undated];
and the Queen's Bodyguard in Scotland, the Royal Company of
Archers [Paul, 1875; Hay, 1951].
Having analyzed IAE/SAE degree centrality and clique
measures, it is appropriate to determine explanations for their
considerable variation. For this purpose, the Borgatti et al. [1992]
UCINET program permits linear regression models to be tested
with variables generated by it. These are reported in Table 5.
Table 5 describes four regression models. Each equates a
dependent variable (degree centrality for each founder) with two,
four, or five independent variables (i.e.; practice type; number of
landowner, legal, and insurance company links; and birthplace,
each as described in Table 2). For purposes of this analysis, actual measurements are used with the dependent variable (as per column 7 of Appendix 1) and the three independent variables concerning links. With practice type, however, a coding frame is
adopted (i.e.; public accountancy set at three, insurance management at two, and legal and banking positions at one). For birthplace, a coding frame is also used, with Edinburgh set at three,
Lothians at two, and other regions at one. In order to provide
validity to the regression calculations, a rule of thumb of one independent variable for approximately every 15 observations is used
in each model. The robustness of the regression results is automatically tested in the UCINET program by 1,000 random regression calculations for each independent variable. The results of
this bootstrapping are reported in the last five columns of Table 5
(i.e., as a percentage of the 1,000 random tests).
With respect to the four variations of the IAE/SAE foundation
group in Table 5,9 the results reveal a consistent pattern. The high9

Other regression models were run using data summarized in Table 2. Factors
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p

0.04

0.01

0.01

0.11

0.05

0.03

0.00

0.04

0.03
0.00

0.00

0.00

0.05
0.03

0.03
0.05

Value
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Proportion < Coefficient For
Independent Variables Relating to Links to
Practice
Land
Law
Insurance
Birth

75

61

29

68

Degree Centrality of
Initial group
IAE group
SAE petition group
Total group

Dependent Variable

N

0.33
0.48
0.41
0.48

F
Value
6.25
11.60
9.63
12.79

TABLE 5
Linear Regressions of IAE/SAE Founder Groups
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er the degree centrality score, the larger the number of landowner, legal, and insurance links and the more likely the founder was
such as parental occupation, age in 1853, practice type, practice experience, membership in the Institute of Actuaries, bank connections, and marital status in 1853
have little or no explanatory power with respect to variations in degree centrality.
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a public accountant originating from Edinburgh. Typically, the
most-connected founders, at whatever stage of the IAE/SAE foundation, were Edinburgh-born public accountants, the most connected to landowners and the legal profession, and the most
involved with the management and governance of the insurance
industry. The statistically weakest part of the models concerns
practice type as an explanation of variations in degree centrality
in the petitioning group. The overall result, however, reinforces
the impression of cohesiveness in the IAE/SAE foundation group.
The strongest explanation for potential influence variation relates
to insurance connections. The most-connected founders in the
group had the greatest association with the insurance industry. In
addition, each variation of model provides reasonably strong and
statistically robust results.
THE IAAG FOUNDERS
The 51 IAAG founders are listed in Appendix 2. There were 27
requisitionists (less-experienced practitioners) and 15 requisitionees (more-experienced practitioners) in October 1854, and
nine other members admitted during 1854. Following two withdrawals, this resulted in 49 signatories to the royal-charter petition
of October 1854. The IAAG foundation involved 22 meetings until
the receipt of the royal charter in 1855. Individual involvement in
the foundation was bimodal as in the IAE/SAE foundation. There
were five accountants (approximately 10% of the group) who
attended more than 60% of the 22 meetings (W. Mackenzie, 22
meetings; J. McClelland, 20; P. White, 19; A. McEwan, 18; and W.
Anderson, 14). All five men were requisitionees and officers or
members of the first governing IAAG Committee. A further four
founders played a less active part in the process (T.G. Buchanan,
eight meetings; A. Cuthbertson, D. Dreghorn, and J.W. Guild,
seven each). Buchanan, Cuthbertson, and Dreghorn were requisitionees and members of the first governing IAAG Committee.
Guild was the son of a Solicitor of the Supreme Court in
Edinburgh, a requisitionist, and a member of the first IAAG
Bankruptcy Committee. He became an IAAG Council member in
1856 and was IAAG president in 1873-1874 and 1878-1881. The
remaining founders played little or no explicit part in the foundation. In fact, 17 of the 51 men (33%) attended no recorded meeting in the foundation process.
The personal attributes of the IAAG founders are described in
Table 6. They are similar in nature to those of the IAE/SAE
Published by eGrove, 2000
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founders and are contrasted w h e r e relevant with the Edinburgh
data reported in Table 2.
A large proportion (55%) of the IAAG founders w e r e b o r n outside the city of Glasgow and its surrounding region. This is unsurprising given the quadrupling of Glasgow's population by immigration in the first half of the 19th century [Strang, 1862].
However, it does suggest that a significant n u m b e r of Glasgow
founders did not have the same childhood, education, and training contacts of founders w h o originated in the city. This finding
is different from the IAE/SAE situation w h e r e approximately six of
every ten founders were born in Edinburgh, thus having an
opportunity to build a closer community at an earlier stage in
their lives.
Second, paternal occupation also provides a clear distinction
between the IAAG and IAE/SAE founders. Approximately one in
every ten IAAG founders was the son of a landowning and/or
lawyer father, compared to approximately four of every ten
IAE/SAE founders. By contrast, 49% of IAAG founders had banker,
merchant, manufacturer, or farmer fathers, compared to 18% of
the IAE/SAE founders.
Third, the age of Glasgow founders in 1853 reveals further differences in the two communities. The majority of IAAG founders
were aged between 20 and 39, whereas the majority of IAE/SAE
founders were between 40 and 59. The mean ages of the respective groups are 39 and 44 years. This suggests that the Edinburgh
founders were members of a more mature and established community, which is also reflected in the contrast of practice experience by 1853. Sixty-three percent of IAAG founders had less than
ten years of practice experience, compared to 65% of IAE/SAE
founders with between ten and 29 years of experience. The mean
experience for the two groups in 1853 is nine and 16 years,
respectively.
Fourth, 53% of Glasgow founders had practices in w h i c h
stockbroking or a combination of accountancy and stockbroking
and other commercial activities were the main services provided.
This contrasts with a significant proportion of the Edinburgh
founders (32%) involved in insurance m a n a g e m e n t , c o u r t
appointments, or banking. These findings are supported by a contrast of memberships in non-accounting bodies. Fifty-one p e r c e n t
of IAAG founders were members of the Glasgow Stock Exchange
Association in 1853, and 28% of the IAE/SAE founders were members of the Institute of Actuaries in the same year.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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1
0
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1
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4
96

Bank
Links

40-59
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& stockbroking
Stockbroking

Accountancy

Accountancy

100

33
20

47

Practice Type
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Unmarried
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Status
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47
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10-29
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6
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*A11 data are expressed as percentages of the 51 founders listed in Appendix 2.

Total

n
3,4
1,2

%
29
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55

100

Insurance
Links
%
n

Glasgow
Region
Other

Age

Accounting

100

49

22

10

%

Birth
Place

28

Legal
Links

Landowner
and/or lawyer
Other
professional
Merchant
or other
Unknown
Total

Father's
Occupation

TABLE 6
The IAAG Founders' Attributes in 1853*
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Fifth, the large majority of IAAG founders (67%) had no
observable connections to the legal profession, compared to 25%
of the IAE/SAE founders. Similarly with respect to insurance connections (excluding agencies), 88% of IAAG founders had no man-
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ager, director, or audit connection to insurance companies,
whereas 73% of IAE/SAE founders had at least one connection.
Only in the case of banking connections is there some similarity
between the two foundation groups with 96% of the IAAG
founders and 75% of the IAE/SAE founders having no links to
banking management or governance.
Overall, this analysis of the personal attributes of the IAAG
founders discloses interesting features and points of contrast with
those of the IAE/SAE founders. It suggests that, consistent with a
variety of previous studies [e.g.; Brown, 1905; Stewart, 1977;
Macdonald, 1984; Kedslie, 1990b], the IAAG and IAE/SAE founders
were members of distinguishable public accountancy communities.
THE SOCIAL NETWORK OF IAAG FOUNDERS
The social network of IAAG founders is described by two sets
of relational measures. The first set comprises degree centrality
scores derived from the observed social ties between each of the
Glasgow founders by 1853. The second set describes cliques of
founders with clique size set at a minimum of five founders.
Degree centrality and clique measurements are computed and
presented as for the IAE/SAE foundation. Individual and mean
degree centrality measures are reported in Appendix 2 for the requisitionist, requisitionee, and total foundation groups. Because of
the small size of the subgroups, individual and mean clique memberships are reported for the total group only.
With respect to the requisitionist group of 27 individuals, the
group centrality score of 25% indicates no particularly dominant
requisitionist. C. Cairns, C. Cunningham, J. Fleming, and W.G.
McLean are the most-connected accountants within the group,
tied to at least 11 of the 26 other members. A. McNicholl, on the
other hand, is connected to no other requisitionist. Nine of the 27
requisitionists are linked to approximately one-third of their colleagues.
For the smaller requisitionee group of 15 individuals, there is
greater cohesion compared to the requisitionist group. The
degree centrality index of 25% indicates no domination by any
individual. However, the mean score of 64% signals close connections within the group. A. Black and P. White are connected to 12
of their 14 colleagues, and 11 of the 15 individuals are linked to at
least half of the group. A. Cuthbertson and D. Dreghorn, w h o are
the least-connected members, became initial IAAG Committee
members.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13

38

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2000, Vol. 27, no. 2
30

Accounting

Historians Journal, December 2000

The mean degree centrality score for the total foundation
group is 29%. On average, each IAAG founder was connected to
approximately 15 of the other 50 founders. The group centrality
score is 28%, suggesting no particularly dominant founder existed
in the total group.
Of additional interest in Appendix 2 is how the potential influence of the requisitionists and requisitionees changed when they
are considered as part of the total group of founders. In terms of
degree centrality scores, and in the case of the requisitionists, the
predominant feature is of little or no change. Twenty-five of the
27 requisitionists fall into this category, and only C. Gairdner and
H. Kerr demonstrate a significant increase in influence as part of
the total group. Respectively, they were partners of P. White (the
first IAAG treasurer) and W. Anderson (an initial IAAG Committee
member), two of the most-connected founders. In the case of the
requisitionees, the tendency is for individual influence to drop
significantly within the total group. Fourteen of the 15 in this subgroup can be classified in this manner, and only J. McClelland's
influence increases within the larger group, thus providing a possible reason why he became the first IAAG president.
What these analyses reveal is that, the requisitionists and requisitionees were two relatively distinct groups of public
accountants in Glasgow. Most of the founders have proportionally fewer connections within the total founding community than in
their requisition subset. In order to explore this issue further,
Table 7 reports the most-connected members of each of the three
groups analyzed. To provide a reasonable proxy for potential
influence within the IAAG foundation, the degree centrality and
clique scores for the total group in Appendix 2 are combined. For
the subgroups, influence is measured by degree centrality alone.
TABLE 7
The Most Influential IAAG Founders
Requisitionists
C. Cunningham
J. Fleming
W.G. McLean
J. McGeorge
J.L. McKirdy
W. Cowan
D.E. Outram
G. Wink
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W.

Requisitionees
A. Black
P. White
W. Anderson
T.G. Buchanan
J.C. Foulds
R. Aitken
Auld
A. McEwan
W. Mackenzie

Total Group
W. Anderson
P. White
W. Auld
A. Black
C. Cunningham
W.G. McLean
A. McEwan
R. Aitken
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None of the most-connected requisitionists became an initial
IAAG officer or Committee member, even though C. Cunningham
and W. McLean were two of the most influential m e n in the total
group. Cunningham was the 45-year-old son of a leading Glasgow
merchant and a founding member of the Glasgow Stock Exchange
Association. He was never involved in IAAG affairs and died in
1861. McLean was a 49-year-old Glasgow town councilor and magistrate and became an IAAG Council member in 1872.
Six of the nine most-connected requisitionees are also among
the most-connected men in the total group, w h o also became initial IAAG officers and Committee members. W. Auld and A. Black
had no later involvement in the IAAG, and J.C. Foulds became an
IAAG Council member in 1858. Each of these men was a stockbroker and significantly involved in the management of the
Glasgow Stock Exchange Association. By contrast, J. McClelland,
the first IAAG president, was regarded as the leading Glasgow
accountant of his time [Maclehose, 1886]. A. Cuthbertson and D.
Dreghorn were elected to the first IAAG Committee with relatively small connections within the requisitionee and total foundation
groups. Cuthbertson was one of Glasgow's leading merchantaccountants in 1853. He was the youngest son of William
Cuthbertson, the "founder of public accountancy" in Glasgow
[Stewart, 1977], and a partner with his brother in a leading firm of
m e r c h a n t s that also provided public accountancy services.
Dreghorn was a well-known member of the Glasgow business
community and an active town councilor and magistrate of the
city [Tweed, 1983].
What the previous analysis clarifies is that, the Glasgow
founders comprised an elite group of two sets of individuals. The
requisitionists were relatively younger and less experienced than
the requisitionees. Although they were less networked than the
requisitionees, they contained a n u m b e r of members w h o w e r e
well connected within the context of the total group, thus providing a potential to bridge the two subgroups. Nevertheless, not
even these individuals became part of the original management of
the IAAG. On the other hand, several requisitionees did join the
initial IAAG Committee despite relatively fewer connections in
the requisitionee and total groups.
The elite nature of the IAAG foundation is further clarified by
examining some of the original officers and committee members
not previously mentioned. All were requisitionees. R. Aitken, son
of the Glasgow agent for the Bank of Scotland, was one of the
founders of the Glasgow Stock Exchange Association in 1844,
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active in its management and governance, a former partner of T.G.
Buchanan, and a partner in 1853 of W. Mackenzie, the first IAAG
secretary. W. Anderson was well connected to the legal profession, a leading bankruptcy practitioner, trained by J. McClelland,
and a partner of H. Kerr (one of the most-connected requisitionists). T.G. Buchanan was linked to Glasgow merchant houses and
banks (e.g., the Union Bank and the West of Scotland Bank) and
was first vice-chairman of the Glasgow Stock Exchange
Association. A. McEwan, a former apprentice of J. McClelland, was
a partner with W. Auld (one of the most-connected requisitionists), t h e first secretary of the Glasgow Stock Exchange
Association, and connected to the legal profession and insurance
industry. W. Mackenzie was the son of a landowner and lawyer,
trained with and then became a partner of J. McClelland, and married the daughter of the Sheriff-Substitute of Renfrewshire. P.
White was one of the founders of the Glasgow Stock Exchange
Association, active in its management, and a partner of C. Gairdner
(one of the most-connected requisitionists).
Table 8 provides a concluding statement about the elite structure of the IAAG foundation community. Using a tabu search
routine, a cluster analysis of the total founder group provides
further evidence of its interconnectedness. The search split
the group into 12 clusters of founders with identical relationships.
The routine was executed several times to ensure consistent
results. As seen in Table 8, seven of these clusters
contain relative isolates w h o did not necessarily lack connections
within the group as a whole (i.e.; A. Cuthbertson, D. Cuthbertson,
W. Jamieson, M. Mitchell, A. McNicholl, R. Scobie, and J. Watson).
The five remaining clusters contain 26 of the 27 requisitionists, 12
of the 15 requisitionees, and eight of the nine most active
founders, all of w h o m became initial IAAG officers or Committee
members. These clusters strongly evince the cohesiveness of the
IAAG foundation group.
EXPLAINING THE IAAG COHESION
In order to explain differences in the ties between IAAG
founders, linear regression models were constructed for four
founder sets (requisitionists, requisitionees, officers and
Committee members, and the total foundation group). The models are reported in Table 9. The degree centrality scores reported
in Appendix 2 represent the dependent variable indicative of differences in ties in each model. The independent variables are as
Published by eGrove, 2000
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stated in Table 6 (parental occupation, age in 1853, practice type
and experience, legal connections, and marital status in 1853).
These characteristics include factors significant in the IAE/SAE
study (practice type and legal connections). Others have been
emphasized in earlier research of the Glasgow founders; i.e.,
parental occupation (a proxy for connections to the commercial
community) and practice experience (representing the 1853 requisition division between experienced and less-experienced
accountants). With two exceptions, the independent variables are
based on actual measurements and dealt with as for the IAE/SAE
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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founders. The exceptions are parental occupation (1 = landowner and/or lawyer, 2 = other professionals, 3 = merchants, etc.) and
marital status (1 = married, 0 = unmarried). In order to protect
the validity of the regression calculations, a conventional rule of
t h u m b of one independent variable for approximately every 15
founder-observations is adopted in each model. As with the
IAE/SAE founders, the robustness of each model is tested in the
UCINET program by a form of bootstrapping. The results are
reported in Table 9 as a percentage of 1,000 random regression
calculations.
The data in Table 9 represent the best explanatory models for
each of the four IAAG groups within the inevitable constraint of
the data collected. Use of other independent variables provided
significantly weaker explanatory models. For the requisitionists,
those founders with the largest n u m b e r of ties are the oldest in
the subgroup and have the greatest amount of public accountancy experience. An explanation of this finding suggests that social
connections are a function of age and experience. For the requisitionees, on the other hand, those with the greatest n u m b e r of
ties are those w h o practiced either exclusively as stockbrokers or
in combination with public accountancy services. For the initialofficer and Committee-member group, marital status is the only
significant explanation of tie differences; i.e., the most-connected
founders in the group were married. For the total group, tie variations are explainable in part by a combination of three independent variables. Those founders with the greatest n u m b e r of network ties had fathers connected to the commercial, manufacturing, or farming communities. They were married and most connected to the legal profession.
These results suggest that, for the IAAG foundation and unlike
the IAE/SAE foundation, there is no particularly consistent explanation of variations in network ties. There are statistically significant results to suggest married IAAG founders from a commercial
background with legal connections had the highest degree centrality scores. These findings are consistent with prior expectations w i t h respect to mercantile and related c o n n e c t i o n s .
However, the marital-status and legal-connection variables suggest
other factors at play not evident in prior studies. It is also clear
that factors significant in the IAE/SAE foundation (birthplace,
practice type, and insurance connections) are not significant in
the case of the IAAG.
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27
15
13
51

Requisitionists
Requisitionees
Officials
Total group

0.34
0.27
0.40
0.39

R2

6.10
4.86
7.21
9.97

F
Value
PO

0.01

p
Value
0.00
0.04
0.03
0.00
0.03

AG

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.02
0.00

Proportion < Coefficient For
Independent
Variables
Relating to Links to
PT
PE
LE
MS

PO = parental occupation; AG = age in 1853; PT= practice type; PE = practice experience by
1853; LE= legal connections; MS = marital status in 1853.

N

Centrality

Variable

of

Degree

Dependent

TABLE 9
Linear R e g r e s s i o n s o f IAAG F o u n d e r G r o u p s
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COMPARING THE IAE/SAE AND IAAG NETWORKS
Table 10 compares the interconnectedness of the IAE/SAE
founders with those of the IAAG group:
The greater cohesion of the IAAG group compared to its
IAE/SAE equivalent is evident in the above data. Differences are
significant at p<0.05 using the chi-squared test of association.
Eighty percent of the IAE/SAE founders were connected to less
than one-third of their colleagues. The equivalent IAAG datum is
58%. Similarly, whereas only 8% of the IAE/SAE group w e r e connected to 40% or more of their fellow founders, 28% of the
Glasgow founders fell into this category. The respective mean
centrality scores of 21% and 29% reinforce this observation.
TABLE 10
A Comparison of Degree Centrality Measures of the Founders
Degree Centrality
Measure

IAE/SAE

SAE

%

%

00-20
21-30
31-40
41-60
Total
n

47
33
12
8
100
75

27
31
14
28
100
51

%

%

Mean
Group

21
28

29
28

X2

10.23

pValue

0.02

However, both groups have a low 28% group centrality score, suggesting no particularly dominant individual existed in either
group. In addition, there are 169 IAE/SAE cliques of five or more
founders, compared to 52 IAAG cliques, with a mean size of six
individuals in both cases. Finally, the 12 IAE/SAE cluster memberships ranged from four to ten members, whereas the 12 IAAG cluster memberships ranged from one to nine individuals. Most of
this evidence supports the notion that a more cohesive group
than its IAE/SAE counterpart initiated the IAAG foundation.
A search of the IAE/SAE and IAAG archival databases reveals a
data set that both connects the two foundation groups and
describes school, university, training, and business ties involving
one or more individuals from each foundation community. These
c o n n e c t i o n s provide evidence of potential c o m m u n i c a t i o n
between the two communities. In other words, in addition to
individual non-foundation links to either city, there was a social
network of IAAG and IAE/SAE founders by 1853. This network
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was a bridge between the two groups and had the potential for
information flows about their respective intentions and activities.
Appendix 3 reports the degree centrality scores and cliques for
the 30 founders linking the two foundation communities in this
way.
The data in Appendix 3 reveal ties between the founding communities that involved some of the most-connected founders in
each group. J.M. Baillie, for example, was well connected to
Edinburgh landowners and lawyers and was a p a r t n e r of W.
Moncreiff, brother of the Lord Advocate for Scotland. R. Balfour
was Edinburgh secretary of the City of Glasgow Assurance
Company and one of the most-connected IAE/SAE accountants to
the legal profession. As previously stated, J. Maitland was the
Accountant of Court. Other IAE/SAE founders w h o also had
potentially great influence are J. Brown and T. Mansfield, the first
two presidents of the SAE. In the IAAG group, D. Cuthbertson was
one of Glasgow's best-known accountants, with strong board-ofdirectors links to the insurance industry in Edinburgh. His
younger brother, A. Cuthbertson, was active in the IAAG foundation and an initial IAAG Committee member, as was A. McEwan,
the brother of a lawyer and the first IAAG auditor. J.W. Guild,
whose father was a Solicitor to the Supreme Court in Edinburgh,
trained as a lawyer there and moved to Glasgow in 1848 as a
bankruptcy specialist.
The above brief analysis suggests there w e r e social network
ties between leading IAAG and IAE/SAE founders. This introduces
the potential for debates, decisions, and actions of the two foundation communities to be known to each other. A linear regression model supports this conclusion. The d e p e n d e n t variable is
the degree centrality scores of the bridging founders named in
Appendix 3. The most significant independent variables are practice type and degree centrality scores in the individual foundations. The results suggest that the interconnected founders with
the highest degree centrality scores are those in practice as public
accountants, with the highest Centrality scores in their individual
foundation network (R2 0.33; F value 6.58; p value 0.00). This is
consistent with the proposition of a potential bridging influence
by founders in the two communities. In other words, those public accountants with the highest bridging connections were those
with the highest connections within their o w n foundation community.
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CONTRIBUTIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
This study contributes in a n u m b e r of ways to the early history
of institutionalized public accountancy in Scotland. First, it
demonstrates that the social networks of the IAE/SAE and IAAG
founders evolved gradually over several decades through a combination of school, university, practice, business, social, and address
ties. By 1853, both networks were established and mature. The
social network analysis of the IAE/SAE foundation demonstrates
that the 75 founders were a single social group or block with no
isolates. All Edinburgh founders were connected directly or indirectly to each other, with a range of degree centrality scores from
three to 49%. In the case of the IAAG foundation, the situation is
almost identical with only one isolate in that community and
degree centrality scores for the other 50 founders ranging from
four to 56%. The network analyses reveal that the IAAG founders
w e r e more closely networked than their IAE/SAE counterparts.
These findings portray both groups of founders as cohesive communities, with a small minority of each group acting as a bridge
between the IAE/SAE and the IAAG.
In general terms, the personal attributes of the IAE/SAE and
IAAG founders suggest that most individuals had at least middleclass origins. More specifically, the personal attributes and social
ties of the IAE/SAE founders provide evidence that they were a
predominantly upper-middle-class community within Edinburgh.
On the other hand, the personal attributes and social ties of the
IAAG founders are socially consistent with the mercantile and
farming nature of Glasgow and its surrounding regions in the middle of the 19th century. In combination, and in the context of
other accountants in both cities, these findings suggest that the
IAE/SAE and IAAG founders were cohesive and elite communities
by 1853.
The range of degree centrality measures for the 75 IAE/SAE
founders confirms Lee's [19961 tentative conclusion of the existence of an elite within an elite in the IAE/SAE. The Edinburgh
founders with the highest scores were predominantly public
accountants with Edinburgh origins and the largest n u m b e r of
ties to landowners, lawyers, and insurance companies. A similar
super-elite cannot be detected in the IAAG foundation. It involved
two subsets of founders differentiated by age and experience
rather than by network ties and social connections. Thus,
although the evidence for both foundation groups is consistent
with the expectation of overall cohesiveness and elitism, the
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IAE/SAE founders were different from their IAAG counterparts in
terms of predominant social class and inner elitism.
In both the IAE/SAE and IAAG foundations, there appear to be
two sets of individuals at work in the process. The first set contains founders most concerned to institutionalize their profession
of public accountancy. They are typically to be found in the initiating groups of founders. The second set comprises individuals
invited by members of the first set to be involved in the foundations. In the case of the IAE/SAE, the invitees were mainly insurance managers w h o were well connected within and outside the
IAE/SAE network. Because they w e r e not primarily public
accountants, they were termed honorary members of the IAE in
1853. However, by the time of the SAE royal charter, most of the
honorary members chose to leave the IAE. It can therefore be concluded that the brief association of the IAE with well-connected
insurance managers provided credibility to the foundation at a
critical stage of its early history.
By contrast, the IAAG foundation did not involve the temporary or honorary membership of leading practitioners in areas
outside public accountancy. However, the foundation started
with one set of junior practitioners petitioning a more senior set
to join with them in institutionalizing public accountancy in
Glasgow. The invitees were typically well connected within the
overall group and predominantly involved in stockbroking rather
than public accountancy. However, unlike their Edinburgh insurance counterparts, these men were involved in the foundation
and became IAAG members and its initial officers. Unlike the
IAE/SAE foundation and the involvement of insurance managers,
the conclusion here must be that these senior providers of predominantly non-public accountancy services were necessary to
the long-term credibility of the IAAG. These findings are consistent with the second expectation of the study that both foundations involved individuals w h o would not ordinarily be described
as public accountants.
The various regression analyses of the social network data
confirm the p r i o r e x p e c t a t i o n that t h e most-connected
Edinburgh founders w e r e most associated with landowners,
lawyers, and insurance companies. By contrast, the Glasgow
founders were most connected to merchants, manufacturers, and
farmers, only moderately to lawyers, and rarely to insurance management and governance. These findings are also consistent with
a prior expectation. However, in the case of the IAAG founders,
marital status appears to be strongly related to variations in the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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network connections of the founders (the most-connected m e n
were married by 1853). There is no obvious explanation for this
unexpected result.
Although most of the founders with the greatest n u m b e r of
ties and clique memberships were the most involved in their
respective foundations, there w e r e a n u m b e r of founders w h o
established different patterns. For example, R. Balfour, T.G.
Dickson, J. Maitland, and C. Pearson are four of the most-connected founders in the IAE/SAE network; yet, they did not openly participate in the foundation or its s u b s e q u e n t m a n a g e m e n t .
Similarly, in the case of the IAAG, J. Gourlay, J. Fleming, J.C. Foulds,
and H. Kerr were well connected but relatively uninvolved. This
suggests that certain IAE/SAE and IAAG founders with potentially
influential positions in their respective communities had either
little incentive to participate explicitly in the foundation events or
preferred to be involved in a less public way. This emphasizes the
value of social network analysis and is consistent with analyses in
other social history areas [e.g.; Bearman, 1993; Padgett and Ansell,
1993]. In other words, network analysis helps to identify those
individuals with strong ties in a network that did not need to be
visibly active to exercise influence. Alternatively, as in this study,
there are others with relatively fewer ties that appeared to compensate by being very involved (e.g., T. Martin and G. Meldrum of
the IAE/SAE and J.W. Guild of the IAAG).
Overall, the institutionalization of Edinburgh and Glasgow
public accountants in 1853 was based on strongly networked
groups of typically experienced public accountants who, generally speaking, were well entrenched in the u p p e r strata of their
respective local societies. The study reveals the considerable
insights to be gained from examining a social situation in terms of
the relations and attributes of the participants rather than the latter alone. The major contribution of the study, therefore, is to
bring social network analysis to accounting history research and,
in so doing, to provide a better understanding of the IAE/SAE and
IAAG foundations and their founders.
The limitations of the study are equally clear. First, the analysis is based on the relations discovered in accessible archives.
There may well be more evidence undiscovered. The results of
the study are therefore conservatively stated. Second, the study
does not attempt to measure the actual influence of the individual founders. It allows generalizations to be made about possible
behavior but not about actual activity. The latter would require a
different type of archival research that may not be possible
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because of lack of evidence. That attempts should be made to do
such research is not in doubt. Likewise unquestioned is the need
to examine more specifically the lives and roles of individual
founders to discover more about their involvement, or lack thereof, in the IAE/SAE and IAAG foundations. In particular, the specific roles of the most connected but least active founders are worthy of future research.
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APPENDIX 1
The Founders of the IAE/SAE
NAME

INITIAL

INITIAL

IAE

DEGREES CLIQUES DEGREES
%

J.M. Baillie

(5)n
4

%

IAE

PETITION

(5)n

%
27
42

19
44

J. Barron

3
28

0

0

15

7

39
6

33
0

27
38

43
50

6

33
30

28

30

43

4

20
24

CM. Barstow
A. Borthwick 46
J. Borthwick
J. Brown
J.A. Brown
H. Callender
F.H. Carter

8

T.R. Chaplin

33
15
9
24

R. Christie
R. Christie Jr

28
33

14

0
1

13
10

0
1

31
27
30
14

9
0

8

0

0

7
43
42

43

41

43
21

54

G.A. Esson
G.L. Finlay
J. Fraser
J.C. Fraser
A. Gibson
R. Gordon
T. Grant
J. Grieve
A. Horne
J. Howden
J. Hunter
H. Ivory
A. Jamieson
G.A.Jamieson
J.M. Liddell
D. Lindsay
W. Low
J. Maitland
T. Mansfield
D. Marshall

1

4

0

18

1

50

8

29
21

0
1

25

2

43

6

5

15
35
0
30
20
24

8

0
1

23
8

9
0

0

5
12

0

22

43
41

46

20

8

2
56

5
4

22

31
7

22

1

19

4

24
36
7
6
21
24
15
25
39
12
15
33
24
22

7
20
0
0
2
14
0

20

3

5
20
25
15

0
2
11
0

23
34
7
5
19
23
14

37
12
15

19
1
0

7
22
0
0
2
14
0
3
35
1
0

25
13
42
33
25

10
0
37
14
10

25
25
13
22
12
42
30
23

3
1
2
2
0
26
4
7

21
25

49
0

15
14

2

G. Dundas

41

36

12

T.G. Dickson 57
C.H. Douglas

19

23
0
20

H.D. Dickie
5
11

28
3
26

D. Cormack
46

% (5)n

10

11

9
6

J.J. Dickson

TOTAL

(5)n

43

31

TOTAL

CLIQUES DEGREES CLIQUES

R. Balfour

43

PETITION

CLIQUES DEGREES

3
34
1
0
28
3
1
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23
36
11
15
31
22
23
14
26
14
39
31
24

29
3
1
3
10
0
42
16
11

54

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2000, Vol. 27, no. 2
46

Accounting Historians Journal, December 2000

APPENDIX 1 (Cont.)
The Founders of the IAE/SAE
NAME

INITIAL

INITIAL

IAE

DEGREES CLIQUES DEGREES

%
T. Martin
7
G. Meldrum
7
G.T. Mitchell
J. Moinet
J.S. Moncrieff 29
W. Moncreiff 39
P. Morrison
D. Murray
G. Murray
W. Myrtle
J.M. Macandrew29
J. Mackenzie
K. Mackenzie 64
D. Maclagan
A.T. Niven
J.J. Ogilvy
J.S. Ogilvy
18
A.M. Paterson
C. Pearson
57
D.S. Peddie
S. Raleigh
25
G. Ramsay
A.W. Robertson36
W. Russell
R.E. Scott
T. Scott
25
W. Smith
D.R. Souter
R. Spottiswoode
C.W. Thomson
W.T. Thomson
G. Todd
18
J. Wilkie
H.G. Watson 57
J. Watson
W. Wood
39

(5)n
0
0

Mean/total
34
No. of
observations 29
Centrality index32
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2
6

2
11

0
11
1
1

3

IAE

PETITION

PETITION

TOTAL

TOTAL

CLIQUES DEGREES

CLIQUES DEGREES CLIQUES

6
6
15

(5)n
0
0
4

7
7
13

(5)n
0
0
2

21
24

9
23

20
25
8

8
16
0

22

7

23

6

22
33
52

22

3

9

6
41
63
0

25
16

13
0

43
28
15
21
22
13
25
21
12
22
19
13
28
16
18
43
22

58
16
4
4
8
2
8
8
1

52
10
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32
17
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37
28
18
22
25
12
25
22

43
0
1
11
0
10
33
12
6
3
4
2
6
9

22
22
15

5
3
2

13
18
40

0
1
27

33

%

%

% (5)n
5
5
14
12
19
27
8
19
22
11
20
32
49
9
12
30
15
16
41
28
18
20
24
12
23
20
11
20

0
0
4
0
9
30
1
3
7
1
6
47
67
0
2
14
0
11
60
16
6
4
10
2
8
9
1

5

33

9
4
2
19
1
1
41
5
27

21

23

154

22

90

21

169

29

68
30

68

61

61

75
28

75

0
11

31

18

19
12
27
15
19
41
20
32

9
6
2
20
1
1
42
5
31
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APPENDIX 2
The Founders of the IAAG
NAME

REQUISITIONIST
DEGREES

%
R. Aitken
W. Anderson
W. Auld
A. Black
J.A. Brodie
T.G. Buchanan
C. Cairns
W. Cowan
C. Cunningham
A. Cuthbertson
D. Cuthbertson
D. Dreghorn
J. Fleming
J.C. Foulds
C. Gairdner
J. Gourlay
J. Graham
J.W. Guild
D. Hamilton
W. Hendrie
W. Jamieson
H. Kerr
H. Leck

J. Mann
J. Miller
M. Mitchell
J. McClelland
R. McCowan
D. McCubbin
A. McEwan
G. McFarlane
J. MacGeorge
W. Mackenzie
J.L. McKirdy
W.G. McLean
W. McNaughton
A. McNicholl
D.E. Outram
J.C. Reid
A. Ritchie
G. Robson
R. Scobie

REQUISITIONEE
DEGREES

%

%

71
79

50
56
54
52
22
44
42
28
50
10
32
26
42
40
36
38
32
28
24
22
4
42
22
22
20
14
50
24
32
50
20
40
42
24
50
18
0
24
26
20
28
12

7i
86
19
79
50
31
46
21
64
29
42
79
15
43
27
27

27
15
19
43
19
27
71
23
35
71
35
42
23
0
31
19
23
27

TOTAL
DEGREES
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TOTAL
CLIQUES

(5)n
12
25
16
17
4
7
5
2
16
0
9
7
11
11
14
17
1
1
2
4
0
7
2
8
3
1
14
10
14
13
1
5
10
1
15
1
0
1
5
1
1
1
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The F o u n d e r s o f t h e IAAG
NAME

REQUISITIONEE
DEGREES

REQUISITIONIST
DEGREES

J. Smith
J. Thomson
W. Tolmie
J. Watson
P. White
J. Wilkie
G. Wink
A. Woodside
A. Wylie

16
18
18
26
46
24
26
18
20

26

64

29

52

15
25

51
28

51

19
15

64
86
• 27
31

Mean/total
27
N u m b e r of
observations
27
Centrality index 25

TOTAL
CLIQUES

TOTAL
DEGREES

APPENDIX 3
Links Between IAAG and SAE Founders
NAME
IN IAAG

J.A. Brodie
W. Cowan
D. Cuthbertson
J.C. Foulds
J.Graham
J.W. Guild
H.Kerr
A. McEwan
D.E. Outram
J.Smith
J.M. Baillie
R. Balfour
CM. Barstow
J. Borthwick
J.Brown
H.D.Dickie
T.G.Dickson
A.Gibson
A. Howden
J. Hunter
J.M. Liddell
J. Maitland
T.Mansfield
G. Meldrum
J. Moinet
W. Moncreiff
P. Morrison
A.M. Paterson
H.G.Watson
J. Wilkie

%
22
28
32
40
32
28
42
50
24
16

DEGREE CENTRALITY
IN SAE
IN BRIDGE

%

28
41
26
5
31
12
41
19
11
15
14
39
31
5
14
27
8
16
41
20

10
17
3
10
10
3
21
17
10
3
10
10
14
10
7
7
3
3
10
7
10
21
7
3
10
3

n
1
1
3
1
1
2
0
1
1
0
4
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
3
1
0
1
0
9
30

.

%
10
10
31
7

Mean/total

31
10

20
20

10
30

Centrality index

25

28

22
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Abstract: In 1940, Walt Disney was faced with crafting a message of
corporate accountability under duress. His company, the product of
his creative genius, had been forced to submit to public accountability. It had a pressing need to raise preferred equity finance for a
major expansion during a period of market uncertainty, war, and
reported losses. This paper conducts a "close reading" of the "Letter
to Stockholders" in Walt Disney Productions' 1940 annual report,
the first such letter signed by Walt Disney. The letter's rhetorical features, including metaphor and ideology, are examined in the context of the times. What is revealed is an accountability document
skillfully crafted with the exigencies faced by Disney's company
firmly in mind. The letter offers suggestive insight to the world as
Disney made sense of it. The paper contributes to understanding
the use of rhetoric by top management in activities related to
aspects of financial accountability and reporting. It also helps to
understand better a significant public persona of the 20th century,
Walt Disney.
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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
Analysis of annual reports, including letters by CEOs to stockholders, has a long history in management and accounting literatures. Discourse by CEOs is important not only because of the
power that corporate leaders wield in their own organizations,
but also because of their political and cultural influence generally.
Since such discourse may be viewed as a form of sense making
[Weick, 1995], its study also has value because the CEO may be
talking or writing at least partly to himself or herself, and in so
doing creating, justifying, and reacting to the world thus fashioned. We think, talk, and write to help us learn and understand
what we then know [Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993;
Weick, 1995]. CEOs are no different.
The many papers which have examined CEOs' letters to shareholders included in corporate annual reports have had a focus
other than exploring the metaphors and ideologies at play within
such discourse (e.g.; Bettman and Weitz [1983]; Salancik and
Meindl [1984]; Hager and Scheiber [1990]; Jones and Shoemaker
[1994]; Abrahamson and Amir [1996]; Thomas [1997]; Courtis
[1998]; Hyland [1998]; Devinney and Kabanoff [1999]). This
paper follows a path largely untrodden in previous studies of
stockholders' letters in accounting annual reports. It explores, by
means of a "close reading," meaning in the narrative of the stockholders' letter of the first public annual report of the global company which still bears Walt Disney's name. Such accountability
narrative merits close reading since it is part of the "battery of
belief-forming institutions" [Tinker, 1985, p. 82] top management
uses to define the language by means of which its self-accounts are
to be written. Our close reading is performed with an interest not
only in "examin[ing] the way discourses are constructed in order
to achieve certain effects" [Eagleton, 1983, p. 205], but also to help
reveal more about the author.
The close reading we conduct is similar to Slagell's [1991, p.
155] "close textual analysis" of Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural address during the American Civil War, in which she "considers the speech in relation to its historical setting" (pp. 155-156). Of
course, in contrast to an American president's inaugural address,
CEOs' annual letters to stockholders are mundane, common discourses of seemingly minor importance. It is perhaps because of
their commonness and institutionalized, periodic, calendric role
in the functioning of our socioeconomy that such common documents deserve scrutiny. Letters to stockholders, written by CEOs
Published by eGrove, 2000
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and published in corporate annual reports, are too important a
part of the ideological paraphernalia of our society to be ignored
or brushed aside as mere rhetoric.
The chosen text is the letter to stockholders included in the
annual report of Walt Disney Productions, issued in respect of the
financial year ended September 28, 1940, and signed by Walt
Disney. Disney's company had been compelled to seek outside
capital to finance the expansion of its studio. Our analysis uncovers aspects of the public persona of the then very prominent Walt
Disney, a person reputedly "the most significant figure in graphic
arts since Leonardo" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988, p. 131, citing
British cartoonist David Low]. He, or his alter ego, is revealed,
inter alia, as a skillful financial and business rhetorician whose discourse reveals ways of thinking that accord with the ideology of
the market [Carrier, 1997]. Such microanalysis of an accountability text prepared by top management is consistent with entreaties
for accounting-related narratives in annual reports to be investigated "to better understand the motives and attitudes of management and the communication process" [Jones and Shoemaker,
1994, p. 174], and, more generally, with polemics in recent
accounting literature encouraging "greater use of narratives in
accounting and management research" [Llewellyn, 1999, p. 233].
The particular Disney stockholders' letter we analyze deserves
special study for three additional reasons:
•First, it is the initial stockholders' letter of the Disney
Company, a corporation that today has global importance in the
entertainment and communications industries.
•Second, the letter was a public and permanent document signed and most likely substantially crafted by Walt Disney
(perhaps with contributions from his brother Roy).1 Thus, it has
potential to provide insight to Disney's public persona at the time
and seems likely to add to historical understanding of this
acknowledgedly charismatic, yet complex business and cultural
leader [Boje, 1995; Bryman, 1995]. We cannot say with certainty
(nor can anyone we expect) that Walt Disney physically drafted

1

Attributing authorship unequivocally to Walt Disney solely or substantially is
difficult if not impossible. While acknowledging this lack of strong, unequivocal
proof of authorship, w e take some solace that it is the "metaphoric Walt," as mentioned in the next footnote, that may be of sustaining importance. As Schickel
11968/1997, p. 44] wrote: "In the last analysis, Walt Disney's greatest creation was
Walt Disney." There is no doubt that the "metaphoric Walt" signed and is accountable for the letter.
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the 1940 stockholders' letter. However, in view of his reputation
for keeping "a sharp eye on financial arrangements" [Capodagli
and Jackson, 1998, p. 185], his multi-skilling philosophy, his acute
awareness of the "bottom line," and his obsession w i t h careful
attention to small detail [Capodagli and Jackson, 1998, pp. 7, 181185], it seems likely that he was strongly implicated. Watts [1997,
p. 260], a Walt Disney biographer, referred to "Walt's comments"
in his brief reference to the company's annual reports of the
1940s. In addition, Schickel's [1968/97, p. 256] detailed descriptions supporting Walt Disney's dominant role and "father figure"
persona in regard to his company, provided strong, albeit circumstantial, evidence that Disney had at least some significant hand in
the letter's crafting.
• Third, since stockholders' letters in recent Disney annual reports make explicit, favorable reference to "Walt" [Amernic,
1998], a "metaphoric Walt" may influence current-day Disney
CEOs.2
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides context for the letter and its analysis. The third section examines
rhetorical qualities of the letter, except for metaphor, which is analyzed in section four. A final section contains concluding comments.
CONTEXTUALIZING THE DISNEY STOCKHOLDERS' LETTER
The Stock Issue—Features, Reasons, Consequences: In 1940, Walt
Disney Productions, as the company was then known, was a relatively small film production studio in terms of financial and tangible assets, but not in terms of reputation, expectations, and innovation. It had just gone public by issuing 155,000 shares of $25 par
value, 6% cumulative, convertible preferred stock (see Exhibit 1).
As a consequence, the Disney brothers' company became publicly
accountable. Its first annual report, for the fiscal year ended
September 28, 1940, was issued in December 1940. That report is
the focus of this paper. Of particular interest is the letter to stockholders, a text not only proffered to the public domain but also
personally associated with the company's chief executive. The letter to stockholders was signed by Walt Disney and was included as
the first main component of the report.
2

A reviewer has drawn attention to the prospect that a "metaphoric Walt"
helps provide flexibility in justifying present business practices of the Disney corporation. He could be used in much the same way as Sam Walton might be used as
an ongoing mythic figure at Wal-Mart Inc.
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EXHIBIT 1
Selected Financial and Other Information About
Walt Disney Productions in 1940

Reported net income or loss for fiscal year ended
September 28. 1940*

A loss of $1,259,798

Total assets reported on balance sheet as of

$8,562,137, of which $4,926,557 represented costs

September 28. 1940*

associated with feature films and short subjects (in
other words, "soft" assets)

Stockholders equity reported on balance sheet as of

$5,787,646

September 28. 1940*?
Number of employees *

1179 (as of September 28. 1940)

Number of feature animated films released in fiscal

one

(Pinocchio)

1940*
Total reported production costs for feature animated

$2,595,380

films released in 1940*
Number of shorts ("cartoons'") released in fiscal
1940*

ten

Average production costs for a cartoon released in
1940#

$22,548

*from 1940 annual report.
#derived from information in 1940 annual report

Disney was prompted to raise capital from the public, according to the New York Times [February 22, 1940, p. 35, col. 7], by an
immediate need to provide permanent capital for the company's
huge expansion program then nearing completion—a $3 million,
51-acre studio complex in Burbank, California. In 1940, Time magazine [March 25, 1940, p. 77] put it thus:
Last week, with its second full-length feature,
Pinocchio, ready for a nation-wide Easter week
opening, Walt Disney productions applied to the
SEC for permission to sell 155,000 shares of $25
par, 6% cumulative convertible preferred stock.
Purpose of the $3,875,000 offering: to pay off
bank loans incurred in building the company's
n e w studio at Burbank, Calif., and to provide working capital for four more features now in production: Bambi, Wind in the Willows, Peter Pan,
Fantasia.
Disney had a long history of reinvesting profits from his animated films and other revenue sources. He did so to meet ever-rising production costs and to help ensure even better films in the
future [Hollister, 1940]. As early as 1934, Fortune magazine [1934,
p. 91] described Disney as reinvesting profits "for the sole purpose of making his films more beautiful, more elaborate, more
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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nearly perfect." But, by early 1940, earnings had taken an unexpected battering for three principal reasons: the lukewarm box
office response to Pinocchio, Disney's difficulties in containing
costs, and the effects of the European war.
Bryman [1995, pp. 9-10] summarized the position confronting
Disney:
Largely as a result of Snow Whites success
[released on December 21, 1937], Walt realized
that feature film production had to become the
Studio's main focus, and soon afterwards work
began on Pinocchio, Fantasia, and Bambi. In order
to accomplish this level of production effort...the
[Disney] brothers decided to build a new studio.
In the summer of 1938, they placed a deposit for a
new purpose-built studio in Burbank. In effect,
the new studio building would consume the bulk
of the profits from Snow White. The move was
completed in May 1940, by which time the studio
had about 1,100 employees. The Studio's financial
position began to deteriorate [in 1939]. Both
Fantasia and Pinocchio performed poorly at the
box office and produced sizeable losses, the former especially so, since they had proved very costly to produce. Also, Disney's European market had
all but dried up as a result of the war...the Studio
was heavily in debt and was forced to issue [preferred stock] shares to the public in April 1940, a
move to which the brothers had always been
opposed (emphasis added).
The reasons for the preferred stock issue merit some elaboration. While the audiences responded very positively to Snow
White ("The $1,500,000 borrowed to make Snow White was
repaid within three months..." [Hollister, 1940, p. 700]), there was
always the risk that after the initial successes, the movie-going
public would consider such films just a fad and would quickly lose
interest. Disney's next animated feature, Pinocchio, released in
1940, fared poorly. It was a challenge to create and produce fulllength, animated films involving cartoon characters that audiences would pay to see. The market for feature films of this type
was new and unproven.
Additionally, Disney was struggling to maintain profitability in
an environment characterized by a rapidly changing technology
in animation and movie making. He was confronted by market
uncertainty and considerable production risks posed by the chalPublished by eGrove, 2000
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lenges of n e w technology (i.e., coping with the special sound
equipment requirements for Fantasia). It was a challenge as well
to maintain control over costs while at the same time striving for
better quality ("The average pay is higher than the average in any
other Hollywood studio" [Hollister, 1940, p. 700]). In a sense, his
problem was similar to that now confronting computer hardware
and software companies.
The European war 3 also had a major impact on the studio by
limiting the company's ability to release pictures in any of the
countries at war. This constrained the market for basic cartoon
shorts and, even more importantly for n e w features. Given the
technological and cost-control risks associated with new, fulllength, animated films, losing the potential to spread some of the
market-acceptance risk was a serious blow — audiences in foreign
markets might have resulted in a future stream of revenues even if
the domestic market eventually regarded these films as mere fads.
Furthermore, currency regulations, as well as fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, reduced the company's revenues from pictures already released in foreign countries. And even domestic cinema goers might be less inclined to spend their disposable income
on going to the theater, given the prospect of U.S. involvement in
the war.
So, at the time Walt Disney signed the 1940 letter to stockholders, Walt Disney Productions was in a precarious position. It
had to learn to master n e w technology. It had a product with a
potentially vast market, but that market was largely unproven in
the longer term. The European war was beginning to have an
impact and seemed destined to create further havoc with film distribution and markets, both worldwide and domestically. The intimate control exercised by Disney over every facet of the business 4
was being strained by rapid expansion and the challenges mentioned above, as well as by the need to raise funds through a public stock offering. Schickel [1968/1997, pp. 49, 247] described
Disney's attitude within the context of this difficult time in the following way:
3
Although it had provided significant support to Britain and its allies, the U.S.
did not enter World War II until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
December 7, 1941.
4
According to Hollister [1940, p. 700]: "Walt is the spark plug of production.
No story starts toward a picture until Walt has bought or invented it, shaped it,
tried it out, and given it a push...Throughout the production pattern of every picture Walt threads in and out like a guiding outline...Walt knifes into the most
minute step of the most microscopic element..."
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...The precariousness of the family's livelihood
undoubtedly shaped his own desire not merely to
succeed but to do so in a particular way—namely,
to avoid surrendering any part of his autonomy to
outsiders and to hold his company's stock and its
decision-making power as closely as he could.
...Indeed, in 1938 he had every reason to believe
that he could afford a money-losing experiment
[that is, Fantasia]. But with Pinocchio unable to
perform as expected abroad and with the potentially profitable but difficult Bambi put aside in
order to devote full effort to Fantasia, he was suddenly in perilous straights. Far more than should
have depended on Fantasia.
And the situation worsened even as the film
approached completion. Early in 1940 the banks
shut down the Disney credit line entirely, and in
order to raise operating capital he was forced in
April, 1940, to offer stock to the public for the first
time—a step he feared would mean dilution of his
control over the enterprise...it was a psychological
blow that was perhaps harder for him to take than
it would have been for other men.
To exacerbate matters, the company had incurred a significant loss in 1940 (see Exhibit 1). Thus, it was an opportune time
for Walt Disney to display the charismatic leadership for which he
became famous. The thesis of this article is that he did so partly
through skillful rhetoric employed in the 1940 letter to stockholders. To contextualize further the circumstances leading to the
stock issue and the environmental circumstances in which
Disney's letter to stockholders was composed, it is important to
develop a better understanding of the history of the Disney company and the persona of Walt Disney, subjects to which we now
turn.
Company History: In 1924, Walter Elias Disney, a 23-year-old cartoonist, opened a small animation studio in a storefront in Los
Angeles with his older brother Roy. The business was known as
the "Disney Bros. Studio," but when it moved into new premises
near downtown Los Angeles in 1926, it became the "Walt Disney
Studio." Disney's early ventures endured hardships typical of
Published by eGrove, 2000
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many business startups. 5 Walt Disney went bankrupt before his
move from Kansas City to Los Angeles and his subsequent initial
success in the late 1920s. He is reported to have said: "When I was
21, I went broke for the first time. I slept in chair cushions in my
studio in Kansas City, and ate cold beans out of the can" [Boje,
1995, p. 1024].
The company achieved its first major success w h e n its animated cartoon, Steamboat Willie, featuring the n e w Mickey Mouse
character, was shown at the Colony Theater in New York on
November 18, 1928. Although the company's cartoons were very
popular, by the early 1930s the Walt Disney Studio was struggling
to survive since, among other problems, animation costs continued to rise. But its fortunes were soon to improve. Lucrative merchandising agreements were negotiated, granting permission for
images of Disney characters, such as Mickey Mouse, to be used on
manufactured items. 6 With the release of the company's first feature animated film, Snow White, merchandising agreements w e r e
at the forefront of what was called "a n e w dimension in fashion
merchandising" [Bristol, 1938, p. 13].7 The introduction of color to
improve cartoon quality led to an Academy Award and commercial
success for the studio's first color cartoon, Flowers and Trees.
Other innovations in animation, such as providing cartoon characters with unique, focused personalities (as in The Three Little
Pigs and for characters such as Pluto, Donald Duck, and Goofy)
appealed to Depression-era audiences.

5

Problems included decreasing profit margins on their products (cartoons) as
they endeavored to make technical improvements to satisfy their market, as well as
hardball tactics by their financial backers (who lured away several of Disney's animators). The material for this and several following paragraphs draws u p o n
Bryman [1995], unless otherwise noted.
6
The New Internationalist [1998], the Walt Disney Company 1997 Fact Book,
and de Cordova [1994] are drawn upon to disclose that, "In 1930 the first international licensing contract for the sale of Mickey Mouse m e r c h a n d i s e was
signed... [and that] ...the first Mickey Mouse watch was sold by Ingersoll Watch
Company in June, 1933" [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 19].
7
Disney's approach to licensing his animated characters for commercial
exploitation was highly successful very quickly: "...in 1932 sales of Disney character articles had totaled $300,000, in 1937 they were $35,000,000" [Bristol, 1938, p.
15]. That success has become institutionalized; in modern times there is a well
established and curiously seamless fusion of cinematic art with consumerism:
"Every Disney animated film comes bundled with a complete marketing strategy
for merchandise, interactive games and a line of children's books" [ N e w
Internationalist, 1998, p. 28].
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By 1934, the company employed 187 staff. Walt Disney decided to expand into the feature film business since "it was becoming
increasingly difficult to combine the growing costs of animation...
with the inherently limited returns that could accrue from shorts"
[Bryman, 1995, p. 9]. The company's first feature-length animation movie, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, which opened on
December 21, 1937, was a great success, at first critically and then
commercially.8 The company began other animated features
(Pinocchio, Fantasia, and Bambi), while continuing to produce
cartoon shorts. It soon outgrew its studio facilities. Plans for a
new, custom-designed studio were hatched in the summer of
1938, and the company, now with about 1,100 employees and
called "Walt Disney Productions," moved into its new studio in
May 1940. The decision to focus much of the company's efforts on
very expensive but potentially very profitable feature animated
films, as well as the related need for new production facilities,
prompted the company to raise funds from the public through a
preferred stock issue in April 1940. It subsequently released its
first published annual report in December of that year.
Disney Persona: By 1940, Walt Disney was acclaimed widely as an
international success. Indeed, even by the early 1930s, Disney had
reached a position of eminence that matched the greatest of
Hollywood stars. His admirers included Italian conductor
Toscanini and Russian film director Eisenstein, among a glittering
array of adoring fans [Costantino, 1991, p. 12]. Disney's Mickey
Mouse character became "a national figure, an international
attraction, and finally a cultural totem" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988,
p. 130]. Critics from New York to Leningrad were said to "gravely
laud him" [Fortune, 1934, p. 89].9 In 1934, his comedies were
exhibited in 88 countries, and he was said to be "an international
hero, better known than Roosevelt or Hitler, a part of the folklore
of the world" (p. 89). Watts [1997, p. 124] described the cultural
influence of Disney in the 1930s in the following way:

8

One wonders whether modern-day audiences would have been so receptive
to a female hero who was "young, virginal, pretty, sweet-natured and obedient" and
unfazed by domestic drudgery through absolute belief that "a handsome owningclass chap [would], someday soon, come and save her" [Maio, 1998, p. 12].
9
A11 references in this section are taken from Fortune [ 1934], unless otherwise
indicated.
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Universities...provided reinforcement for the
notion of Disney animation as art. In 1933, the
College Art Association helped arrange an exhibition of Disney drawings in New York. Five years
later, Harvard, Yale, and the University of Southern
California granted h o n o r a r y degrees to Walt
Disney...
The lengthy and major profile of Disney and his film-making
operations in Fortune magazine in 1934 portrayed him as a mythmaker. His products were said to enthrall audiences throughout
the world by bringing them to a "delicate balance between fantasy and fact, poetry and comic reality." They were said to appeal to
the simplest emotions and to give pleasure. They had "plasticity" —
nothing in a Disney film was impossible (p. 88). The themes of his
cartoons were such that "courage overcomes wickedness and fear;
industry triumphs over dalliance; false ambition gives way to resignation" (p. 88). In sum, they were short morality plays. They
were the epitome also of what has become known as "disneyfication" — "sanitized, safe, entertaining and predictable" entertainment [Ellwood, 1998, p. 8].
Disney has been described as a moody, deliberately "ordinary,"
informal man who, although having "rural gusto and naive fancy"
(p. 90), nonetheless had an imagination renowned for its fantastic
quality (p. 146). He was a stickler for high artistic standards; he
made daring and innovative use of music, sound, and folk material; and he was reported to "mistrust the shoddiness and hypocrisy
of the pseudo-artist" (p. 146). His personality was said to have
been shaped by "a nostalgic yearning for romance or simple values" and to have been affected by a "frugal, authoritarian and
moralistic" father [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 8].
But as Boje [1995] has argued, Disney had a "darker side." The
Dictionary of American Biography claimed that Disney became
"self-satisfied, intractable, arrogant" and was "probably never the
quite generous father of a gifted flock that he seemed on the surface" [Garraty and Carnes, 1988, p. 131]. "The discerning eye," it
was said, could find in his programs "breaches of taste, philistine
wisecracks, a milking of the nostalgic mood, slipshod cultural references, a growing dependence on received folklore and other
people's classics, and an increasingly slick technical achievement
of rather tawdry effects" [Garrety and Carnes, 1988, p. 131]. His
character Mickey Mouse was said to have been flawed by a streak
of sadism, and the film Fantasia was adjudged by some as a "prehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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tentious hodgepodge." He was alleged to be "both paternalistic
and domineering...he brooked no dissent, rewarding loyalists w i t h
favors and punishing dissidents" [New Internationalist,
1998, p.
8].
RHETORICAL QUALITIES OF THE 1940
LETTER TO STOCKHOLDERS
The Writer: In 1940, Walt Disney was not just another ordinary
corporate CEO writing a stockholders' letter for the first annual
report of a relatively small, n e w public company. As w e have
shown above, he was a cultural sensation. He had been written
about rather extensively in the 1930s in major national publications such as Fortune, New Yorker, American
Magazine,
Scribners, New York Times Magazine, Time, etc. [Bryman, 1995].
He was also someone w h o guarded with zeal his prerogatives to
lead and to control the results of his genius [Hollister, 1940]. As
Bryman [1995, p. 10] claimed, he was "forced" to issue shares
because of the company's debt. How might a cultural icon, w h o s e
creative genius had long been publicly acknowledged, contemplate the writing of a stockholders' letter as part of a compelled
accountability flowing from the apparently unwanted, but financially necessary, public offering? This question is important in a
rhetorical sense since "the speaker's life, insofar as it is public,
forms a long prelude to his speech" [Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca, 1958, p. 320].
The Audience: Modern annual reports, including the stockholders' letter, often have many audiences with diverse and partly conflicting interests. These audiences include current and potential
stockholders and debt holders, financial intermediaries, employees, unions, competitors and the public-at-large, among others.
While it seems reasonable to surmise that Disney's 1940 letter was
an important part of financial reporting intended for similar
diverse constituencies, perhaps the first among equals was the
n e w group of preferred stockholders. Disney was in a somewhat
invidious position for he had just been provided a financial lifeline
to sustain his company. He was confronted with the problem of
crafting a document mainly intended for the company's n e w preferred stockholders. He needed to be alert to the potential they
had to constrain his ownership and his pursuit of all things associated with his icon status. He would need to acknowledge the various operating and market difficulties the company had faced and
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the difficulties it might face in the future. Additionally, he would
have to explain effectively how top management (that is, the
Disney brothers) was firmly in control and leading the company
towards future success. In clear and compelling terms, he would
need to analyze the company's performance and prospects so as to
encourage strong and unwavering adherence to Disney's leadership of the newly public company. His letter would have to serve
as a public vehicle for sense making [Weick 1995, p. 13] by preferred stockholders and others interested in the company, including himself and his brother.
Rhetorical Characteristics of the Initial Substantive Section: The
1940 "Letter to Stockholders" is reproduced in Appendix 1. Its second section, following immediately after the w a r m but respectful
welcome, is headed "NEW STUDIO." It is reproduced below with
each sentence labeled for reference:
NEW STUDIO
[Sentence 1] At the time of the sale of the 6%
Cumulative Preferred Stock, the Company was
c o n s t r u c t i n g and e q u i p p i n g its n e w studio.
[Sentence 2] This studio was substantially completed and e q u i p p e d and virtually all of the
Company's p r o d u c t i o n operations w e r e transferred thereto by the end of May, 1940. [Sentence
3] As a result of the increased facilities, the
Company has been able to augment its production
of completed footage by more than 100% and has
succeeded in lowering the cost of production per
foot substantially. [Sentence 4] Therefore, the
Company will be able to carry out its n e w policy
of releasing two or more feature subjects each
year as well as a large number of short subjects.
[Sentence 5] As a result of the reduction in costs,
short subjects are now being produced at a figure
which the management believes will result in profitable releases even though sources of income in
certain foreign countries now at war are no longer
available.
Sentence 1 links the preferred stock issue (that is, the resources
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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provided by the "Stockholders" to whom the entire letter is
addressed) with the positive, forceful activities of "constructing
and equipping." While the "ing" endings are a weak example of
rhetorical use of repetition (homoioteleuton), the effect is made
rhetorically stronger by culminating in the fulfillment of a major
task ("completed," "transferred," "succeeded"). This is an extremely positive section of the letter, with good use of forceful action
words and a strong sense of direction. Indeed, Sentence 4 beginning "Therefore, the Company will be able to carry out its new
policy..." assures that promises will be kept and that the company
has a logical, rational plan unfolding as it should. It establishes the
following close, sequential linkage:
New financial resources from preferred stock issue
New, larger studio
Increased capacity and efficiency
Lower unit costs
Increase in number of features released and short subjects
Expected profits
This piling-up of arguments in support of expected profits,
rhetorically a sort of diallage, which Lanham [1991, p. 51]
explained as "bringing several arguments to establish a single
point," creates a sense of moving forward with an active, in-control management in charge.10
10

Within this piling-up of arguments are other rhetorical devices. First, repetition of the phrase "As a result o f at the start of sentence three and sentence five
interlaces two references to cost reduction. Such phrasal repetition verges on
anaphora, whereby the same words "are repeated at the beginning of successive
clauses..." [Lanham, 1991, p. 11]. Second, the use of action-oriented, decisive words
and phrases such as "At the time of the sale;" "was constructing," "was substantially completed;" "were transferred;" "As a result of;" "has succeeded;" "Therefore;"
"will be able," "now being produced;" and "will result in" is the textual equivalent
of epitrochasmus; that is, "a swift movement from one statement to the next; rapid
touching on many different points" [Lanham, 1991, p. 70].
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There is also a short, almost completely self-contained, fivesentence, morality-tale narrative of the American success story in
this passage. It seems fitting that Disney the storyteller would
incorporate narrative into his CEO discourse in the stockholders'
letter. After all, if important external constituencies, and internal
ones as well, buy into top management's strategic narrative, such
discourse has certainly served its purpose [Barry and Elmes,
1997]. The uncertainty associated with the business is incorporated subtly, almost unobtrusively, by the use of words "substantially"
and "believes" and the rather soft introduction of the threat to
"sources of income in certain foreign countries n o w at war."
The story narrated in this passage seems almost as fictional as
a Disney cartoon, thereby making the rhetorical quality of the section more interesting. The company had borrowed considerably
to establish its n e w facilities and expand its work force. It had
done so believing that more lucrative opportunities would flow
from animated features rather than from short subjects. But cost
control problems, some market resistance, and the European war
had intervened. This had compelled the Disney brothers to do
something they did not want to do — issue preferred stock to
reduce part of the debt and provide them with some liquid funds.
Given these events, it is contestable w h e t h e r Disney was in control of his company to the extent that might be demanded. Thus,
his use of rhetoric was adept and skillful impression management,
directed to portraying what was arguably a mirage; that is, of
Disney being decisive and in control of all dimensions of his company's affairs [Salancik and Meindl, 1984].
"EFFECTS OF THE WAR'' and "PRODUCT": The contrast between
the second and third sections is dramatic. While the second section was upbeat and optimistic, there unfolds in the third section
a series of negative news about the impact of the war, again characteristic of diallage. The first sentence of this section ["The effect
of the war in Europe u p o n the affairs of your Company has been
serious and the full measure thereof cannot yet be determined"
(emphasis added)], stands in stark contrast to the previous section's final sentence in which the war was blamed almost as an
afterthought for making "sources of income in certain foreign
countries" "no longer available." Why the sharp, sudden alteration
in message? Perhaps it had to do with Walt Disney's problems as a
leader and an entrepreneur in 1940. He had an unpalatable story
to tell in his company's first public annual report, especially about
the almost catastrophic problems with Pinocchio. According to
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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the 1940 annual report, $1 million of the $2.6 million cost of producing this animated feature was written off during the year
because of the combined effects of market conditions and the
excessive costs. (See Appendix 1 under the heading "PINOCCHIO.") Thus, first serving up some bad news about the impact of
the war, the effect of which had already been marginalized to
some degree at the end of the previous section, might be seen as
a skillful use of "order" as a rhetorical device.
But the rhetoric is even more skillful and subtle. Disney refers
to "the" Company on 44 occasions in the letter. Only once, and in
this section, does he refer to "your" Company. In doing so, he
heightens the emphatic effect, helping to steer home the implications of the bad news to shareholders. His tone, for whatever reason, is almost accusatory, as if the shareholders were answerable
for the bad news.
The letter begins with very good news about increasing production, reducing costs, and anticipating profits. These successes
were due to factors presumably controllable by management. The
next section describes the potential impact of the war in very
general terms — the war being, of course, beyond the control of
management. The following section, headed "PRODUCT,"
describes the even more sombre news about Pinocchio and the
possible bad news about Fantasia. The bad news about Pinocchio
is first reported as due to "the conditions prevailing throughout
the world" (see subsection headed "PINOCCHIO"), in other
words, beyond management's control. Despite this, later in the
same subsection, the letter mentions the company's growth ("the
transition period through which the Company passed when it
changed its policy of making one feature in two years...to a policy
of producing from two to four features a year...") and the "discarded work of untrained personnel," "the schooling and training of
personnel," and "inadequate plant facilities" before moving into
the new studio.
The portion of the third section devoted to Fantasia reminds
the reader that the company is an innovator, and that innovation
sometimes requires changing strategies and profit expectations.
The remainder of the fourth section provides a barrage of upbeat
news about new animated features, cartoons in process, and other
sources of revenue.
Disney's Rhetorical Use of Accounting: Aho [ 1985] and Carruthers
and Espeland [1991] have argued that accounting is powerfully
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rhetorical. Disney displayed an innate understanding of this feature of accounting in his stockholders' letter. Under the heading
"GENERAL," Disney attacks the strictures of accounting convention by invoking a statement made in the company's formal, legal
prospectus inviting subscriptions in the preferred stock issue. The
portion of the section reads as follows (sentences are n u m b e r e d
for reference purposes):
[Sentence 1] In considering the profit and loss
statement of the Company, it is worth while to
repeat the following statement made in t h e
prospectus offering the 6% Convertible Preferred
Stock:
[Sentence 2] "The Company's principal income
accrues according to the rapidity with which its
features are exhibited in theatres and, accordingly,
the relationship between dates of release and
dates of accounting periods has in the past produced and will probably continue in the future to
produce wide variations in earnings as they may
from time to time be reported. [Sentence 3] This
is made more pronounced by a program which
contemplates the release of only one or two features per year. [Sentence 4] In connection with
SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS, the
Company adopted a policy of writing off the
entire cost of the picture against the first revenues
received, and the Company may in the future follow this policy with respect to all of its feature productions. [Sentence 5] Consequently, if any given
accounting period closes at a time w h e n revenues
have failed to exceed the costs incurred in connection with the production of a feature released
during such period, it is possible that a loss may be
reported in such period notwithstanding the fact
that an actual profit may eventually be realized on
such feature."
In Sentence 1, Disney invokes the authority of the prospectus,
a legal document that had been approved by the California authorities. This appeal to authority, or apomnemonysis
[Lanham, 1991,
p. 191], gives added weight to the text. Such a rhetorical move is
quite consistent with the central role that appeal to authority,
often embodied in GAAP, serves in modern accounting. The
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prospectus excerpt is cited in sentences 2, 3, and 4 to tell of the
company's virtuous accounting by which the entire cost of animated features is written off against the first revenues received, a
conservative accounting policy, at least in the short run. In sentence 5, the excerpt suggests strongly that resulting accounting
losses are an artifact of the interplay between this conservative
accounting policy and the arbitrariness of the relationship
between accounting periods and revenues. In effect, Disney signals to the letter's readers the company's sobriety of purpose by
using a conservative method of accounting. 11 But h e t h e n draws
u p o n this excerpt from the preferred stock prospectus to urge
readers not to take t h e resultant accounting too seriously.
Rhetorically, he seems to want to have it both ways; e.g., conservative accounting shows evidence of the social virtue of conservatism, but accounting itself can be relied u p o n only to an extent.
Can he have it both ways?12 Can Disney both draw u p o n the
authority of accounting to influence readers and almost at the
same time plead the arbitrariness of certain accounting conventions, such as the accounting period convention? Accounting is
such a rhetorically serviceable and elastic mode of representation
and argument that it is not surprising that Disney, the creative storyteller, employs it thus.
However, the conservative method of revenue recognition
chosen by Disney had a decidedly unconservative side as well.
Feature animated films whose costs had been fully recovered
could be taken off the shelf and distributed again with 100% of the
producer's revenues during these re-releases going directly to the
company's before-tax profits. This happened with Snow White in
1940—that year's income statement in the annual report included
revenues of $103,526 from the reissue of Snow White, but
revealed no costs in 1940 since all production costs for the picture
had b e e n recovered in previous years. So the conservative
accounting used by Disney had a temporal dimension—very conservative in early years in which feature film production activity
was high and unconservative once such features were completed

11

Indeed, the financial statement footnotes in the 1940 annual report reveal
the method of accounting to be conservative twice over. Not only were profits on
an animated feature not admitted to the company's accounting system until all of a
feature's costs of production had been recovered, but Disney did not account for
any revenues at all until cash was received from a film's distributor.
12
A reviewer raised this dual nature of accounting argument in the stockholders' letter.
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and went into re-release. Since 1940 was one of these "early years,"
this unconservative side remained unobtrusive during the crucial
year of 1940.
In the 1941 stockholders' letter, Walt Disney demonstrated further his rhetorical capability to use accounting strategically. He
constructed, or more likely had his accountants construct, a
detailed accounting comparison between the company's 1941 and
its 1940 results. He included this comparison near the beginning
of the 1941 letter (see Appendix 2). He was using accounting
information to show that in spite of a reported loss of $789,297 in
1941, many features highlighted in this artfully constructed comparison suggested strongly that great progress had been made in
1941 as compared with 1940. Constructing such an unusual
accounting schedule and placing it near the front of his stockholders' letter, where it more or less dominated and conditioned
perceptions of the rest of the letter and perhaps the rest of the
entire 1941 annual report, was a skillful rhetorical move. The
authority of the accounting information used, drawn from the
audited financial statements, was apomnemonysis combined with
"order" in persuasive harmony.
The "Summary of the Balance Sheet and Income Statement,"
presented in the 1941 Stockholders' Letter, seems skillful rhetorically in another sense as well. It presented a gross mass of numbers across 3 x 8 digit columns, 26 rows long. Clearly, the notions
of accounting materiality and "rounding" had not been embraced
by Disney or his accounting advisors, as the financial data were
presented to the precise dollar and cent. Although this may have
reflected Disney's reputation for "attention to detail," it may also
have been a rhetorical ploy. This so-called "Summary" was a visual
onslaught likely to test, and find wanting, all but the most determined, accounting-trained readers. Perhaps it was a visual
metaphor used as a rhetorical device, a way for Disney to vent his
frustration with the complexity and confounding nature of
accounting methods and practices. For such a skillful graphic
artist, one who was renowned for the most beautiful of screen
images, the "Financial Summary" was out of character. Whereas
Disney was a creative graphic artist, adept at fashioning compelling and beautiful screen images, when it came to conscripting
something as mundane as accounting data to craft the (financial)
story he wished to tell, the end result was metaphorically a barrage of numbers bereft of aesthetic appeal, but perhaps a classic
rhetoric move. More simply however, this could have merely been
brother Roy's influence.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13

76

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2000, Vol. 27, no. 2
68

Accounting Historians Journal, December 2000

The Rhetoric of an Accountability Document: It is not surprising
to find that the 1940 letter to stockholders was well constructed
rhetorically. After all, Walt Disney had by this time a universal reputation as a master storyteller. So why would he not use this talent
in telling his company's financial story during a period of crisis in
a way that might be expected to garner positive reaction from his
audience? Financial reporting, in both its qualitative and quantitative aspects, is like all text, and discourse generally, unavoidably
rhetorical. Disney was as skilled at giving a financial account as he
was at giving an account of Mickey's latest adventure.
Understanding the inherent rhetorical nature of such discourse is
important to understanding the role such discourse plays in
accountability.
Indeed, in any accountability document (such as a set of audited financial statements, a stockholders' letter, a variance report, a
corporate press release), there is a vast array of rhetorical choices
available which the author might apply with greater or lesser
degrees of awareness. Such choices, made even subconsciously by
the author, influence the perceptions of the audience. Our analysis of some rhetoric features of Disney's letter has merely touched
the surface of possibilities; for example, we might have explored
more deeply the argument schemes apparent in the letter
[Warnick and Kline, 1992], examined ways in which the letter
dealt rhetorically with its composite audiences [Myers, 1999], analyzed text structure, and metadiscourse [Hyland, 1998], etc.
Having established, we submit, that the letter was crafted skillfully in a rhetorical sense, we now focus our attention on the nexus
between rhetoric and ideology. We read Disney's letter with
metaphor uppermost in mind since it is largely through metaphor
that we might begin to understand a text's "ideological agenda
that is apt to be hidden from view" [Postman, 1993, p. 124].
METAPHOR IN THE 1940 LETTER
Metaphor is a central aspect of rhetoric. Among recent contributors to the extensive literature on metaphor, Eubanks [ 1999,
p. 195] has made a case that:
...metaphor is rhetorically constituted. No
metaphor is spoken or written except in the context of a sociohistorically bound communicative
situation. Therefore, all metaphors are inflected by
politics, economics, philosophy, social interests,
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professional commitments, and personal attitudes
— in short by the whole of our cultural and conceptual repertoire. Because metaphors are inflected, we cannot explain how they work unless we
consider concrete instances of metaphor, taking
into account h o w inflections constrain the way
metaphors are uttered and understood.
Eubanks asserted that metaphors are "fundamentally responsive," and thus cannot be understood by themselves (i.e., "atomized"), but rather only in relation to "metaphoric and literal concepts that are already in motion within a culture's (or subculture's) discourse." As a consequence:
Because metaphors are concretely responsive and
because c o m p e t e n t speakers and w r i t e r s are
aware, consciously and unconsciously, of the
interplay of metaphors and concepts, the utterance of a metaphor carries rhetorical benefits or
costs...Speakers and writers build consensus and
risk rhetorical capital w h e n selecting and reenvoicing metaphors. However, they manage that
risk complexly by claiming, ascribing, and shifting
the metaphors they utter [Eubanks, 1999, pp. 195196].
Metaphor theory has a long, rich, and unsettled history. Some
contend that metaphor is simply flowery but unnecessary. But
many scholars would agree with Postman [1996, p. 174] that "a
metaphor is not an ornament. It is an organ of perception."
Others suggest intriguingly that thought itself is fundamentally
metaphorical [Gibbs, 1994], and that metaphorical language is
merely the surface manifestation of an underlying cognitive mapping between two domains—a target domain and a source domain
[Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993]. Considerable persuasive
evidence, much of it summarized by Gibbs [1994], provides support for the view that metaphor is basic to thought, and that there
are systematic relationships among metaphorical structures. For
example, Lakoff [1993, pp. 222-224] wrote about a metaphorical
mapping hierarchy whose highest level is the fundamental "event
structure" metaphor.
Scholars in a wide variety of fields have taken up the seriousness of metaphor. Harrington [1995] argued persuasively that
G e r m a n race ideology was made m o r e virulent t h r o u g h
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metaphoric processes; Dunn [1990] showed how the "root
metaphor" of the new industrial relations has facilitated the erection of a new industrial relations paradigm; Miller and Fredericks
[1990] argued that metaphors used in a major educational policy
document revealed a particular ideological predisposition that
foreclosed alternative recommendations; Daughton [1993]
claimed that Franklin Delano Roosevelt's use of metaphor of a
holy war contributed to the immediate impact and enduring influence of his first inaugural speech; and Postman [1996, p. 174]
pleaded rhetorically and, of course, metaphorically to educators
by asking: "Do I exaggerate in saying that a student cannot understand what a subject is about without some understanding of the
metaphors that are its foundation?"
We suggest that the metaphor, "the company is a sentient
being on a purposeful journey traversing an at-times hostile environment," permeates the 1940 Disney stockholders' letter, and
that this metaphor is consistent with the fundamental and pervasive event-structure metaphor hierarchy described by Lakoff
[1993]. Evidence supporting this contention includes the following metaphoric language from the section headed "NEW STUDIO": (1) "...the Company was constructing and equipping its new
studio," (2) "...the Company's production operations...," (3) "...the
Company has been able to augment its production...," (4) "...the
Company will be able to carry out its new policy..." These may be
argued to be instances of verbal reification, but they are also
instances of attributing sentience and purposiveness to the
Company. Such ways of talking and writing about companies are
commonplace, and it is perhaps because they are commonplace
that they are rhetorically important.
There are numerous other instances of reification of the company as an active agent that has commercial "affairs" (e.g., "EFFECT
OF THE WAR": "The effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of
your Company..."); that takes action (e.g., "PRODUCT": "...the
Company delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc."); that enjoys benefits (e.g., "PINOCCHIO": "...there have accrued to the credit of the
Company..."); that creates saleable names and characters (e.g.,
"SHORT SUBJECTS"); that has expectations about the future (e.g.,
"GENERAL": "...the Company expects to have three new feature
pictures in general release..."), etc. Perhaps the most important
language manifestation of this metaphor is under the heading
"PINOCCHIO" in which Disney writes: "...the transition period
through which the Company passed when it changed its policy of
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making one feature in two years...to a policy of producing from
two to four features a year." Here, we have a company that not only
pursues the sentient activity of changing a policy, but also has to
endure passage through a transition period on its journey.
An obvious objection to this analysis might be that these are
merely words, and besides, many managers talk and write about
their company in similar ways. But that is the point; "managers
work with words" [Jonsson, 1998, p. 411]. The modern theory of
metaphor suggests strongly that words matter because they influence the way those uttering those words think and act.
Calling a company "a sentient being on a purposeful journey
traversing an at-times hostile environment" has several implications and entailments. The company, a sentient being, knows best
through its means of cognition and decision making (i.e., its leadership) about its goals and how to achieve them; about which path
through the at-times hostile environment to take; and h o w to
adapt w h e n circumstances change. Therefore, acknowledging the
interests of other stakeholders is limited and perhaps utilitarian.
These other stakeholders are not part of the being itself (i.e., the
company) unless they submit to the authority of the company as a
sentient being—a strongly managerialist view. Further, any obstacles in the path are adversaries and goals are non-negotiable. 13 To
see the consistency of these ideas in Disney's managerial discourse, w e take a brief look at the 1941 stockholders' letter (see
Appendix 2).
In the section "LABOR RELATIONS" in the 1941 stockholders'
letter, Disney describes the company's journey as "beset by labor
troubles" and ventures the observation that this obstacle to purposeful travel has occurred in 1941 "[f]or the first time in its history." This section describes Disney's view of the famous 1941
strike, a view in sharp contrast to Disney's hostile, and perhaps at
13

A reviewer, rightly in our view, proffered objections to a version of this
metaphor which we called "the company is a sentient being on a purposeful journey" as follows: "Could there be an explanation that is a little less grand? Basic company law tells us that limited liability companies enjoy separate legal form. It could
simply be that what is seen here is a playing out of that, with the company being
accorded its own identity in the text as a consequence of this commonplace
usage..." While undoubtedly this is true, a reader of Disney's stockholders' letter
would be p r u d e n t not to ignore the strong, pervasive strain of Midwestern independence that several scholars have attributed to Walt Disney [Bryman, 1995;
Schickel, 1968/1997; Watts, 1997] and which seems to have conditioned greatly his
conception and attitudes towards his company, the product of his creative, emotional, and physical labors.
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times illegal, anti-union activity summarized in Boje [1995],
Schickel [1968/1997], and Watts [1997]. If we think of a "company as a sentient being on a purposeful journey," then what do we
think of the people who attempt to unionize and impede the journey? Disney characterizes the 1941 cutbacks which led in part to
the union activity and to a subsequent strike as a
"program...designed to bring output in line with results reasonably to be anticipated from the distribution of the Company's pictures under present world conditions." He portrayed it as a technical problem that required a reasonable technical solution. Thus,
the union advocates and strikers, who Boje [1995, pp. 1014-1015]
pointed out had several complaints about their inequitable treatment by Disney, were the source of the "labor troubles" that
"beset" the company. The impression is one of Big Labor and its
goons ganging up on the company (the American Federation Of
Labor is mentioned, as are "secondary boycotts" and "'hot cargo'
activities"). The arbitration award is described as being "imposed"
on the company (the word is used twice in the section). So the
metaphor established in the 1940 stockholders' letter is carried
over to the 1941 letter and is consistent in its entailments: unreasonable employees joined a union and went on strike, preventing
the company from implementing a reasonable program to help it
on its journey. Then, despite "[r]epeated efforts by the Company
to effect a settlement," government came in and arbitrated a settlement, which imposed several bad things, further impeding the
journey. However, everything "is now operating smoothly" in
spite of these obstacles.
Despite these comforting words, Disney was apparently in no
mood to have future journeys disrupted by what he regarded as
ideologically perverted union behavior. The 1941 strike is said to
have caused him to become "a militant anti-communist" and, in
the 1950s, "a [secret] special FBI agent charged with passing on
information about supposed communist infiltration" of
Hollywood [New Internationalist, 1998, p. 8]. His embrace of a
business structure of vertical integration in which, for example,
his company controls not only the production of film and television programs, but also controls their distribution and associated
product licensing and retail merchandising sales, points to the
adoption of the metaphor of the uninterrupted journey as a tangible business goal.
Carrier [1997, p. 51] described "a public language" of "the
Market model" which he alleged:
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...provides the vocabulary and conceptual equipment that make it relatively easy to define certain
sorts of things as problems and relatively hard to
define other sorts of things that way. Just as it
influences the sorts of problems that can be
addressed, so it influences what is likely to appear
as an acceptable, plausible solution.
Like a lingua franca, such a version of the "Market" helps create "an
external reality that [people] have to adopt if they are to communicate with others" [Carrier, 1997, p. 49]. Carrier was concerned
with the idea of the "Free Market" in the 1990s, and h o w such a
richly complex metaphor affects people's arguments, decisions,
and public debates. He traced the most important historical roots
of the "Market" to 18th and 19th century Britain. Importantly for
purposes of this paper, he concluded that "...in popular consciousness the idea flourishes best in the United States, with its
long traditions of that secular, acquisitive individualism and concern with equality of process rather than of outcome that form
part of the Market" [Carrier, 1997, p. vii].
Disney's ideological notion of his company is metaphorical in
the same sense as Carrier's notion of the "Market." Disney's company is related intimately to Carrier's "Market," for the company
metaphorically pursues its life-journey largely by entering into
transactions within the ambit of this metaphorical market. And
since, as Carrier [1997] reminded us, such a metaphorical market
is a "Free Market," anything that interferes with such metaphorical
freedom is to be treated with non-metaphorical hostility (e.g., the
national labor union with which Disney's striking employees
allied themselves in 1941). Perhaps warfare was not restricted,
metaphorically or otherwise, just to Europe in 1941.
Eubanks' [1999, p. 195] contention that "all metaphors are
inflected by politics, economics, philosophy, social interests, professional commitments, and personal attitudes" seems apt here
since the fiercely independent and self-made Disney probably
could conceive of his company in no way other than the
metaphoric representation described above. His discourse in the
1940 and 1941 stockholders' letters set out his ideology and philosophy of management and management control. Such discourse
represented, in effect, the way he made sense of the world.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have used the themes of rhetoric and metaphor to examine the 1940 stockholders' letter of Walt Disney Productions, the
first such accountability document signed by Walt Disney, and, to
a lesser extent, the 1941 letter. These letters provide an accounting, a story, that Disney intended to craft within the confines of
the tensions between his company's financial exigencies and his
creative, iconic persona. Walt Disney was as skilled in designing
financial reporting and accountability narrative and discourse as
he was in creating animated cartoons and features. The letters
seem crafted with the goal to forge allegiance with the new preferred stockholders firmly in mind in spite of his strong resentment. And if we take seriously the current literature of cognitive
metaphor, the letters also reveal features of Disney's thinking,
especially about key social and economic institutions. In sum,
although the narrative part of financial accounting examined here
is rhetorically and linguistic complex, the analyses conducted
expose the types of insights that help render management and the
companies they lead more understandable. Disney as accountant
was ever as complex as Disney the cultural icon.
An ongoing and important task addressed by historians is that
of revealing and analyzing the character, personality, and behavior
of corporations and their CEOs. In pursuing that task, important
insights about corporations and individuals have been sourced
from many quarters. But rarely have historians delved into the
narrative discourse of CEOs in annual reports when seeking to
add to the arsenal of information they marshal in support of biographic profiles, corporate histories, or other historical text. This
paper provides an example of how analysis of narrative discourse
by CEOs in annual reports can add to and enrich understanding of
leading corporations and their chief executives.
The insights offered through adoption of a "close reading" of
CEO text have been demonstrated clearly here. By focusing on the
rhetorical, metaphorical, and ideological features of Walt Disney's
1940 letter to stockholders, insight into the behavior and character of Walt Disney and the Disney Corporation is provided. Our
analysis reveals Walt Disney to be a skillful, yet subtle rhetorician,
whose rhetorical capabilities encompass a deft capacity to manipulate accounting data strategically. Disney was not only a master
storyteller in the surreal surrounds of the cinema where he could
exploit the glitz and glamor of visual and sound imagery. Perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, he is revealed as very adept also in a grey
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and glamor-free domain with which few would remotely imagine
associating him — financial reporting. Our analysis reveals Disney
as a very clever storyteller in weaving rhetorical magic in the
realm of the mundane — accountability narratives in an annual
report.
By exploring Disney's use of metaphor, w e show h o w further
perspectives can be developed and h o w this assists us in entering
theoretical speculations about Disney's ideological motivations.
Our analysis yields results which, in the main, are contrary to the
popular, ambient image of Walt Disney; that is, as the wholesome,
friendly "Uncle Walt." Somewhat perversely, w e find evidence
consistent with what w e reported earlier as Walt Disney's "darker
side." He is revealed as something of an enigma, the cultural icon
w h o seemed almost as adept at crafting financial narrative in a
hard-nosed business world as he was at fashioning animation.
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APPENDIX 1
Letter to Stockholders for the 1940 Walt Disney Productions
Annual Report
To the Stockholders of Walt Disney
Productions:
In April, 1940, Walt Disney Productions sought and obtained the participation of the public
in its business through the sale of 155,000 shares of 6% Cumulative Convertible Preferred
Stock, and the Board of Directors herewith submits its first annual report to the Company's
n e w stockholders.
Included herein are financial statements of the Company for the fiscal year ended September
28, 1940, accompanied by the report of the Company's auditors, Messrs. Price, Waterhouse &
Co. We invite your attention to the notes which are attached to and constitute an integral part
of the financial statements.
Your management believes that it will be of interest to our 1,800 stockholders to supplement
the information shown in the financial statements with the following additional facts pertaining to the Company.
NEW STUDIO
At the time of the sale of the 6% Cumulative Preferred Stock, the Company was constructing
and equipping its n e w studio. This studio was substantially completed and equipped and virtually all of the Company's production operations were transferred thereto by the end of May,
1940. As a result of the increased facilities, the Company has been able to augment its production of completed footage by more than 100% and has succeeded in lowering the cost of production per foot substantially. Therefore, the Company will be able to carry out its n e w policy
of releasing two or more feature subjects each year as well as a large n u m b e r of short subjects.
As a result of the reduction in costs, short subjects are now being produced at a figure which
the management believes will result in profitable releases even though sources of income in
certain foreign countries n o w at war are no longer available.
EFFECT OF THE WAR
The effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of your Company has been serious and the
full measure thereof cannot yet be determined. It has been impossible to effect an orderly
release of the Company's pictures in any of the countries at war and in many countries it has
been impossible to effect any release whatsoever. In fact, in most of the territories dominated
by the Axis Powers, the release of American pictures has been forbidden. In addition, currency restrictions and regulations, as well as fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, have served to
reduce further the Company's income from such pictures as were already released in foreign
countries.
PRODUCT
During the year, the Company delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., the organization currently distributing our pictures, one feature picture and ten short subjects and has in current
production a n u m b e r of other features and short subjects. Developments in connection with
the Company's product are summarized as follows:
PINOCCHIO:
PINOCCHIO was first shown at the Center Theatre in New York on February 7, 1940, and
at the Pantages and Hillstreet Theatres in Los Angeles on February 10, 1940. It was subsequently released for general exhibition on February 23, 1940. To the end of the Company's fiscal year, September 28, 1940, this picture had earned gross world film rentals of $ 1,673,956.54
of which $1,627,331.79 represented film rentals from the United States and Canada. The
Company has received from its distributors as its net share of the world film rentals,
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$976,211.94. In addition, there have accrued to the credit of the Company, certain funds in
Great Britain and Australasia amounting to £5818.7.5, which have been blocked by currency
restrictions.
The Company has prepared Spanish and Portuguese language versions of this picture
which are currently being shown in all the countries of Central and South America, as well as
in the Philippine Islands and Portugal. No income from the Spanish and Portuguese language
versions of PINOCCHIO is reflected in the above-mentioned film rentals as the picture was
released in those countries too late for any such revenue to be included in the year ended
September 28, 1940.
The total cost of producing PINOCCHIO was $2,595,379.66 and it is n o w anticipated that
this amount will not be recouped under the conditions prevailing throughout the world.
Accordingly, a charge of $1,000,000 has been made to provide for the excess of cost of this picture over the estimated total revenue.
The picture PINOCCHIO was planned and production was started prior to the outbreak
of the European war. Consequently, it was budgeted on a program contemplating income from
all countries where SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS had been released. In addition,
this production suffered from excessive cost which was a direct result of the transition period
through which the Company passed w h e n it changed its policy of making one feature in two
years (SNOW WHITE was released in January, 1938), to a policy of producing from two to four
features a year as presently projected. These excessive costs cannot be segregated as they very
largely represent discarded work of untrained personnel. PINOCCHIO was produced during a
period of development and expansion. These factors which included the schooling and training of personnel to meet the increased production needs, together with inadequate plant facilities at the old studios, contributed in no small measure to the high cost of this production.
FANTASIA:
FANTASIA was exhibited for the first time at the Broadway Theatre in New York on
November 13, 1940. This picture is an innovation in the field of entertainment, featuring
Leopold Stokowski and the Philadelphia Orchestra in a program of music as interpreted by
Walt Disney and the Company's staff of artists and technicians. FANTASIA is being presented
by methods never before employed in the exhibition of motion pictures. The exhibition of this
production requires special sound equipment and the Company has contracted to purchase
sufficient equipment so that the picture can be distributed simultaneously in twelve theatres.
It is now planned to distribute the picture by the "road show" method in the first-run cities of
the United States, Canada and other large centers. The management believes this method of
distribution will result in an eventual realization of revenue in excess of that which would be
realized by ordinary methods of distribution. However, this method of distribution will require
a longer period of time for the Company to recoup the cost of the picture.
OTHER FEATURES:
Three other feature length pictures currently in production are planned for release during the fiscal year ending September 27, 1941. THE RELUCTANT DRAGON is a combination of
animated cartoon and "live action" comedy, featuring the well-known humorist, Robert
Benchley BAMBI is a dramatization, through the medium of the animated cartoon, of the wellknown book of the same name by Felix Salten. A distribution contract for both of the last-mentioned features has been entered into with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. The name and basic story
of the picture, DUMBO, THE FLYING ELEPHANT were purchased by the Company and are
being developed by our staff into a feature length cartoon.
Among the features scheduled for release in 1942 are PETER PAN and WIND IN THE WILLOWS.
SHORT SUBJECTS:
During the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940 the Company delivered to RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc. a total of ten short subjects and contemplates delivery of twenty short subjects
during the fiscal year 1941. These pictures continue in high popular favor and should prove to
be a profitable part of the Company's business inasmuch as the increased efficiency made possible by the new plant has materially reduced production costs.
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The Company has recently extended its releasing contract with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.
to cover a fourth series of eighteen short subjects.
The Company presently has twenty-eight short subjects in various stages of production.
OTHER ENDEAVORS
Names and characters created by the Company and licensed for use on merchandise, etc. continue to have a wide-spread appeal. Royalties from this source, from books and music, and revenue from comic strips and art sales, constitute a substantial portion of the income of the
Company.
GENERAL
The inventory of pictures in process at the close of the fiscal year was the largest in the
Company's history. The total cost of the feature length and short subjects in production was
$3,650,256.67. These pictures represented a total film length of 44,490 feet. In addition there
were 149 stories in our inventory on which we had spent $367,275.41. The system of budget
control both as to cost and output was revised w h e n the Company moved to the n e w studio,
with the result that both feature pictures and short subjects are presently being completed on
schedule and at their budgeted costs.
Your management has reduced expenses and has taken aggressive steps toward lowering
production costs by increasing efficiency and eliminating dispensable activities.
In considering the profit and loss statement of the Company, it is worth while to repeat
the following statement made in the prospectus offering the 6% Convertible Preferred Stock:
"The Company's principal income accrues according to the rapidity with which its features are
exhibited in theatres and, accordingly, the relationship between dates of release and dates of
accounting periods has in the past produced and will probably continue in the future to produce wide variations in earnings as they may from time to time be reported. This is made more
pronounced by a program which contemplates the release of only one or two features per year.
In connection with SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS, the Company adopted a policy
of writing off the entire cost of the picture against the first revenues received, and the
Company may in the future follow this policy with respect to all of its feature productions.
Consequently, if any given accounting period closes at a time w h e n revenues have failed to
exceed the costs incurred in connection with the production of a feature released during such
period, it is possible that a loss may be reported in such period notwithstanding the fact that
an actual profit may eventually be realized on such feature."
During the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940, the Company had only one new feature
picture-PINOCCHIO-in release.
The Company also re-issued SNOW WHITE in the United States and Canada in July, 1940.
This was released as the WALT DISNEY FESTIVAL in conjunction with four Walt Disney short
subjects and is currently doing a satisfactory business.
During the next fiscal year ending September 27, 1941, the Company expects to have
three new feature pictures in general release, in addition to its quota of n e w short subjects.
These pictures should reflect the benefit accruing to the Company by reason of the training
and skill acquired by the artists during the last three years. While the serious effect on the
Company's business caused by the loss of foreign markets cannot be minimized, nevertheless
your management now believes it has adjusted the Company's operations to a schedule of production and costs designed to be independent of those markets.
CAPITAL STOCK
At a meeting of the directors held on February 24, 1940, the capital stock of the Company was
reclassified into 755,000 shares, of which 600,000 shares were designated as Common Stock
(with a par value of $5 a share), and 155,000 shares were designated as 6% Cumulative
Convertible Preferred Stock (with a par value of $25 per share). 300,000 shares of Common
Stock ($5 par value) were thereupon issued in exchange for 150,000 shares of Common Stock
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($10 par value) previously outstanding, and 45,000 shares of Common Stock were issued as a
15% stock dividend on the new amount of outstanding stock. 10,000 shares of Common Stock
were issued to Walter E. Disney and Roy O. Disney in consideration of the cancellation of
$200,000 indebtedness of the Company to them. 150,000 shares of preferred Stock were sold
to the public through underwriters for net proceeds of $3,412,500 and 5,000 shares were sold
to officers and employees for $125,000.
An initial dividend of 37 l / 2 c was paid July 1, 1940, to the Preferred stockholders of
record June 15, 1940, and a regular quarterly dividend of 37 l / 2 c was paid October 1, 1940, to
Preferred stockholders of record September 16, 1940. The regular quarterly dividend of 37
l/2c payable January 1, 1941, to Preferred stockholders of record December 16, 1940, was
declared by the Board of Directors at a meeting held December 2, 1940. This dividend will be
paid from the Company's initial surplus. No dividends were paid on the Common Stock.
DIRECTORS
During the year, Edward M. Francis resigned as a director of the Company and in his place the
board elected Jonathan B. Lovelace as the representative of the Preferred stockholders in anticipation of Paragraph 9 of Article 5 of the Articles of Incorporation, as amended, which provides that:
"Holders of the Preferred Stock, voting separately as a class and entitled to one vote per share,
shall be entitled at the first annual meeting of the Corporation after the close of the fiscal year
ending September 28, 1940, and annually thereafter, to elect one Director of the Corporation
to hold office for a term of one (1) year and until his successor shall have been elected.''
EMPLOYEES
At September 28, 1940, the organization consisted of a total of 1179 employees.
The Directors want to take this opportunity of thanking all members of the organization,
whose loyalty and co-operation have contributed in such large measure to the continued
progress of the Company.
FOR THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
WALTER E. DISNEY, President.
APPENDIX 2
Letter to Stockholders for the 1941 Walt Disney Productions Annual Report
To the Stockholders

of Walt Disney

Productions:

We submit herewith as part of this annual report to stockholders financial statements of
the Company for the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, accompanied by the report of the
Company's auditors, Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Co. We direct your attention to the notes
which are attached to and constitute an integral part of the financial statements.
FOREWORD
In our annual report to stockholders issued in December, 1940, and covering the fiscal
year ended September 28, 1940, we stated, "the effect of the war in Europe upon the affairs of
your Company has been serious and the full measure thereof cannot yet be determined." It was
evident that the loss of foreign markets necessitated a sharp lowering in production costs in
order to assure a profit from the remaining markets. The Company immediately took steps
toward that objective. Since the date of that report there has been a further deterioration in
the foreign markets and the Company again found it necessary to reduce materially its operating expenses and personnel in order to consolidate its position. As this program was being
placed in effect, a strike was called by a minority group of the Company's employees. This
development, discussed later in this report under the heading "Labor Relations," resulted in a
retardation of our production schedule and interfered with the delivery and exhibition of
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product already completed.
Following is a summary of income account and balance sheet items taken from the financial statements published on pages 8 to 10 of this report, compared with corresponding figures in last year's report:
Fiscal year
Income Account
Income from short subjects less
amortization
Income from royalties, comic strips,
art work, licenses, etc., less costs
Income from "Snow White and
the Seven Dwarfs"
Total
Administrative and selling expenses
Balance
Interest expense
Profit (loss) before provision
for losses on features
Provision for excess cost of features
over estimated net income
Balance (loss)
Balance Sheets
Cash and receivables
Inventories at cost:
Pictures in process, etc.
Unamortized picture costs
Total current and working assets,
before deducting reserves
Deduct provision for excess of
cost over estimated net income
from feature pictures
Current and working assets
as per balance sheet
Bank loans
Other liabilities, reserve for taxes
and deferred income
Total liabilities
Excess of current and working assets (as stated) over all liabilities
Deposits in foreign banks at current
rates
Land, buildings and equipment at
cost less reserve for depreciation
Copyrights, trademarks and patents
less reserve for amortization
Deferred charges
Total net assets, as per balance
sheet
Funds not taken into books
representing blocked currencies at
current official rates, approximately

1941

1940

$ 457,391.61

$ 131,668.88

185,253.97

267,898.90

Increase
(decrease)
$325,722.73
(82,644.93)

139,173.23
$ 781,818.81
420,127.32
$ 361,691.49
150,988.55

103,526.10
$ 503,093.88
649,354.68
$ (146,260.80)
113,537.25

35,647.13
$ 278,724.93
(229,227.36)
$ 507,952.29
37,451.30

$ 210,702.94

$ (259,798.05)

$ 470,500.99

1,000,000.00

1,000,000.00

$(789,297.06)

$(1,259,798.05)

$ 470,500.99

September
27, 1941
$ 156,020.52

September
28, 1940
$ 132,410.20

Increase
(decrease)
$ 23,610.32

2,882,713.43
4,874,006.16

4,093,119.94
1,833,436.66

(1,210,406.51)
3,040,569.50

$7,912,740.11

$6,058,966.80

$1,853,773.31

2,000,000.00

1,000,000.00

1,000,000.00

$5,912,740.11
$3,371,669.03

$5,058,966.80
$1,932,992.24

$ 853,773.31
$1,438,676.79

907.273.30
$4,278,942.33

841,499.11
$2,774,491.35

65,774.19
$1,504,450.98

$1,633,797.78

$2,284,475.45

$ (650,677.67)

1,060.61

1,088.70

(28.09)

3,005,161.18

3,263,170.31

(258,009.13)

7,892.77
234,186.31

8,613.67
230,297.68

(720.90)
3,888.73

$4,882,098.75

$5,787,645.81

345,000.00

22,000.00

$ (905,547.06)

323,000.00

The comparative figures taken from the income account show the progress made in
reduction of costs. The Company shows a profit, after all charges but before provision for
excess cost of feature pictures over estimated net income therefrom, of $210,702.94 as com-
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pared with a loss of $259,798.05 in the fiscal year ended September 28, 1940. The income
account does not reflect the reduction in costs of feature pictures as DUMBO was not released
until after the close of the fiscal year. It does, however, reflect the working off of the inventory of high cost shorts and restoration of a satisfactory profit in that division. Last year the
Company provided a reserve of $1,000,000 to write off the excess cost of PINOCCHIO. The
Company has estimated its expectancy of return from all of its feature product, and as a result
has set u p a provision against a possible loss in the amount of $ 1,000,000.
The comparative figures taken from the Balance Sheet show that while pictures in
process have decreased $1,210,406.51, the unamortized value of completed pictures has
increased $3,040,569.50, giving a net increase in inventory (before reserve) of $1,830,162.99.
This increase, which was largely financed by bank loans, is due primarily to the delay in the
general release of FANTASIA, and to labor difficulties experienced at the time of release of THE
RELUCTANT DRAGON. The Company now has two feature pictures ready for general release,
DUMBO and FANTASIA. A third feature, BAMBI, is practically completed. With current operations reduced by 50% from last year, a steady reduction of the bank loan is anticipated.
Blocked currencies are not included in the Company's accounts until received. In
October, 1941, the British Government entered into an agreement with the motion picture
companies whereby 50% of the blocked currencies previously impounded in Great Britain was
released. One-half of this amount was immediately payable and one-half is payable in April,
1942. The Company, since the date of this report, has received approximately $65,000 as part
payment of its share of impounded funds. Australia and New Zealand have not yet released any
of that portion of our revenue which those countries impounded.
PRODUCT
During the fiscal year under review the Company released its feature picture FANTASIA.
Initially this picture was distributed directly by the Company through the medium of road
shows using "Fantasound" rather than through normal distribution channels. The picture was
presented in thirteen cities (New York, Boston, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago,
San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo, Minneapolis, Washington and Baltimore) and
while a few of the engagements were disappointing, the aggregate results indicated a picture
with wide appeal. The length of the New York and Los Angeles runs broke all existing records
since the advent of sound.
Experience gained from the exhibition of FANTASIA in the above-mentioned cities
demonstrated that a nation wide distribution of this picture with "Fantasound" was impractical. It was therefore decided to abandon "Fantasound" and generally release the picture
through normal distribution channels. Our sound engineers succeeded in combining the various "Fantasound" tracks into one composite track, enabling the Company to present FANTASIA in motion pictures everywhere.
The company entered into an agreement with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. for the distribution of FANTASIA throughout the world. Spanish and Portuguese versions have been prepared
for the South American market, and the picture has already been released in Rio de Janeiro and
Sao Paulo, Brazil; Montevideo, Uruguay and Buenos Aires, Argentina. FANTASIA is also being
currently released in England and Australasia.
It is now planned to place FANTASIA in general distribution in the United States immediately following DUMBO. In preparation for this general release, test runs were made in representative small towns to guide in editing this picture.
THE RELUCTANT DRAGON
This picture was completed and delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. on April 17, 1941.
It was first put into general release on June 20, 1941. Revenues obtained from this picture were
seriously affected by the strike, due to picketing at various theatres throughout the country. It
has been released in Great Britain and Australasia. Spanish and Portuguese versions have been
prepared for the release of the picture in South America.
Although results to date have been disappointing, we are confident of the return to the
Company of at least $500,000 and have provided in the inventory reserve for the balance of
the cost.
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DUMBO
DUMBO was completed and delivered to our distributor September 11, 1941. Because of
selling conditions in the industry the picture was not generally released until the middle of
December. The picture was pre-shown in the Broadway Theatre, New York, beginning
October 23rd, and has b e e n well received. In the trade and press it is getting excellent
exploitation and publicity.
DUMBO is our first all-cartoon feature picture budgeted and produced subsequent to the
outbreak of the European war and the loss of our foreign markets. The picture was produced
at a cost well within present market possibilities and is of a quality that assures, in our opinion,
a profitable return.
SHORT SUBJECTS
During the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, the Company delivered to RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc. a total of twenty-two short subjects. Our costs have been reduced to meet present
market conditions and the pictures continue to be a profitable source of revenue.
Under date of April 11, 1941, the Company extended its releasing contract with RKO to
cover a fifth series of eighteen short subjects.
The Company now has 22 short subjects in various stages of production.
BAMBI
The Company's feature picture BAMBI has been in work for over three years and is n o w
practically completed. As now scheduled it will be delivered to RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. on or
about the first of February, 1942. Completion of this picture was delayed at least three m o n t h s
by the strike. It was the last of the feature pictures projected on the basis of the pre-war markets. Its cost will be substantially higher than DUMBO but will be approximately $1,000,000
less than the cost of PINOCCHIO. It is the consensus of opinion of those w h o have seen the
picture that it is the best the Company has ever produced for entertainment value and quality
of production.
FEATURES RELEASED IN PRIOR YEARS
During the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941, PINOCCHIO, which was first shown on
February 7, 1940, returned a gross film rental of $554,730.74 of which the Company's share
amounted to $387,100.12. This brought the total gross film rental on September 27, 1941, to
$2,228,687.28 of which the Company's share was $1,363,312.06. The amount received in 1941
would seem to assure recoupment of the balance of the unamortized negative cost of
$233,439.64 after giving effect to the reserve set u p last year. The Company's share of blocked
currencies resulting from the showings of PINOCCHIO had a value at official rates of approximately $240,000 at September 27, 1941. This amount is not included in the figures quoted
above.
SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS which was first shown in December of 1937
returned to the Company the sum of $139,173.23 in the fiscal year ended September 27, 1941.
OTHER ENDEAVORS
The licensing of names and characters created by the Company continues to have universal commercial appeal but revenue has fallen off during the year mainly because FANTASIA
did not lend itself readily to such exploitation. Certain of our licensees also were beginning to
feel the effect of defense priorities. However, royalties from this source and from books, music,
comic strips and art sales continue to be substantial sources of income.
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LABOR RELATIONS
For the first time in its history the company was, during 1941, beset by labor troubles.
Early in May the Studio launched a program of reducing operating expenses and personnel,
designed to bring output in line with results reasonably to be anticipated from the distribution
of the Company's pictures under present world conditions. As this policy was being initiated,
a strike was called (on May 28, 1941) by Screen Cartoonists Union, Local No. 852, an affiliate
of the International Brotherhood of Painters, Paperhangers and Decorators of America (A. F.
of L.). A majority of our employees stayed at work and during the nine weeks of the strike the
Company's production proceeded satisfactorily. However, due to secondary boycotts and "hot
cargo'' activities on the part of sympathetic unions it became impossible to deliver and exhibit our product.
Repeated efforts by the Company to effect a settlement were unavailing. Finally, a commissioner from the National Conciliator's Office intervened; arbitration was agreed upon and
an award was eventually rendered. Among other things, the award imposed the following: a
close shop; reinstatement of all strikers; and 100 hours' retroactive pay for strikers. In relation
to our proposed reduction of personnel, the award also imposed a formula under which a certain percentage of strikers had to be retained pro rata to non-striking employees. However, it
required the Union to take in as a body without prejudice and at a nominal initiation fee
employees in its classification w h o had remained at work during the strike.
After a period of four weeks of complete shutdown, necessitated by protracted negotiations, the Company resumed operations on September 15, 1941. The Studio is now operating
under the terms of the award which, unfortunately, is in many respects very ambiguous and is
silent on several disputed issues. However, the plant is now operating smoothly.
DIVIDENDS AND SINKING FUND REQUIREMENTS
In a letter addressed to the stockholders under date of June 14, 1941, you were advised of
the reason for the omission of the preferred stock sinking fund payment due April 1, 1941, in
the amount of $50,000 and of the deferment of the quarterly preferred dividend due July 1,
1941. The necessity for conserving working capital pending the orderly liquidation of the
Company's inventory of completed feature pictures caused omission of the $100,000 preferred stock sinking fund payment due October 1, 1941, and deferment of the quarterly dividend on the preferred stock due on that date. Consideration will be given to resumption of
payments w h e n and as a comfortable working capital position has been re-established, but no
prediction can be made in this respect at this time. The dividends on the preferred stock being
cumulative, all arrearages in such dividends as well as fixed sinking fund payments must be
paid before any dividends may be paid on the common stock.
GENERAL
Our principal problem now is one of orderly and satisfactory liquidation of feature product. Within the Studio production is going forward and costs are in keeping with present markets. The Company is operating with less than 50% of the personnel and pay roll of May, 1941.
Our working capital position is strained because of the large amount of money tied u p in feature negatives--DUMBO, FANTASIA and BAMBI. With proper liquidation of these three features, it is believed the Company will reduce its bank loan to a nominal figure or liquidate it
completely and restore its working capital position to a satisfactory level. DUMBO and BAMBI
are feature pictures which will have none of the problems of distribution presented by FANTASIA. Both are excellent pictures and should do satisfactory business.
For the current year, the Company is continuing its production of short subjects and has
three feature subjects available for production, of which o n e would ordinarily b e completed
during the 1942 fiscal year. However, your management is making its facilities and equipment
available for Army, Navy and other Government films in connection with national defense. We
are now working on short subjects in cooperation with our Government's plans to p r o m o t e
hemispheric solidarity and are also producing a series of short subjects for the U. S. Navy and
five short subjects for the Canadian Government. New feature product is being curtailed in
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favor of federal defense work. The volume of defense film work required of us will determine
the extent of work done on feature subjects during the current year.
In summary, we are still in an adjustment period brought about by world conditions and
the consequent loss of markets, but we believe we have sustained the major shocks of this
adjustment. Pictures being projected will be properly budgeted and produced for present
restricted markets. Our experience with DUMBO and our short subjects gives us every confidence in our ability to meet these conditions satisfactorily with respect both to cost and quality of our product.
FOR THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Walter E. Disney, President
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of Ontario, president of the Dominion Association of CAs, and
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INTRODUCTION
Biographical research provides an opportunity to explore the
role of individuals in the development of accounting and accounting institutions [e.g.; Parker, 1994; Previts and Robinson, 1996;
Slocum and Roberts, 1996]. It is individuals w h o create ideas and
organizations [Wren, 1998]. It is often individuals, and their
involvement in a range of seemingly unrelated activities, that provide the threads that hold together the fabric of historical experience. This is not to deny the role of broader social interests or
structures in shaping historical outcomes. As Hooks [1953, p. xiii]
observed, "every philosophy which recognizes that men can and
do make their own history also concerns itself with the conditions
under which it is made." Biographical research thus examines the
interaction between the individual and the social structures that
constrain and enable their actions [cf. Giddens, 1984; Macintosh
and Scapens, 1990].
This biography traces the contribution of one individual,
George Edwards, w h o had a significant impact on the Canadian
accounting profession. Throughout his career, Edwards displayed
a remarkable clarity and consistency of vision for the Chartered
Accountancy (CA) profession. At his retirement dinner in 1926,
W.H. West [1926, p. 213], president of the American Institute of
Accountants, gave tribute to Edwards, saying:
Mr. Edwards is k n o w n from one end of the
Dominion to the other as a man w h o has constantly striven for an ideal; that ideal being a unified profession established on a high plane, not
only technically and intellectually, but morally as
well.
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Edwards viewed accountancy
as a profession rather than a business. This was reflected in his
commitment to accounting education, to restricting entry to the
CA profession to those w h o had passed a test of competency, and
to his desire to demonstrate the social value of accounting. He
wanted the CA institutes to be the sole representative of public
accountants in Canada. He worked tirelessly to protect CAs
against the encroachment of competing professional bodies. He
also tried to institutionalize the public service dimension of
accounting through his own example and through the creation of
codes of ethics.
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Edwards served the Canadian accounting profession for more
than 30 years. During this time he was president of the Institute of
CAs of Ontario (four terms), p r e s i d e n t of t h e D o m i n i o n
Association of CAs (two terms), and founding president of the
Canadian Society of Cost Accountants. He established a major
national public accounting firm and used this firm to help build a
national CA profession. His work earned him life memberships in
the Institutes of CAs of Alberta, Ontario, Manitoba, and
Saskatchewan. He was the first managing editor of the Canadian
Chartered Accountant (now CA Magazine) and was instrumental
in establishing accounting education as a university program of
instruction in Canada. Queen's University awarded him an honorary degree in recognition of this service. During World War I, he
served as accounting systems designer, comptroller, auditor, and
liquidator for the Imperial Munitions Board in Canada and was
named Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE).
After the war, he served as auditor of Canada's national accounts,
the first external auditor to serve in this role. He retired in 1926
from professional politics but remained an active m e m b e r of his
firm until 1941. He died in 1947 at the age of 86.
METHOD
The examination of George Edwards' career in this biography
provides a unique perspective on the history of the Canadian profession. He was a source of continuity among a series of key formative events in the profession. His vision and values represent
one of the many perspectives on accountancy during its early
years. The success of his vision was, in part, a reflection of his
indefatigable efforts against formidable opposition over 35 years.
More importantly, the vision reflected the tenor of the times. It
provided a rallying point for like-minded accountants and resulted
in the creation of institutions consistent with broader social interests. George Edwards' biography allows us to identify the interaction between his policy choices and the context within which
they were enacted and, hence, to understand better the evolution
of the Canadian profession.
Biographical research has not developed a well-defined
methodology [Jones, 1998]. The process involves selecting a subject, gathering data, analyzing, and reporting [Lomask, 1986].
Each of these steps involves choices that should be made explicit,
but there are few guidelines for undertaking each stage. As
Goodman and Kruger [1988, p. 315] noted: "It is easy to describe
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the steps that the historian follows, it is significantly harder to
understand the process that he or she undertakes." Beyond this,
biographic research varies according to the perspective that the
author brings to the task. For example, biographers have developed psychological profiles of their subjects [e.g., Harris-Seares,
1997], focused on the cultural context of the subject [e.g.,
Reynolds, 1997], or provided a detailed linguistic analysis of the
subject's writings [Erlich, 1996]. This section will provide an
overview of the choices made in constructing this biography.
The choice of George Edwards as a subject reflects the importance of the period from 1890 to 1925 in the development of the
Canadian profession and the prominence of his role(s) throughout this time. This 35-year period resulted in the formation of all
of the accounting associations that n o w dominate the Canadian
profession. It is also the period in which the audit market developed its current form. It is a period in which the structure of the
profession was debated and institutionalized. For example, the
relationship between provincial and federal accounting associations, the division of labor between management and financial
accounting associations, and the institutional framework for
accounting education programs were all decided during this period. In each of these cases, an examination of the archives will
show the important role that Edwards played [cf. Richardson,
1994]. To use Lomask's [1986, p. 10] word, George Edwards has
significant historical "residue."
The data available for this biography consist of both primary
and secondary sources. Primary sources include Edwards' writings, reports of the committees on which he served, recorded testimony before Senate hearings, and documents generated by him
in various capacities (e.g., presidential addresses). Many of the key
documents related to Edwards' contributions w e r e published in
the Canadian Chartered Accountant, a professional journal he
founded for the CA profession. Data were also collected from
marriage certificates, church records, business directories, and
census records. Secondary sources include histories of the
accounting associations and organizations with which he worked.
In particular, the histories of the Imperial Munitions Board
(including biographies of its chairman, Sir Joseph Flavelle) and
the Institutes of CAs of Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta include
materials relevant to Edwards. Given Edwards' prominence in the
profession, his obituaries in both the daily press and professional
publications also provided valuable data and leads for additional
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source material [Editorial, 1947; Obituary, 1947]. Unfortunately,
no archive of Edwards' personal papers has been located. 1
The analysis process used in this biography is narrative,
chronological, and thematic [Erlich, 1996, p. 79]. No attempt has
been made to quantify Edwards' contribution to the profession.
Based on the documents, a series of key events was identified and
discussed in chronological order. The analysis and interpretation
of data assume that Edwards drew insights from his experiences
and applied them to n e w circumstances as they emerged. It is also
assumed that key aspects of Edwards' values and priorities are
reflected in patterns of behavior over time [Atwood and Stolorow,
1984]. These emergent patterns are used retrospectively in this
biography to help rationalize the choices that Edwards made during his life.
The structure of the paper follows the logic of analysis outlined above; i.e., it is chronological and thematic. The paper begins
with a brief sketch of Edwards' personal life. This is followed by an
overview of his business, primarily carried on u n d e r the name
Edwards, Morgan & Co. There follow five sections dealing w i t h
t h e major issues in w h i c h Edwards was involved: (1)
federal/provincial professional relations; (2) accounting education; (3) the Imperial Munitions Board; (4) government and bank
accounting; and, (5) the division of labor in the profession
between financial and management accounting. The conclusion
identifies the c o m m o n elements in Edwards' contribution to the
profession and areas wherein his goals were not achieved.
GEORGE EDWARDS: PERSONAL
Edwards was born in St. James Ward, Toronto on March 25,
1861, six years before the creation of Canada as a sovereign nation.
He was the fourth of five children born to William and Mary Anne
Edwards. 2 He died on February 12, 1947 in the aftermath of World
War II (see his photograph in Exhibit 1). His formal education was
limited. He attended the Toronto Collegiate Institute ( n o w Jarvis
Collegiate Institute) and had "private tutors." Toronto Collegiate
Institute was the first "Grammar School" in Canada (founded in
1807) and was intended to provide an academic education for students continuing on to college. Bookkeeping was taught in these
1
Edwards' family was contacted during the preparation of this biography and
was invited to comment on this paper. The interpretations expressed, however,
have not been approved or otherwise by the Edwards family.
2
based on the 1871 Census of Canada
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schools using the Irish National School texts [Bell, 1918; McKeen
and Richardson, 1998]. Edwards gained a basic understanding of
bookkeeping and business practice through these courses.
Edwards continued his accounting
EXHIBIT 1
training as an a p p r e n t i c e w i t h the
a c c o u n t i n g firms h e a d e d by E.R.C.
Clarkson in Toronto, beginning at age 19
(Turner, Clarkson & Co. until 1881,
E.R.C. Clarkson thereafter). Upon receiving his CA designation in 1889, he left
Clarkson's firm and started his o w n
practice. Edwards and Clarkson (both
E.R.C. and his son G.T. Clarkson) would
repeatedly find themselves at odds over
the next 25 years regarding the structure of the profession, the need for
examinations as a basis for entry to the
profession, and the ethics to be applied
to practice. At its heart, this disagreeGeorge Edwards
ment was over w h e t h e r accountancy
c.1947
was primarily a profession or a business.
At his retirement dinner, Edwards mentioned Clarkson as a
friend and thanked Clarkson for giving him his start as an
accountant. Although Clarkson could not be there (he was 74
years old and in poor health at the time), he wrote a letter of congratulations [Clarkson, 1926, p. 214] that included this rather
cryptic paragraph:
There are few w h o have not more antipathies than
are good for them — fellowship rubs these away;
the game is here for members of this Institute to
play manfully — it is a good and honest game — and
they are the men to play it. These meetings indicate that, behind, there is a deep tribal sense that
they should stand together and play the game fairly, and by consultation and argument pass on their
knowledge to one another, encouraging by every
means possible a full sense of the supreme obligation each one owes to his own conscience and his
own pride.
This paragraph subtly suggests that the tension between them had
not been forgotten, but that Clarkson recognized that their
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debates had c o n t r i b u t e d positively to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of
accountancy.
George Edwards' family was well positioned in Toronto society. His father, William, had emigrated from England in 1836. He
was a manufacturer, deeply involved in the Toronto Mechanics'
Institute, a forerunner of the public library system, and a m e m b e r
of the Toronto City Council [Morgan, 1898, p. 305]. By 1868,
William Edwards had been appointed as secretary (deputy minister) of the Ontario Department of Public Works, a position he
held until his retirement [Champion, 1899; Creighton, 1984, p.
130]. He is also listed in various Toronto city directories as the secretary and treasurer of the Board of Arts and Manufacturers
(1865) and as accountant and librarian to the Board of Agriculture
(1866).
William Edwards was prominent in the Methodist community of Toronto; both his eldest and youngest sons were Methodist
ministers. The Edwards family initially attended the George St.
Methodist church. This church was the wellspring of Methodism
in Toronto, serving the city's merchant families. Champion [ 1899,
p. 83] described the congregation as follows:
No professional men, either physician or lawyer
was found among its worshippers. It had several
w h o were engaged in business but n o n e w h o s e
business was large enough to be remarkable. It
had a monopoly of the merchant tailors and master shoemakers of the city.
As William Edwards progressed in his career, he moved his family
to a more prestigious neighborhood and joined Trinity Methodist
church. William held several positions within the church, acting
as a trustee and as a member of its temperance committee. The
congregation at Trinity Methodist included "some of Toronto's
merchant princes and successful businessmen" [Champion, 1899,
p. 219]. These contacts would be important in George Edwards'
career as an accountant.
George Edwards also maintained close ties with the church. In
1911, he bought the former Bala Falls Hotel in Bala, Ontario about
100 miles north of Toronto. He built a cottage on the property
which he named "Caerholme" [Petry, 1998, p. 40]. 3 George added
a room to the cottage for the use of the Anglican bishop of
3

The property is now known as Edwards' Point.
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Toronto. In 1920, he donated a portion of the land around his cottage to the Anglican Church and a small, cedar shake chapel (St.
Alban's) was built on the site. This church allowed the Anglican
congregation to move from a nearby church shared by Anglicans,
Methodists, and Presbyterians. His connection to the Methodist
and Anglican churches provided guidance for his attempts to
restructure the profession (see the discussion of the Dominion
Association of CAs below) and gave him contacts with prominent
business and political elites (see the discussion of Edwards' firm
below).
Edwards married Sarah Caroline Woods in 1884 at age 23.
Together they had five sons (Arthur, Hugh, Oswald, Alfred, and
John) and one daughter (Gertrude). Edwards has been described
as "small and dapper" [Creighton, 1984, p. 130] and "ambitious,
outspoken and just plain pig-headed" [Perspectives, 1985, p. 2].
He ran his accounting firm as a family business and, although successful, he was reputed to have had difficulty maintaining senior
staff whose surname was not Edwards [Creighton, 1984, p. 134].
Interestingly, on his marriage certificate Edwards listed his
occupation as "woolen manufacturer." At his retirement dinner in
1926, it was mentioned that he had obtained "a general mercantile
experience" between 1880 and 1890 (his years with Clarkson).
Clarkson had a significant bankruptcy practice and on occasion
would take over the management of a failed firm rather than liquidating the assets [Little, 1964, p. 18]. Clarkson also had several
business interests of his own. Edwards spent nine years with
Clarkson prior to receiving his CA designation at a time w h e n a
five-year apprenticeship was the norm. It is possible that Edwards
was involved in one of Clarkson's businesses during this time.
Edwards also recounted at his retirement dinner that Clarkson
had paid him $2.50 per day rather than the going rate of $2 per
day which, he recalled, was greatly appreciated given his family
responsibilities.
Although Edwards was not listed in any of the Who's Who in
Canada for this period, his profile is consistent with the "accounting elite" [Richardson, 1989]. The accounting elite in Canada during this p e r i o d was primarily Ontario-born, Anglican,
Conservative, male, and relatively less educated than the business
elite of the day. Unlike the typical member of the accounting elite,
Edwards was not active in municipal politics or as a company
director. 4 The lack of these commitments may have allowed him
4

based on the Canadian Directory of Directors for the period
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the time to concentrate on professional issues. The fact that
Edwards was not listed in these directories, while other members
of his firm and family were, suggests that he consciously refused
to be included. This apparent humility, a preference to work out
of the limelight, is characteristic of his career.
THE ACCOUNTING FIRM: EDWARDS, MORGAN & CO.
George Edwards articled with E.R.C. Clarkson beginning in
1880 at the age of 19. He stayed with Clarkson until he received his
CA designation in 1889. At that time he formed a partnership with
Alexander Hart-Smith and began to practice in Toronto. HartSmith died in 1903 and Hart-Smith's stepson, William Pomeroy
Morgan, entered into partnership with Edwards. The n e w firm
was known as Edwards, Morgan & Co. (see Exhibit 2).
All of Edwards' five sons eventually joined the firm: Arthur
Harper Edwards (CA, 1902), Hugh Percival Edwards (CA, 1913),
Oswald Noel Edwards (CA, 1917), Alfred Geoffrey Edwards (CA,
1917), and John Macham Edwards (CA, 1920). Several of his sons
would follow in their father's footsteps in serving the profession.
Arthur became a founding member of the Institute of CAs of
Manitoba and served as a president of the Institute of CAs of
British Columbia. Hugh (Percy) served for many years on the
Institute of CAs of Ontario (ICAO) council and as president.
Oswald is also notable, but for contrary reasons. Although he
became an accountant, he was apparently not happy with the role.
He was able to express this antipathy on one occasion w h e n he
was asked to set an examination on cost accounting for the ICAO.
The examination was so difficult that no one achieved a passing
grade, and Oswald was never asked to take on such duties again
[Creighton, 1984]. The Edwards, Morgan & Co. firm continued
past Edwards' death until it finally disappeared through a merger
with Deloitte and Touche in 1957.
Edwards' daughter (Gertrude), it should be noted, is neither
among the alumni of the firm nor is her name or Edwards' wife's
n a m e ever m e n t i o n e d in any professional d o c u m e n t s .
At
Edwards' retirement dinner, Mrs. Edwards was presented with a
brooch to commemorate the event. This is probably not surprising given Edwards' views on w o m e n in the profession. As president of the ICAO in 1896, Edwards debated the wisdom of admitting w o m e n to membership. He offered the opinion that "women
could not hold their own in executive ability, especially in
accounting" and that "the prestige of the profession would suffer
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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by admission of ladies to membership" [Creighton, 1984, p. 47].
Edwards' views held the day, and the Institute voted against allowing women entry to the profession [McKeen and Richardson,
1998]. Edwards' attitude was common for his generation and is
consistent with his educational experience at the Toronto
Collegiate Institute where women were relegated to one classroom in the basement [Jarvis Collegiate Institute, 1999].
EXHIBIT 2
An Advertisement for Edwards, Morgan & Co.

EDWARDS, MORGAN & CO.
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS

TORONTO

MONTREAL

WINNIPEG

A discrete advertisement from The Monetary Times, 1930
The Edwards, Morgan firm expanded across Canada, benefiting from the "greatest economic boom in [Canada's] history"
between 1900 and 1913 [Bothwell et al., 1987, p. 55]. Edwards
opened offices in the financial centers of Toronto and Montreal
and subsequently followed the railway-and-settlement boom
across the prairies with offices in Timmins, Winnipeg (operating
as Edwards, Ronald & Co.), Calgary, and Vancouver. Creighton
[1984] suggested that Edwards, Morgan & Co. was the first multioffice firm in Canada and second only to the Clarkson Gordon
firm in prestige among Canadian accounting firms. The latter
claim may be somewhat exaggerated. Richardson [1999] identified Edwards, Morgan as the eighth largest audit firm in Canada in
terms of the number of audits conducted during the period 19021941. During this period, the firm averaged a market share of
about 2.75% of all clients. Edwards, Morgan's client list did not
include any of the larger firms in Canada. For example, Edwards
did not audit any of the banks, railway companies, or public utilities that dominate the list of Canada's largest companies.
The firm's clients included the Borden Company (dairy),
Canada Bread Company Limited (bakery), Canada Permanent
Mortgage Company (mortgages), Coast Copper Company (copper
mining), the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of
Canada Limited (copper, zinc, and lead mining), Dunlop Tire and
Rubber Goods Company (tire manufacturing), Holinger
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Consolidated Gold Mines (mining), National Trust Company
(trust/banking), Photo Engravers & Electrotypers Limited (photographic equipment/services), Russell Industries Limited (automobiles), Joseph E. Seagram (distiller), Hiram Walker-Gooderham &
Worts Limited (distiller), George Weston Limited (baker), and
Wright-Hargreaves Mines (mining). 5 The firm also audited the
accounts of the Dominion of Canada for three years (see the section on government accounting below). Edwards' participation in
the Methodist church community of Toronto provided links to
many of his clients. Some of the leading figures in the Canadian
(and, in particular, the Toronto) business community w e r e
Methodists including Ames, Cox, Eaton, Gooderham, Gundy,
Flavelle, Massey, Weston, and Wood [Champion, 1899, p. 285;
Sanderson, 1910, p. 394; Bliss, 1987, pp. 346-349]. These w e r e the
"merchant princes and successful businessmen" of the parish of
Trinity Methodist church [Champion, 1899, p. 219]. Edwards
included many of this group among his clients, particularly
Weston, Cox, Gooderham, and Flavelle. Cox and Gooderham
deserve particular mention due to the extended group of companies they controlled.
Cox controlled a w e b of financial institutions centered on the
Bank of Commerce and including Dominion Securities, a stock
brokerage run by Ames (his son-in-law), National Trust (with
Joseph Flavelle as president), Canada Life Insurance Company,
and several other smaller insurance companies [Naylor, 1975a, b].
Cox was also the lead member of a syndicate that bought the
Canadian assets of the Dunlop Tire and Rubber Company of
America to create the Dunlop Tire and Rubber Company of
Canada. Edwards was connected to this group through his audit of
National Trust and Dunlop Rubber. Joseph Flavelle, president of
Cox's National Trust, was instrumental in providing Edwards'
entree into government accounting (see below).
The Gooderham family developed its business based on grain
milling. This venture soon diversified into distilling to take advantage of excess grain production. Ultimately, the family controlled
a group of companies including the Hiram Walker-Gooderham

5
This list of clients was compiled from Houston's The Annual Financial
Review (various editions 1902-1941), supplemented by Henderson [1984, pp. 29,
44]. The editor of this volume invited companies to submit financial statements to
him which he condensed and published. This list is, therefore, unlikely to be complete, but it provides a sample of the types of firms Edwards, Morgan audited.
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Worts Distillery, the Canada Permanent Mortgage Company,
Manufacturers Life Assurance, Manufacturers Accident Insurance,
and the Bank of Toronto [Bliss, 1987]. Edwards was connected to
this group through his audits of the Hiram Walker-Gooderham
Worts Distillery and the Canada Permanent Mortgage Company.
The Edwards, Morgan firm played an important role in
establishing the CA profession across Canada. For example,
the first meeting of the Institute of CAs of Alberta was held in
t h e offices of Edwards, Morgan in Calgary in 1911
[Perspectives, 1985, p. 1]. Arthur Edwards, George's eldest son,
was one of six charter members of the Alberta Institute. In
Manitoba, the Institute of CAs of Manitoba (ICAM) had b e e n
created in 1886, but the Institute was dormant and held no meetings between 1888 and 1902 [Hoole, 1963]. The ICAM was
reawakened by Edwards in 1902 through members of his firm
(then Edwards & Hart-Smith) which had been recently established
in Winnipeg [Neville, 1986, p. 9]. Edwards needed the support of
the ICAM in his battle, described below, with the Dominion
Association of CAs (DACA). W.S. Ronald, a member of Edwards'
firm in Winnipeg, became president of the ICAM in 1903.
Edwards became an out-of-province member that year and represented Manitoba at the DACA in 1922 [Hoole, 1963, p. 7].
Edwards' firm provided him with a network of contacts across
Canada and the financial resources that allowed him to devote
considerable time to the profession. The remainder of the biography deals with specific issues or events that were important in
Edwards' professional life. Each of these events provided an
opportunity for Edwards to enact his vision of the profession. In
particular, these events show h o w Edwards worked to create a unified profession based on high standards of technical and moral
practice. His vision, however, was not unopposed, so that these
events also show Edwards to be an adept political strategist.
FEDERAL / PROVINCIAL RELATIONS
Canada is a federation with a central government and 13 member states (ten provinces and three territories as of 1999). The
division of powers between these levels of government was laid
out in the British North America Act of 1867 (now the Canada
Constitution Act). The Act is ambiguous on certain matters and, as
a result, there are continuing debates over matters of jurisdiction
between the provinces and the federal government. For example,
both levels of government have powers to incorporate companies.
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This constitutional structure sets the scene for one of George
Edwards' major battles and victories.
The first institutes of CAs were established through provincial
legislation and accepted into membership all those w h o had
passed the prescribed examinations regardless of their current
occupation. Contrary to this model, John Mackay sought to create
an association of CAs more narrowly restricted to those in public
practice but with membership based on experience rather than
examination. Mackay was a practicing auditor in Ontario at this
time. One of his clients was National Trust w h e r e he served with
George Edwards as co-auditor. Mackay sought federal incorporation of this association in 1901 but was unsuccessful. The following year with help from the Association of Accountants of
Montreal and two p r o m i n e n t Ontario accountants, Clarkson
(Edwards' former employer) and Cross, b o t h of w h o m had
resigned from the ICAO over a professional misconduct case
[Richardson, 1990], the DACA was created.
Edwards saw the DACA as a rival to the provincial institutes,
and he attempted to close down the federal body. He opposed the
federal incorporation of the DACA successfully in 1901 on the
strength of his political lobbying. The 1902 application for incorporation of the DACA had more institutional support, most
notably from the Association of Accountants of Montreal, and he
was unable to prevent incorporation on that occasion. As a result
he had to change tactics and in 1903, he arrived at the DACA annual meeting with 76 applications for membership and proxy votes
from Ontario and Manitoba. He attempted to use these proxies to
outvote the existing 17 members. The chair of the meeting did not
allow this move. In 1908, he sought legislation in Ontario that
would limit the use of the CA designation in Ontario to members
of the ICAO. Although the province passed the legislation, the
DACA petitioned the federal government which disallowed the
Ontario legislation as ultra vires (beyond Ontario's jurisdiction).
In effect, the Ontario legislation had declared that the federal legislation authorizing a national CA designation was invalid in
Ontario. This position was not allowed to stand.
Finally, under the mediation of Harry Price, president of the
Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors of England, at
the 1908 conference of the American Association of Public
Accountants in Atlantic City, the groups met and peace was negotiated. The DACA became a federal body for the provincial institutes with no powers over designations, education, or standards.
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George Edwards had w o n and in the process had created the
structure now followed by all accounting associations in Canada.
The DACA was given the mandate to (1) secure the incorporation of provincial societies in provinces of the dominion w h e r e
n o n e existed; (2) assist provincial societies in securing uniform
legislation for the better protection and regulation of local professional interests; (3) secure the adoption by provincial societies
of uniform standards of examination and m e m b e r s h i p ; (4)
arrange for reciprocal privileges between provincial societies for
the benefit of their members; (5) consider the question of ethics;
(6) secure harmony of action on all matters affecting the c o m m o n
interest and generally to act in an advisory capacity to provincial
societies [Edwards, 1915, p. 340].
Two aspects of this mandate are particularly n o t e w o r t h y First,
Edwards succeeded in institutionalizing (in item 3) his vision of
limiting entry to the profession by examination, contrary to the
preferences of the original founders of the DACA. This was a key
victory for those w h o saw accountancy as a profession rather than
simply as a business. It established the principle that the skills of
the accountant were to be gained through education rather than
just through practical experience. Second, the mandate given to
the DACA reflected Edwards' view that accounting associations in
Canada should be comprehensive and noncompetitive (items 1
and 4). There would be a CA association in each province so that
all public accountants would be represented, but members of one
provincial association would be guaranteed membership in all
others, thereby eliminating competition between provincial associations.
Edwards was a vice-president of the DACA in 1910 and became
its president in 1911 and again in 1913. He announced the aim of
the DACA through the slogan "one name, one standard, one aim"
[Edwards, 1912, p. 86]. This slogan, Edwards volunteered, was a
paraphrase of the slogan of "one of our influential church organizations," referring to the attempt of the Presbyterian, Methodist,
and Congregational churches to merge. Semple [1992, p. 416]
described the underlying belief of the unification movement to be
that "all Christians throughout the world belonged to the same
family, shared the same values and worked for a c o m m o n end." It
is reasonable to speculate that Edwards' ties to the Methodist
church, through his brothers and father as well as conversations
with the archbishop at his cottage, would have provided him with
insider knowledge of the unification process. Incidentally, the
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process was successful, and the United Church of Canada was created in 1925. Edwards endorsed the aims of the church unification
movement as a goal for the accounting profession.
Edwards' experience with the DACA made him aware of the
potential for rival designations/associations in Canada. His interaction with Harry Price is also likely to have made him aware of
the situation in the U.K. where six professional associations competed for public recognition of their members. At the DACA annual meeting of 1912, he warned:
The permanency of the name by which competency in a public accountant will be designated
cannot be doubted. More largely as a result of coincidence of thought, however, than of any careful
planning or design on our part the name of
Chartered Accountant is the name which has
come to occupy a commanding place in Canada. It
is not good enough to be content to accept this
good fortune complacently and assume that this
condition must perforce be permanent. The history of an older commercial center than ours warns
us that there may be dangerous rivalries in the
near future to the supremacy of the Chartered
Accountant in Canada if we fail to profit by observation [reported in President's Address, 1921, p.
142].
Edwards would continue throughout his career to monitor
and manage the emergence of competing accounting associations.
This role is most notable in the creation of the Society of Cost
Accountants of Canada, but he was also involved in negotiations to
limit the charter of the Certified General Accountants of Canada
to prevent them from competing directly with CAs (see below).
He continued on the DACA Council as a representative of the
ICAO until his retirement in 1926. During this time he served on
the "General Purposes" Committee (essentially an executive committee), the Uniformity of Standards Committee, and the
Magazine Committee. The latter committee is particularly important. Edwards became the first managing editor of the Canadian
Chartered Accountant (CCA) in 1911. This role gave him a vehicle
to communicate the social value of accountancy to a broader audience.
Edwards worked consistently to develop the CCA as a comhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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munications mechanism within the profession and, more importantly, with outside parties. In the first volume of the CCA, a
report from the "journal committee," chaired by Edwards, reported:
Enough has been said to justify the prediction that
our circulation in the near future amongst business men and educators will far outweigh the support the publication will receive from our own
members and those who compose our student
societies, thereby substantially enhancing the
value of the journal as a select advertising medium.
He constantly pushed to increase the frequency of publication of
the journal [e.g., Report of the Magazine Committee, CCA, Vol. 14,
1924, p. 166]. When the Society of Cost Accountants of Canada
was created in 1920, he used the opportunity to expand the CCA
to a bimonthly publication (from quarterly) with the promise to
include more cost accounting material in its pages. It became a
monthly publication in 1932.
Edwards thought that the journal should be a commercial
enterprise that would accept advertisements and possibly be
turned over to a commercial publisher. This would allow the CAs
to extend their influence and visibility by reaching a larger audience. The DACA did hire an editor to remove the burden from
members but banned advertisements from the journal for a period in the 1930s. Ultimately, however, Edwards' vision of the journal as an important medium of communication beyond the CA
profession did come about.
ACCOUNTING EDUCATION
George Edwards was first elected to the Council of the ICAO
in 1890 and served as its president in 1895, 1896, 1897, and 1903.
He served on the Council and on key committees continuously
until his retirement in 1926. A central concern throughout his
time on the Council was the education provided to CA candidates
and the quality of examinations used to control entrance to the
profession. Between 1903 and 1926, he was chairman of the ICAO
Board of Instruction. This Board had responsibility for negotiating
with proprietary schools (e.g., Shaw's Correspondence Schools)
to arrange programs of instruction for CA students. Edwards was
unsatisfied with the quality of the instruction being provided by
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these organizations [Edwards, 1921b] even though these schools
were often run by CAs. After World War I, he entered into negotiations with Queen's University to provide courses.
The connection between CAs and universities was already in
process when Edwards began his negotiations with Queen's
University in 1919. The dean of McGill University in Montreal had
contacted the Association of Accountants of Montreal in 1912 suggesting that some type of educational program could be arranged
although nothing was ever implemented [Collard, 1980, p. 108].
The Institute of CAs of Saskatchewan entered into an agreement
with the University of Saskatchewan to offer an accountancy
degree in 1913 [Canadian Chartered Accountant, 1913, p. 50], and
its first graduate was reported in 1914. The Institute of CAs of
Alberta concluded an agreement with the University of Alberta to
share responsibility for education and examinations in 1914.
World War I interrupted this momentum.
Queen's University had been involved in distance education
for the Canadian Bankers Association since 1914 [Gibson, 1983, p.
37]. The addition of accounting courses was a small leap for the
University, but associating the University with accounting courses
would add considerable legitimacy to CA training. From the
University's perspective, Smails [1951, p. 7] suggested that Skelton,
the head of the Department of Political Studies, was using correspondence courses to create the backbone of a commerce program [see also Daub and Buchan, 1999].
Edwards [1921a] set out eight policies that formed the basis
for the ICAO's negotiation with Queen's University: (1) the program should be delivered by correspondence so that it was accessible to all CA candidates; (2) the course of study would be based
on commercial textbooks rather than material prepared by the
ICAO; (3) the texts would be Canadian or British in recognition of
the differences between their legal and economic systems and
those of the U.S. in spite of the greater availability of American
textbooks; (4) the program would be offered within defined periods to allow for common examinations for all students; (5) the
course of instruction would be "postgraduate" and build on a base
level of literacy and numeracy; (6) the program would be limited
to candidates for the CA designation; (7) the program of study
would be required of all candidates for the designation; (8) there
would be no optional subjects.
These policies reflect two continuing themes in Edwards'
work. First, by centralizing accounting education in one program,
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Edwards could more easily ensure that all CAs achieved a minim u m level of competence. This was essential in order to guarantee that the CA designation would be worthy of public trust. It
would also facilitate reciprocity of membership among the different provincial institutes of CAs. Second, by restricting the program to CA candidates and by retaining control over the curriculum, Edwards tried to limit access to the appropriate knowledge
to those w h o would become members of the ICAO rather than
some competing accounting association. The design of the program thus contributed to a standardization of CA licensure and
the exclusion of others from public accountancy.
Edwards' policy also had an unintended positive side effect.
The CA program was to use Canadian or British accounting textbooks (policy #3 above), but few existed at that time. Once the
demand for the Queen's program among CA candidates was established, the faculty teaching in the program began preparing their
own course materials. The ready-made market of the CA program
reduced the risk to publishers of producing a Canadian book in a
field dominated by texts from the larger U.S. market. As a result,
the Queen's University faculty would produce some of the first
university-level financial accounting, cost accounting, and auditing textbooks published in Canada [e.g; Ashley, 1931; Smails, 1930,
1933; Smails and Walker, 1926; Walker, 1933].
The Queen's correspondence program was eventually adopted by all of the provincial societies. The program continued until
1967 by which time the CAs had implemented a university degree
requirement (the implementation of the degree requirement varied from 1964 to 1968 depending on the province). Candidates for
the CA designation were expected to take the required subjects as
part of their degree program under the n e w regulations. Edwards
would have approved of this evolution in accounting education.
THE IMPERIAL MUNITIONS BOARD
During World War I, three of George's sons served in the
Canadian Expeditionary Force in Europe. George also served the
war effort as comptroller and auditor for the Imperial Munitions
Board (IMB) in Canada. This dual role is a violation of m o d e r n
independence rules and was recognized as unusual at the time:
In addition to Mr. Edwards being the only officer
in charge of its accounts, he was also Auditor for
the Ministry of Munitions, a curious but very interPublished by eGrove, 2000
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esting anomaly. This fact however shows what
confidence the British Treasury placed in him
[Carnegie, 1925, p. 225].
It is interesting to consider whether or not this situation was
a breach of the accounting ethics of the day. Immediately prior to
the war, Edwards, as president of the DACA, had prepared a paper
on accounting ethics and had distributed this paper to the provincial associations (no copy of it has been located). Other articles on
accounting ethics around this period emphasize relationships
among practitioners rather than issues of broader public interest
[e.g., Bunnel, 1910]. After the war, Edwards continued his efforts
to formalize the ethical duties of CAs. He was a member of the
DACA committee that produced the association's first code of
ethics in 1925. This code continued to emphasize etiquette in collegial relations but did include one clause concerning conflict-ofinterest. This clause required the accountant to "inform a client or
employer" of circumstances that could impair the accountant's
judgment or objectivity [Crowell, 1925]. Edwards' work with the
IMB would have met this minimal requirement.
The IMB was a replacement for the Shell Committee (a political committee of the Canadian government) and was intended to
remove the procurement of munitions for the war effort from
political considerations [Rider, 1974, p. 67]. The IMB was an agency of the British government although it operated primarily in
Canada. Its head was Joseph Flavelle, a Canadian entrepreneur
with interests in meatpacking and finance. The chairman was
empowered to act unilaterally and could use the rest of the Board
for advice but not for decision making. Flavelle was thus empowered to run the IMB as a business rather than as a government
agency.
George Edwards joined the Board at the personal request of
Sir Joseph Flavelle. Flavelle was president of National Trust, which
was audited by Edwards,. Morgan. Edwards devoted full time to the
IMB between 1914 and 1918. The staff of the accounting department during this period numbered 1,200, and the IMB oversaw
"1,200 Million dollars" worth of contracts [Edwards, 1925]. The
British Treasury, through intermediaries in New York City, initially provided the funding for this operation. Edwards also established the accounting procedures in New York. From 1915
onwards, the operations were financed by loans from the
Canadian government, Canadian banks, and the Canadian Pacific
Railway. At the end of the war, George was given the additional
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role of liquidator of the IMB's assets [Carnegie, 1925, p. 225].
Edwards' particular achievements with the IMB were the
implementation of an inventory tracking system for materials
flowing between different contractors and the introduction of
continual auditing [Bliss, 1978, p. 307]. The auditing system p u t
the IMB on a 24-hour cycle from n o o n to noon. Each night the
records of the IMB w e r e audited, allowing audited financial
records to be available the next morning for review. These two
systems were credited with reducing asset loss and improving efficiency in the entire supply system. Prior to Edwards' intervention,
shells produced for government contracts had been subject to significant cost overruns [Bliss, 1978, p. 368].
As a result of this service, Edward was awarded the CBE:
Commander of the Order of the British Empire. King George V
created the Order of the British Empire in 1917 specifically to
reward civilians and servicemen in support positions (as opposed
to field positions). No records are available to trace the process by
which Edwards was nominated, but it is likely to have been
through Sir Joseph Flavelle and his connections with the British
government.
Edwards' work with the IMB required him to work closely
with the Canadian Ministry of Finance. The Canadian government
and Canadian banks (with some government coaxing) provided a
large portion of the funds with which the IMB would operate.
This connection resulted in Edwards being called u p o n to undertake a n u m b e r of projects for the Ministry of Finance after the war.
The more notable projects w e r e investigating the failure of
Merchants Bank (1922) and the Home Bank (1923), providing
advice to the Department of Finance on the audit provisions of
the Bank Act (1923, 1924), and providing evidence before the
Senate Committee on Banking (1923). These experiences allowed
Edwards to have a significant impact on government and bank
auditing in Canada. 6
GOVERNMENT AND BANK ACCOUNTING
Edwards was an early p r o p o n e n t of improved government
accounting. He began lobbying the Ontario government on legislation concerning municipal accounts in 1895. He succeeded in
having the Ontario Municipal Act (OMA) amended in 1897 to
6

See Beckhart [1929] and Edwards' testimony reported in the Proceedings of
the Standing Committee on Banking and Business, 1923, pp. 746-771.
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require that municipal auditors be Fellows of the Institute of CAs
(FCA) or some other organization of expert accountants. The FCA
was awarded by examination at that time, while the CA was given
by a vote of members. This was the first legislation to specify a particular accounting association to fill a statutory role [Creighton,
1984, p. 131]. Creighton also suggested that Edwards' success as a
lobbyist may have had much to do with his father's long-standing
civil service role.
The existence of two sets of criteria in the OMA regarding
appropriate auditors is neither an accident nor a failure of
Edwards' lobbying ability. Edwards recognized that limiting this
role to CAs would have required the CAs to accept into membership all auditors currently auditing municipalities. Edwards wanted to maintain the exclusivity of the designation. He reasoned that
the public would appreciate the integrity of the CA designation
and that, over time, clients would avoid unaffiliated public
accountants [see Edwards, 1915, pp. 342-343]. Edwards again successfully lobbied against naming CAs as the only qualified auditors
in the Trust Companies Act (1919) and the Bank Act (1923).
Edwards was able to put his concerns about the state of government accounting into action when he was appointed the auditor of the national accounts in 1921, 1922, and 1925 (see Exhibit
3) 7 The national accounts are the responsibility of the Auditor
General, a position created in 1878 to ensure that government
expenditures were in accordance with legislative approvals. The
role gradually expanded to include a concern with the overall
financial management of government [Sinclair, 1979].
Between 1918 and 1924, the office of the Auditor General was
virtually dormant. During 1918, John Fraser, the incumbent
Auditor General, was on sick leave, eventually dying in office in
1919. E.D. Sutherland was then appointed as acting Auditor
General, but he too developed health problems and was on leave
from 1922 until his resignation in 1923. The post remained empty
for a year until Georges Gonthier was appointed in 1924 [Ward,
1962, p. 162]. As a result of this series of events, the Auditor
General's office had operated without strong leadership for six
years.
Edwards was thus brought into an environment where "both
the opposition and the government [and particularly the
7

The appointment in 1921 was "without remuneration" [Saunders, Sessional
Paper No. 2, 11 George V, A. 1921, p. vii]. The terms of appointment are not recorded for the other years.
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Department of Finance] lost faith in the auditing process" [Ward,
1962, p. 163]. Although outside firms had been hired on several
occasions during the 1920s for special projects, this was the first
time that an external auditor had been used for the national
accounts. The use of outside consultants hired by the government
was protested by the Auditor General [Sinclair, 1979]. He claimed
that under the act creating the position, the Auditor General was
independent of the sitting government and reported directly to
the Parliament. The government then had no place in arranging
for outside experts to interfere with the operations of the Auditor
General.
In spite of the internal opposition to Edwards' role in the
preparation of the national accounts, he was able to have an
impact on their presentation. One of Edwards' key contributions
was to reformat the national accounts to conform to current practice in business and banking in particular [Saunders, 1921, p. vii].
The original terms of reference of the audit were limited to verification of the conformity of the public accounts with the government's books. Edwards, Morgan & Co. was also engaged in 1922 to
review the government's assets and the procedures in place in different departments for safeguarding revenues.
EXHIBIT 3
Audit Certificates for the Dominion of Canada
We have examined the Balance Sheet of the Dominion of Canada
(shewn herewith) as of March 31st, 1920, also the Expenditure and
Revenue Account for thie fiscal year ended on the said date, and have
verified the same by reference to the Dominion Ledgers. We certify
that the above-mentioned statements accurately set forth the matters
therein referred to, and are as shewn by the said books.
EDWARDS, MORGAN & CO.,
Chartered Accountants.
Ottawa, December 1st, 1920.

We have examined the Balance Sheet of the Dominion of Canada
as at March 31, 1924, and we certify that the Balance Sheet conforms
to the Balance Sheets of previous years in not including in the Net
Debt of the Dominion, issues of the Canadian National Railway
Company and Companies included in its System, which carry the
Guarantee of the Dominion of Canada. Such Guaranteed Issues are
shown year by year as Indirect Liabilities.
GEO. EDWARDS,
Of the firm of Edwards, Morgan & Co.
W. GARTH THOMSON,
Of the firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Ottawa, Canada, 27th January, 1S)25.
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In 1925, Edwards again audited the national accounts but this
time with a co-auditor (no audit statements appear for 1923 or
1924). The change from a single auditor to co-auditors is consistent with Edwards' lobbying on the revisions to the Bank Act of
1923. Given that Edwards used financial reporting in the banking
industry as a model for reformatting the national accounts, it is
likely that he also imported the n e w audit requirements from the
Bank Act into this assignment. The co-auditor in 1925 was Peat
Marwick Mitchell, a firm with an established reputation in bank
audits [Cowperthwaite, 1986].
Beckhart [1929, p. 439] gave Edwards credit for the changes
in the audit provisions of the 1923 Bank Act. Specifically, the act
required that auditors must be experienced members of an association of accountants, that the audit be conducted by two people
of different firms, and that the auditors should not simultaneously provide other services to the bank while acting as its auditor.
Edwards' views were in opposition to those of the Canadian
Bankers' Association which favored the status quo. G. Clarkson,
son of Edwards' former employer and teacher, also gave testimony
at the hearings. He and Edwards were at odds over the need for
bank auditors to refrain from providing any other services to their
banking clients [Beckhart, 1929, p. 439]. Clarkson claimed that
there was so little profit in the audit that his firm would have to
withdraw from bank audits if they were denied the opportunity to
provide other services. He estimated at the time that 4% of his
business was comprised of bank audits, while 25% of his business
was other work on behalf of the banks. 8 Clarkson lived up to this
promise and w i t h d r e w from bank audits after the act was enacted
[Little, 1964, p. 26].
In testimony regarding the Bank Act, Edwards was asked if he
had ever served as a bank auditor. He answered, "no." His expertise in banking stemmed from his work preparing a report for the
Minister of Finance on the failure of the Merchant Bank. This
engagement, in turn, grew out of his work as auditor of the gove r n m e n t accounts. He also argued that his expertise in this matter
was "the result of long study of relationships subsisting between
members of my profession and their clients, and the standards of
competency and conduct in a professional sense, which entitles
them, as a class, to public confidence" [Canada, 1923, p. 764]. He

8

Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Banking and Business
[1923, p. 765].
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argued that independence of the auditor from bank management
was a necessary condition for shareholders to have confidence in
bank financial statements. He also thought that mandatory auditor
rotation would allow management to change auditors periodically w i t h o u t u n d e r m i n i n g depositor confidence in the bank.
Auditor rotation would also ensure that overfamiliarity between
the auditor and management would not impair auditor independence. Although these provisions w e r e opposed by the Canadian
Bankers' Association and other prominent auditors, Edwards'
credibility with the Ministry of Finance and government proved
decisive in allowing his vision of the auditor's role to be enacted.
Edwards also investigated the Home Bank failure in 1923. He
gave evidence on his finding to the Royal Commission that investigated the failure in 1924 [McKeown, 1924, pp. 491-522, 539-551].
Clarkson also provided evidence to the Royal Commission as liquidator of the failed bank. One of Edwards' key findings in this
case was that the Home Bank was the only bank at that time not
audited by a CA. He used this circumstance to impress u p o n gove r n m e n t and bank officials t h e value of CAs in society
[Richardson and Lew, 1992]. Interestingly, George Gonthier, w h o
was appointed Auditor General in 1924, was the first CA to hold
the position [Ward, 1962].
THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN ACCOUNTING
In his presidential address to the DACA, Edwards [1912] spoke
of the Boer War and England's "mistake" in allowing Dutch
colonies to develop in South Africa. He drew members' attention
to "the truth that allies are better than neutrals, for some day
neutrals may become a menace." Further he predicted, by analogy,
"that those of our Canadian Societies which have been tolerant or
neglectful of the growth of independent professional elements in
their very midst will presently reap the harvest in the form
of organized antagonism to our hopes and plans for a united
accountancy profession in Canada." His vision of a unified
accounting profession, however, was challenged by the diversity
of the work locations and tasks that accountants undertake.
Edwards' resolve to eliminate organized opposition was soon
put to the test with the application of the Certified General
Accountants Association of Canada (CGA) for a federal charter in
1913. The CGA originated in 1908 as a technical self-study group
of Canadian Pacific Railway accountants. Gradually this g r o u p
grew, and members began to seek a way to publicly acknowledge
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their accomplishments. Initially they sought a charter that would
allow them to grant a designation similar to the CAs but without
the requirement of an apprenticeship in public practice. Edwards
intervened but withdrew the opposition of the CAs in return for
informal assurances that the CGA would limit itself to the interests
of "employed accountants" (i.e., both financial and managerial
accountants but not those in public practice) and would not grant
a designation. Edwards had thus negotiated for the CGA to be neutral with respect to his ambitions in public accounting. By 1920,
however, the membership of the CGA had grown to include public accountants, while a provincial charter had been obtained in
Quebec that permitted the group to hold examinations and grant
a designation. Edwards regarded this as an abrogation of the original agreement [Edwards, 1921b]. The neutrals had become a
menace in Edwards' eyes.
The division of labor between public and salaried accountants
(essentially a division between the preparation and the audit of
financial statements) was not the only source of challenge to
Edwards' vision of a unified profession. There was also a growing
bod of accountants concerned with costing and managerial uses
of accounting information. In the U.K. (1919) and the U.S. (1919),
associations of cost accountants were formed independently of
the established accounting associations with ambiguous jurisdictional boundaries. In Canada, the CGA was the obvious association
to represent cost accountants since its membership already
included many accountants practicing as cost or management
accountants.
Edwards' experience with the IMB had made him aware of the
variability of costs across manufacturers and the poor state of cost
control in many instances. Edwards was concerned both with the
need to improve the effectiveness of cost accounting practice and
to prevent the creation of another accounting association to compete with the CAs [cf. Edwards, 1921b]. The examination and
apprenticeship requirements that the CAs had carefully crafted to
control entry to public accounting could not be changed to allow
the entry of cost accountants into CA institutes. But, at the same
time, Edwards could not allow the CGA to benefit from this
emerging branch of accountancy by gaining more members and a
stronger mandate. The solution Co these concerns was the creation of an association on terms acceptable to the CAs.
In 1920, the president of the DACA called on the provincial CA
institutes to create a new association for the benefit of cost
accountants. The eight incorporators of the Society of Cost
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Accountants of Canada were the eight provincial presidents of the
institutes of CAs chaired by Dilworth, a partner with the firm
Clarkson, Gordon, Dilworth and Nash. 9 At the inaugural Board of
Trustees meeting, George Edwards emerged as the first chair of
the Society [Canadian Chartered Accountant, 1920, pp. 31-34, 116119]. It is likely given his sudden appearance in this capacity that
it had been George Edwards, working behind the scenes at the
ICAO and the DACA, w h o had orchestrated the creation of the
Society.
This organization would be federally incorporated but, as
Edwards had shown through his battles with the DACA, would not
have the power to hold examinations or establish a designation.
The organization would be a mechanism to allow cost accountants
to share information and improve their craft, but it would not
become a rival to the CA designation. Soon after Edwards stepped
down from the presidency in 1924, however, the Society started to
debate offering "certificates of competency." The Society began
holding examinations in 1927 [Allan, 1982, p. 21] and, after incorp o r a t i n g provincially, created the Registered Industrial
Accountant designation in 1941 (this designation b e c a m e
Certified Management Accountant in 1976).
Edwards' work with the Society of Cost Accountants of
Canada was the last major project he would undertake before
retiring from involvement in professional affairs in 1926 at the age
of 65. The last five years of his professional life were marked by
honors for his achievements. These included an honorary doctorate from Queen's University (1922) and life memberships in the
Institute of CAs of Manitoba (1926) and the Institute of CAs of
Alberta (1927). In 1926, a dinner was held at the University of
Toronto to mark his retirement. Over 200 prominent members of
the accounting and business communities of Canada and the U.S.
attended. To commemorate the event, a painting of Edwards was
commissioned and n o w hangs in the library of the Institute of CAs
of Ontario.
CONCLUSION
Of my ability to adequately serve and promote the
interests and welfare of the Chartered Accountants
in Canada I have had serious misgivings; of my
9

Although there are now ten provinces, a CA association was not created in
Prince Edward Island until 1921, and Newfoundland did not become a Canadian
province until 1949.
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deep concern for those interests and my devotion
to your cause I have never had a moment's doubt. I
hope that your verdict may be that some progress
has been made [Edwards, 1912, p. 81].
George Edwards served the Canadian accounting profession
for 36 years from his first election to the ICAO Council in 1890
until his retirement from professional politics in 1926. He was a
strategist and a tactician. He had a vision of accountancy as a profession rather than simply as a business, mandating a single
standard of practice reflected in educational programs, systems of
examination, and codes of ethics. He worked to establish the CA
profession as the sole representative of public accountants in
Canada with a responsibility for maintaining the standards of
practice and the usefulness of its members to society. He was vigorous in protecting this vision from others and in creating the
infrastructure necessary to support it. His name is prominent at
the initiation of key changes in the profession but, after the structure had been put in place, he operated in the background. For
example, after his stints as president of various associations in
which he was involved, he frequently served on key committees,
working to ensure the implementation of initiatives he had put in
place.
His legacy includes the federal/provincial structure of the
accounting profession in Canada, university-based accounting
education, a professional journal, the division of labor between
management and financial accounting associations, and a vision of
the place of CAs in Canadian society. Although there is no question of Edwards' influence on the profession, several aspects of his
vision were unsuccessful. He was unable to prevent the creation
of alternative accounting associations in Canada. At the time of his
death, the CPA (Certified Public Accountant), APA (Accredited
Public Accountant), RIA (Registered Industrial Accountant) and
CGA (Certified General Accountant) were established designations in Canada. He also lived to see the entry of women into the
profession, albeit after his retirement from professional politics.
In 1929, the Privy Council ruled that the word "person" in
Canadian law referred equally to men and women. This ruling
opened all opportunities created by statute to both sexes. The professions that enjoy statutory protection of their designations and
practice rights were henceforth unable to prevent women from
entering the profession. Edwards saw both of these events as
undermining the status of the profession.
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In 1926, at age 65, George Edwards retired and ceased all activity within the profession. It is hard to imagine h o w someone so
intimately involved in the development of the profession could
end his connection so abruptly. It suggests that Edwards saw his
work in the profession simply as part of his job, not a calling or a
crusade, but simply something that had to be done and done well.
At age 65 it could be that George simply wanted to enjoy his success and spend more time with his powerboats (a passion of his).
Or perhaps it is as George Edwards said at his retirement dinner in
1926: "Our profession is now u p o n an assured foundation and it is
long since it needed any help of mine to ensure its steady
progress."
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ANSON O. KITTREDGE: EARLY
ACCOUNTING PIONEER
Abstract. Leafing through early accounting journals from the
last two decades of the 19th century, accounting historians and
enthusiasts piece together the history of accountancy in the
U.S., yet pay little attention to the editors of these journals w h o
at times almost single-handedly willed their existence, clearing
the road for modern accounting journals. Anson O. Kittredge,
w h o was probably the most outstanding and influential editor
of the 19th century, was also an author, teacher, CPA examiner,
innovator, practitioner, and organizer.

Accountancy should not forget Selden R. Hopkins
its first editor or Anson O. Kittredge his greater
successor [Webster, 1940, p. 11].
The last quarter of the 19th century in America marked the
beginning of a period of substantial economic change, providing
an environment conducive to the establishment of the new profession of public accountancy. The development of the vast railroad system accelerated the nation's transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy and resulted in rapidly growing
urban centers. The industrialization brought about a complex,
new business world with its separation of the owners from the
managers of capital, resulting in the rise of a professional managerial class. The unsatiated demand for capital brought much
British investment and, in tandem, British-trained accountants to
the U.S. The economic changes of the period necessitated the
transition of the accounting profession from bookkeepers to professional accountants.
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There were many U.S. accounting pioneers who helped the
accounting profession develop during this transition period.1
Anson O. Kittredge, editor, author, teacher, CPA examiner, and
practitioner, was one of the main players who contributed to the
development and advancement of the accounting profession in
the last quarter of the 19th century. Kittredge, who served as the
editor of some of the first accounting and bookkeeping journals in
the U.S., also published numerous articles on accounting theory
and practice. He was one of the first accountants to describe the
importance of accounting for inventory quantities and prices in
manufacturing firms and is credited with the development of the
first card-ledger system. (He may have been the first "systems" person in accounting.) Kittredge was instrumental in the organization of the New York Institute of Accountants and Bookkeepers
[Romeo and Kyj, 1998, p. 35] and played a major role in organizing the American Institute of Bank Clerks [Dayton Daily Journal,
1903]. Throughout his work as an editor, he emphasized the
"American accounting system," recognizing the differences
between the American and British ways of performing accounting
that were necessary in the rapidly growing U.S. economy. He was
one of the lead accountants in the promotion of the "science of
accounts."
The goal of this paper is to establish the contributions of
Kittredge to the accounting profession and to the early accounting and business journals he edited. After a brief introduction to
his early background, Kittredge's written contributions to
accounting theory, practice, and education as an editor, author,
and practitioner will be addressed. Second, Kittredge's contribution to cost accounting, specifically his analysis on the classification and application of factory overhead, will be presented.
An analysis of Kittredge's contribution to accountancy was
derived by examining the book he wrote with J. F. Brown, The
Self-Proving Accounting System (1897), and the accounting journals he edited: The Office (July 1886 to May 1891), Business (June
1891 to October 1896), and Accountics (April 1897 to September
1900), as well as a journal for which he may have been a silent editor, Commerce, Accounts and Finance (January 1901 to May
1903).2 Norman Webster's archives at the AICPA library were also
1
A short list of other noted accountants in the 19th century includes Charles
E. Sprague [Mann,1931], Charles W. Haskins [Jordan, 1923], Selden Hopkins
[Webster, 1940], and S.S. Packard [Manao, 1996].
2
This opinion was expressed by Webster [1954, p. 109].

Published by eGrove, 2000

127

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 13
Romeo and Kyj: Kittredge, Early Accounting Pioneer

119

examined. 3 After a brief introduction, this paper will concentrate
on Kittredge's role in accounting.
EARLY BACKGROUND
Kittredge was born on February 19, 1848 in Dayton, Ohio.
Until the age of 13, he attended public grade school, after which
he received most of his instruction from tutoring sessions by local
clergymen. After training at Miami Commercial College (Ohio),
he was employed at 18 as a bookkeeper in the Greer & King
Foundry General Store [Dayton Daily Journal, 1903]. This proved
a valuable experience for the future writer w h o was to publish a
series of articles on foundry bookkeeping systems. While working at Greer & King, he developed what is regarded as the first
card-ledger system. His adult life can be divided into three distinct
areas, in all of which he achieved considerable success: the sheetmetal industry, the accounting profession, and the banking industry.
Kittredge left the stove foundry to start a sheet-metal business,
which was ultimately incorporated as the Kittredge, Cornice, and
Ornament Works. There he patented many sheet-metal machines.
Between 1874-1878, Kittredge published his first journal, The
Sheet Metal Builder, which he later sold to publisher David
Williams. In 1878, he left Ohio and settled in New York City,
w h e r e he became editor of The Metal Worker and Carpentry and
Building.
During this period of his life, he wrote The Metal
Worker Pattern Book, which became the standard among sheetmetal workers for many years [Commerce, Accounts and Finance,
1903, p. 10]. His experience as an editor for the metal-industry
journals provided him with a strong background for establishing
and editing journals in accounting. His first article on accounting,
regarding foundry bookkeeping, was read before the National
Association of Stove Manufacturers on July 22, 1880, and published in the October 26 and November 9 issues of The BookKeeper.
3
Webster published numerous historical articles on accountancy, The Ten
Year Book of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, and the
seminal work, The American Association of Public Accountants 1886-1906. He
served for many years as chairman of the Committee on History for the American
Institute of Accountants (predecessor of the AICPA) and as a m e m b e r of the
NYSSCPAs Committee on History. His archives on accounting history were given
to the American Institute of Accountants Foundation. Webster was known as the
"Historian of American Accountancy" [Committee on History, 1957].
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From the early 1880s until the time of his death, Kittredge
directed most of his energies to the accounting and finance professions, starting as a founding m e m b e r of the Institute of
Accountants (IA) in 1882. At the time of his death on March 23,
1903, Kittredge was p r e s i d e n t of the Account, Audit and
Assurance Company of New York City and secretary of the
American Institute of Bank Clerks [Commerce, Accounts
and
Finance, 1903, p. 9].
EDITORIAL WORK AND PUBLICATIONS
During the later part of the 19th century, a sizeable portion of
business education was provided by periodicals. The early
accounting journals edited by Kittredge paved the way for
accounting journalism in the 20th century. Webster [1940, p. 11],
the noted accounting historian, evaluated Selden R. Hopkins and
Anson O. Kittredge, the two pioneering accounting editors of the
19th century, and found Kittredge the greater of the two
[Webster, 1940, p. 11]. Kittredge's contribution as an editor and
author started early in his life with editorial work in several trade
journals, among them The Iron Age, The Metal Worker, Sheet
Metal Builder, and Carpentry and Business.
As mentioned previously, Kittredge's first article in an
accounting journal appeared in The Book-Keeper, a periodical to
which he continued to contribute over its life. He began his o w n
publication, The Office, in June 1886. Five years later, The Office
was purchased by David Williams, and its name was changed to
Business.
In 1893, Kittredge i n c o r p o r a t e d the Kittredge
Company Publishers, which reacquired Business from Williams.
However, the Kittredge Company was u n d e r f u n d e d , and
Kittredge was forced to sell the journal back to its former owner
[The Bookkeeper, 1896, p. 7]. Due to personal conflicts, Kittredge
resigned as editor of Business and a short time later became the
editor of Accountics.4
The Office's treatment of accounting was based on the "science of accounts as a branch of mathematics," w h i c h was the philosophy of the IA of which Kittredge was a founding member.
Although The Office emphasized n o affiliation, it had a special section for the IA. In latter issues, however, this section was expand-

4

Kittredge explained that he withdrew from Business because he disap-

proved
the course
the magazine was taking. A conflict which may have contributed
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ed to include other accounting organizations as they became
established. 5
Business was a continuation of The Office u n d e r a n e w name.
The rationale for using the name Business was that, what transpires in the office is more than accounting or bookkeeping and
can best be summed up in the word "business" [Kittredge, 1891].
Therefore, Kittredge's editorials in Business from J u n e 1891 to
October 1896 included numerous topics: praise of hard work,
objections to the metric system, the usefulness of the Bureau of
Business Information and Services to businessmen, the need for
trade journals, criticism of American roads, immigration, the
importance of bank examiners, the causes of the financial recession of 1893, w o m e n in business, shortcomings of the public
school systems, the banking system in the U.S., politics and the
business climate, the need for a national accounting convention
and a national organization, the effect of war u p o n business prosperity, the need for business education, and the need for a single
gold standard.
Accountics was a monthly magazine published from 1897 to
1900, devoted to the science of accounting. 6 It was also the first
official journal of an accounting organization in this country (the
IA). Its initial issue in April 1897 stated as one of its objectives to
"impress u p o n the business public the fact that accounting is the
vital element of business, and that for this reason it is entitled to a
degree of recognition and to a breadth of use that has never yet
been accorded to it" [Kittredge, 1897a, p. 16]. Being the official
publication of the IA, Accountics was devoted almost exclusively
to accounting and was used as a vehicle of communication and

to the severing of relations between Kittredge and Williams was the publication by
Williams of the second edition of the Metal Worker Pattern Book. Kittredge was
the author of the first edition. When Williams issued the second edition, he listed
the author as George W. Kittredge, a cousin of Anson, who had initially made some
of the mathematical drawings. Kittredge and his family were very upset by this as
recollected in his daughter's letter to Webster [Kittredge, 1941].
5
The Institute of Accountants and Bookkeepers, founded in New York City in
1882, was one of the earliest recorded efforts to establish the accounting profession in the U. S. The name was officially changed in 1886 to the IA. See Miranti
[1990] and Romeo and Kyj [1998] for more information on the IA.
6
Charles Sprague, the major porponent of the science of accounts, defined
"accountics" as "the science which treats of accounts and the art of keeping, verifying, examining and classifying them" [Kittredge, 1897a, p. 19].
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instruction for accountants.7 Accountics set out to bring to the
forefront much that is distinctly American in accounting practice
[Kittredge, 1897a, p. 18]. Starting in 1897, Kittredge also edited
Lawyer and Creditman [Webster, 1940, p. 11].
Throughout his editorials and articles, Kittredge emphasized
the phrase American accounting." American accounting was a
system that had developed as a result of the swiftly growing conditions of American business. Consequently, significant differences existed between American and British accounting practices. American railroads used different locomotives and different
administration practices than the British [Kittredge, 1898a].
British accounting practices had to meet the requirements of the
Company Acts, whereas accounting practices in America could be
specifically adapted to American conditions and requirements.
Kittredge also understood the need for independent audits, which
were required in Great Britain, and presented editorials and articles on the value of an independent audit. As early as 1888, he
reprinted in The Office [Kittredge, 1888, p. 35] a lecture on the
importance of auditing and auditing procedures presented by F.
W. Pixley before the Chartered Accountants' Students' Society of
London. Kittredge's journals included articles on specific issues
in accounting, among them a series on cost accounting in different industries, conversion of partnership books, changing from
single to double entry, and the history of accountancy. During the
last few years of writing in Commerce, Accounts and Finance, he
emphasized the proper classification of accounts, preparation of
the balance sheet, and profit and loss statements for various types
of businesses [Kittredge, 1901a, 1901b, pp. 1, 8, 1901d]. In the
same journal, Kittredge discussed the differences between a bookkeeper and an accountant [Kittredge, 1901c].
Science of Accounts:
Throughout his 14 years as editor,
Kittredge's journals included numerous educational articles on
the science of accounts. McMillan [1998, pp. 25-28] acknowledged Kittredge to be one of the leading forces advocating the science of accounts in the U.S. and documented evidence on
Kittredge's view of accounting as a real science in his 1896 arti7

The section entitled "Office Juniors" had a specific purpose—to educate
young bookkeepers. Topics included questions from CPA examinations, receipts,
fraud, trial balances, ledgers, goodwill, the metric system, rules of (debit and credPublished
by eGrove,
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cles. A few years later in an article written in the February 1900
issue of Accountics, Kittredge [1900a, p. 35] differentiated bookkeeping and accounting in terms of art and science:
Again, as a conclusion following upon a careful
survey of the field, I am led to believe that, as a
rule, we have far too much bookkeeping and
altogether too little accounting in our offices.
Bookkeeping is the art, the method, the
embodiment of the plan, the practice. In contradistinction, accounting is the science, the analysis, the classification, the scheme or plan in the
abstract.
The proponents of this new school of thought, mostly elite members of the IA, believed accounting to be a real science. This
school of thought contributed to a greater understanding of
accounting and was incorporated into the new accounting programs that developed in the U.S. in the early 20th century, starting
with the New York University School of Commerce, Accounts, and
Finance in 1900. Miranti [ 1990, p. 73] discussed how British professional values did not displace the "science of accounts" as a normative model for professionals in the U. S. until after the deaths of
Charles Haskins and Anson Kittredge in 1903.
Books and Articles: Kittredge may have been one of the first to
emphasize accounting systems. His book, The Self-Proving
Accounting System, coauthored with J.F. Brown, introduced the
idea of using balance sheet ledgers to record transactions. This
system was an early type of perpetual accounting system, which
allowed balance sheets to be readily available to management at all
times. Previous to this publication, a balance sheet would have to
be prepared from scratch, a process which was difficult to complete effectively and efficiently. Use of the ledger to prepare
financial statements allowed businesses to continue with normal,
everyday operations instead of closing down the business to
determine the assets, liabilities, and profits during a given period
of time [Kittredge and Brown, 1897]. No book or system in the
U.S. had advocated this method previously. It combined bookkeeping and business administration with mechanical features
invented by the authors. The entries were posted directly to the
ledger, which consisted of wide and narrow pages so that an ongoing balance sheet was created through the postings. The system
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used a chart of accounts with major headings included on the balance sheet, as well as cost accounts.
The pamphlet Branch House Auditing [Kittredge, 1897b], an
expansion of an article with the same title that appeared in
Accountics, examined the reporting system employed at the Pope
Manufacturing Company to control its departments by using
weekly and monthly reports of transactions from branch offices
to the home office. It reinforced the importance that Kittredge
placed on in-house auditing and independent auditing. He also
wrote A System of Cost Records for Foundry Work [Kittredge,
circa 1886] which demonstrated the type of accounting systems
employed in manufacturing firms. During his days as the editor of
Accountics, Kittredge [1898d] put together a booklet of formulas
entitled Accounting Specifications and Formulas, which was free
to the readership of the journal.
At the time of his death in 1903, Kittredge appears to have
been involved in writing a series of five books advertised in the
journal Commerce, Accounts and Finance: Tools of Business,
Elements of Bookkeeping,
Balance Sheet Accounting,
Auditing,
and Business Organization and Administration.
The books w e r e
supposed to have been produced u n d e r the direction of the
Publication Committee of Commerce, Accounts and Finance. The
committee included nine individuals, among them Kittredge,
although he was not listed as chair. In Kittredge's obituary in the
April issue, the following explanation was given:
Owing to the sudden death of Mr. A. O. Kittredge,
w h o had in personal charge the preparation of the
manuscript for the five books...the publishers are
obliged to announce that the production of the
b o o k s will n o w be indefinitely p o s t p o n e d
[Commerce, Accounts and Finance, 1903, p. 10].
These books were never published, a fact which leads one to conclude that Kittredge was to have been the primary author.
Many of Kittredge's articles indicated an insight into accounting many years ahead of his time. For example, in an 1892 article
on newspaper accounting, Kittredge [1892] suggested using a liability account for subscriptions received but not yet earned:
That subscription received should be credited to
an account belonging to liabilities, so far as classifications in the books of the establishment are
concerned, and that m o n t h by m o n t h there should
Published by eGrove, 2000
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be taken from this account an amount corresponding to the fraction which has been sent of
the papers which have been paid for.
However, Kittredge realized the difficulty of implementing a plan
for each individual subscriber as outlined above and suggested
allocating the amounts to revenue and liabilities on the basis of a
more pragmatic aggregate total:
Instead of dividing the individual subscriptions as
they come to hand into 12 equal parts, crediting
each separate part to the account of the monthly
n u m b e r to which it belongs, w e may by a kind of
calculation reach an amount in a single sum to be
taken from the amount of subscriptions collected
or charged....
A list of Kittredge's articles in business periodicals, accounting
articles in nonbusiness periodicals, and books is included in
Appendix A.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO COST AND SYSTEMS ACCOUNTING
Historians have not acknowledged Kittredge's contribution to
cost accounting. 8 His experience in the sheet-metal business gave
him valuable insight into cost accounting. Based on this experience and his observations as a practicing accountant and editor,
Kittredge developed his position over a period of time from 1880
to 1903. His evolution in cost classification can be seen in his writings over the years.
Initially, Kittredge, like most of the accountants of his time,
did not clearly classify costs, but he did understand the necessity
of including all costs in accounts. In the November 9, 1880 issue

8
Garner [1954], Wells [1978], and Sowell [1973] all mentioned the British
team of Garcke and Fells w h o described practices of allocating overhead costs in
1887. Garner and Wells claimed that these practices were not followed consistently by English and American writers. However, they did not reference any 19th
century American periodicals as part of their bibliographies. They were probably
not aware of contributions of American accountants other than those Americans
w h o wrote about cost accounting in books or made presentations to the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers. This is the reason why Garner found that developments in manufacturing accounting were mostly proposed by engineers. Thus,
he was not aware of the contributions to manufacturing accounting by Kittredge,
w h o was trained as a bookkeeper.
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of The Book-keeper in an article on foundry bookkeeping,
Kittredge [1880, p. 130] wrote, "Everything that concerns the cost
of the manufactured goods belongs in these columns [journal
columns in the books of stove manufacturing]." He continued that
"for the sake of analysis it may be desirable to keep an account
with pig iron, coal, labor advertising, interest, discount, taxes,
insurance, office expenses, etc." Kittredge kept these accounts
separate and distinct for more complete classifications:
They are all represented on the journal, however,
by these sets of columns. The footings of the cost
items are posted to a general account of the same
name in the general ledger in the same manner as
the footings of the 'accounting receivable' column
already described. The total cost to date of the
manufactured product is always represented by
the balance in this account, while an analysis of
the cost may be obtained by an examination of the
nominal accounts comprehended by it under
whatever names they may be kept.
Kittredge initially lumped together all the indirect costs,
including selling and administrative, to determine the cost of the
goods produced.
A few years later in 1886, Kittredge published a series of articles in The Office by Henry Metcalfe delivered before the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the IA concerning
the recording and allocation of materials and labor in a manufacturing company. Metcalfe [1886, p. 64] recommended the allocation of indirect costs as explained in the following paragraph:
All the expenses which the head of a department
cannot assign to a special job, and the material that
he cannot account by inventory, remain of necessity charged to his department, and so constitute a
general expense account representing with his
share of power, rent, insurance, depreciation,
taxes, etc., the cost of the facilities for the performance of work in his department since the last
inventory, say a year ago. The total expense
account for a department divided by the number
of days' labor done in that department during the
same period, gives the cost of facilities per day's
labor therein; this quotient is called the cost factor
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of that department. The yearly cost factor, corrected by experience and applied to jobs done in
the ensuring year, gives their most probable share
of the facilities they enjoy, and added to the net
cost of the labor and material they consume, gives
their most probable actual cost, balancing again in
advance the account for operating expenses.
Metcalfe emphasized the concept of indirect expenses as
divided into variable and fixed in his book, The Cost of
Manufactures [1885], but he did not mention sales expenses and
other general expenses of the firm. Garner [1954, p. 123]
explained that, since Metcalfe usually wrote about accounting for
government workshops, there was no need for expenses connected with sales. Metcalfe [1886, p. 30] himself stated that he was
unfamiliar with the commercial side of business.
Kittredge learned from and expanded on Metcalfe's work.
Writing at approximately the same time, he advocated the inclusion of only indirect manufacturing costs in the general expense
account included in the costs of goods sold. Kittredge described
a system of cost accounting used by Hopson & Chapin
Manufacturing of New London, Connecticut [Kittredge, 1886b].
He detailed the accumulation and recording of costs as materials
pass from station to station on tickets, with job cards for labor, and
stressed the need to take into account rent (return on capital),
cost of power, superintendence, fixed charges, pattern work, and
an allowance for lubricating oil and sand on a daily consumption
basis to determine product cost. Fixed expenses were considered
arbitrary in character, prorated based on the number of days and
applied on a daily basis. Kittredge advocated this to be more useful for comparison of costs on a daily, monthly, or yearly basis.
Advertising or office expenses were not mentioned as part of the
cost of the product.
In the 1897 book, The Self-Proving Accounting System,
Kittredge's understanding of cost classification had evolved to the
point that he specified the distinction between cost of goods sold
and the expenses of doing business. Both the cost of goods sold
account and the expenses of doing business would then be closed
to the loss and gain account [Kittredge and Brown, 1897, pp. 4445]:
Very little thought will be required to show that
the expenses of doing business are entirely dis-
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tinct from the cost of goods, and a little additional
reflection will show that whatever affects the cost
of merchandise in itself should be debited to the
Buying Account [inventory account].
In chapter two of the book, "Classification of Accounts," he
defined the "manufacturing account" as one that was to be debited with all costs incurred in the production of goods. The function of the manufacturing account was to keep track of the costs
of goods produced and to turn them over at cost to the "buying
account" upon completion. When items were sold, the buying
account would be credited and the "selling account" debited with
"goods sold at cost prices" (cost of goods sold).
The fifth chapter, entitled "Manufacturing," contains the
underlying principles of the manufacturing account and how the
records should be managed.9 Kittredge stressed that accounts
should be set up to show costs and not to look for profits that
result from sales. The account should show the costs of manufacturing and be useful for a comparison of production costs with
the price of purchasing the same good from the outside. He presented a manufacturing account, the equivalent of today's work-inprocess, to accumulate costs until the product was finished. Upon
completion the costs were moved out to the buying account (finished goods) from which goods were sold. The balance in the
manufacturing account should represent the "goods in process of
construction" and not yet charged off [Kittredge and Brown, 1897,
p. 761.
In explaining the manufacturing account, Kittredge advocated four subdivision accounts - materials, labor, general expense
with "superintendence, rent, power and other general expenses
which have to be spread over the product in determining the
cost," and depreciation. He presented the use of a percentage
plan of a predetermined rate to allocate general factory expenses
(overhead). Kittredge considered the foundation on which the
percentage was based (cost driver) to be of considerable importance and advocated the use of one that did not vary in price from
year to year. Therefore, he advocated the use of labor costs as they
were more constant than material costs [Kittredge and Brown,
1897, pp. 78-79; Kittredge, 1899, pp. 63-65]:
9
In several places that specifically related to cost accounting, Kittredge
referred to "leaving to another volume a complete exposition." Another volume on
cost accounting was never published, perhaps due to Kittredge's unexpected and
untimely
death.2000
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It is the generally accepted opinion of accountants
everywhere that labor being the least variable of
all the elements of entering into the cost of product, is the best foundation on which to spread general expenses [Kittredge, 1899, p. 63].
To the general e x p e n s e account, or "dead account" as
Kittredge referred to it at times, he debited rent, power, insurance,
watchmen's salaries, superintendence, time clerk, and all other
items of expense "that cannot be properly apportioned among the
orders." These were then allocated on a percent basis [Kittredge
and Brown, 1897, pp. 79-80]:
The percentage of dead expenses determined by
the figures above presented during the past year
was 20 per cent - that is, the dead expenses cost
one-fifth as much as the amount of the pay-roll. We
therefore add arbitrarily to the items of cost
shown by order No. 99, an amount equal to onefifth, or 20 per cent, of the amount of labor which
is shown to have gone into the order, or $20.
The under or overapplication was to be debited or credited to
a loss and gain account (p. 81). A separate depreciation account
for plant and machinery was kept from which depreciation was
allocated in the same manner as general expenses.
Kittredge also realized the problems that existed with the old
merchandise account, which was apparently used for two sets of
values in manufacturing firms. He addressed this issue in his 1897
book with Brown and in several of his articles that followed. In an
October 1898 article in Accountics, entitled "The Merchandise
Accounts," Kittredge [1898b] pointed out the problem with the
old merchandise account: 10
Its balance is an amount which represents goods
on hand, minus the profit made on what has been
sold; or an amount consisting of the sum of the
goods on hand, plus the loss that has been made
on what has been sold. ...What bookkeeper, with
such a hodge-podge of an account before him, is
able to tell from the amount appearing as the balance in the merchandise Account in the monthly

"The article was a reprint of an address before the Business Educators'
Section of the National Educational Association, Washington, July 1898.
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trial balance what it really represents?
...As our books are usually opened and conducted,
there is no account with stock and stores, but all is
dumped into merchandise Account,...
In a presentation to the Cincinnati Manufacturers' Club in
December 1898, concerning the evolution of cost accounting as
well as its underlying principles [Kittredge, 1899, p. 4], he again
mentioned the problem of integrating cost accounts with financial accounts:
So great is this difficulty that in many cases business men appear to entertain the idea that cost
accounts are something separate and distinct from
the regular accounts of the business, that cost
accounts are something which cannot be made a
part of the regular accounting system, but instead
are a separate and distinct effort, something necessary to be done by reason of the information
afforded, but something in which those who have
charge of the general accounts of the enterprise
have no particular concern.
I am disposed to take a different view of the case.
I am disposed to believe that the general system of
the accounts of any business should include everything that had to be recorded concerning that
business, whether it occurs in the factory, in the
salesroom, in a branch house, or in the main
office.
As a solution, Kittredge proposed the integration of cost
accounts with financial accounts and the separation of all the
accounts of any business into two grand divisions—the balance
sheet and the profit and loss statement [Kittredge and Brown,
1897, pp. 25-27; Kittredge, 1898b, 1899].
The second major point made in Accountics is the importance
of net income. In a time period when the balance sheet was the
most important statement, Kittredge [1899, p. 5] also emphasized
the importance of net income:
When the revenue is considerably less than the
expenses there is trouble ahead ...As long as the
profits of the business are greater than the
expenses very few care particularly about the relaPublished by eGrove, 2000
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tive standing of assets and liabilities.
In his book and in several articles, Kittredge displayed a complete chart of accounts, which, except for a few differences in terminology (e.g., he used the term "active" instead of "current"),
could have easily been used by a 20th century manufacturing concern. He is one of the accountants who brought accounting into
the 20th century as noted by the following passage in the same
article:
The day has long since gone by when any dark
corner was good enough for the bookkeeper;
when any cheap book that could be picked up at
the corner stationer's was good enough for the
accounts; when the ledgers of one business were
exactly like the ledgers of every other business,
and when bookkeeping was bookkeeping, irrespective of the line of industry [Kittredge, 1899,
pp. 64-65].
Reporting on Kittredge's address on "Accounting for Cotton
Mills" before the New York Chapter of the Institute, the trade magazine Furniture Trade Review [Kittredge, 1900c] wrote:
We reproduce the address in substance because
the system of accounting described therein is
applicable not only to cotton manufacturing but
to the making of carpets, upholstery goods, and in
fact, all manufacturing business. The general system of accounting referred to in the address is one
that has recently been put into operation by two
very prominent cotton mill corporations in the
northern part of the country and by another in the
South. This system has been adapted to the
requirements of various other industries, and is in
use in many of the largest establishments throughout the nation, from bicycle factories to engine
works, and from publishing concerns to department stores.
No wonder Frank E. Webner, the author of many cost books,
including Factory Costs (1911), noted the influence of Kittredge
on his work in a letter to Webster, dated August 28, 1940. He
wrote, "Anson was quite my patron saint and the real inspiration
of my book Factory Costs."
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Farquahar MacRae [1941], who was a friend of Kittredge, one
of the last surviving members of the IA, and a past president of the
organization, mentioned that:
He [Kittredge] was the first accountant that at that
time insisted that keeping track of quantities and
prices of inventories was as important as keeping
the cash account; and when he went into business
as a public practitioner, it was to specialize in cost
accounting.
Apparently, Kittredge not only understood that cost accumulation and allocation were extremely important in running a profitable business, but he was one of the leaders in cost accounting
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
EDUCATION
Business education was one of Kittredge's favorite topics.
Initially he was an advocate for an apprenticeship similar to the
English system [Kittredge, 1887a]. During the years 1895 and
1896, he was critical of business schools in his editorials, suggesting that they provided nothing more than drills in penmanship,
shorthand, and bookkeeping and that they did not adequately
prepare students for the real world:
Young men can train for all the business trades at
the present time, but nowhere, apparently, is business in the sense of direction and management of
operations and profit-making taught. Actual experience, expensive though it is, is the only plan of
instruction [Kittredge, 1896].
According to Kittredge, commercial college instructors themselves did not have the practical experience to instruct their students properly. If college professors were "placed in offices to
discharge the routine duties of any of the various branches of business they pretend to teach, they would acquit themselves with
scarcely more credit than their greenest graduates" [Kittredge,
1895]. In the same article, Kittredge reported that teachers were
not usually selected from the accounting profession at large but
from students at the time of graduation. Therefore, since they had
no practical experience, they only taught their pupils textbook
material, not practical, "real world" accounting.
Commercial colleges could overcome these problems by hirPublished by eGrove, 2000
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ing "practical, everyday" accountants to teach classes. Until this
happened, Kittredge felt that the accounting profession would
never achieve the level of success it deserved [Kittredge, 1895].
Later, he stated that, "the business world owes much to the commercial colleges—far m o r e than it usually acknowledges"
[Kittredge, 1898c, p. 175].
In the same article, in order to emphasize the importance of a
practical education, he discussed some differences in bookkeeping "as she is wrote and bookkeeping as she is teached (p. 175)."
Apparently, there was confusion in some texts related to the use
of the trial balance and its substitution for the balance sheet.
Kittredge's [1890c, p. 176] position was as follows:
The only use to which a trial balance should be p u t
is to determine the equilibrium of debits and credits in the accounts which are tested by it. The trial
balance was never intended to be a business statement. Its use as an indicator of the progress of a
business has grown out of the fact that no other
statement has been available.
Kittredge [1898c, p. 176] also stated that the profit and loss statement had not been covered adequately or correctly in courses of
instruction as indicated by the following statement:
A profit and loss statement necessarily precedes
the preparation of a balance sheet. It also is something that has not been explained in treatises and
courses of instruction, (so far, at least, as I have
been able to ascertain by very careful inquiry.) In
the way a practicing accounting would consider
appropriate and necessary.
These ideas on a practical education appear to have been
incorporated in the establishment of the first successful accounting program in the U.S.,11 the New York University School of
Commerce, Accounts and Finance in 1900, an institution in which
Kittredge became the first professor of accounting theory and
11
A professional school for accountants, the New York School of Accounts, was
chartered in New York State in the fall of 1892 under the auspices of the American
Association of Public Accountants. The purpose of the college was to provide
"practical instruction in the knowledge, and science of modern accountancy and
finance." The school lasted only one year, from September 1893 to July 1894
[Webster, 1954, p. 185].
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practice. 12 In addition, he also lectured occasionally at the
Columbia School of Business, Cornell, the Stevens Institute of
Technology, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
[Kittredge, 1940].
Ironically, Kittredge did not necessarily practice what he
preached, for in letters to Norman Webster in 1940 and 1947, both
Leslie J. Tompkins and Orrin R. Judd recollected that Kittredge
was criticized about teaching too much theory and too little practice. He apparently was not particularly popular in the classroom
or among the students, giving the impression of knowing more
about the subject than he was willing to communicate.
PROFESSIONAL
Kittredge was one of 23 charter members of the IA. He was
also one of 14 who were members of the Executive Council elected to manage its affairs during its first year. Besides spending various terms as a member of the Executive Council, Kittredge
remained active in the Institute for many years, as evidenced by
the following array of technical papers he presented at meetings:
1884-188613
Oct. 1890
Dec. 1891
Apr. 1895
Dec. 1896
Apr. 1897
Jul. 1898
Nov. 1899
Mar. 1900

The System of Cost Accounts Now In Use by the
Hopson and Chapin Manufacturing Co. of New
London, CT.
The Story of an English Syndicate
How Shall We Educate for Business?
Humanizing Influences of Business
Bookkeeping for the Installment Business
The Ledger—Its Forms and Adaptions
Organization
A Scientific Analysis of Business Accounts
Accounting for Cotton Mills.

He was one of the first members elected as a fellow of the IA,
along with Edward T. Cockey, Charles Dutton, Joseph Hardcastle,
H.S. Ogden, S.S. Packard, Charles Taller, and Charles E. Sprague on

12
Kittredge, along with the following faculty members, was in charge of the
accounting courses: Charles W. Haskins, Dean; Charles E. Sprague, Professor,
Theory of Accounts; Ferdinand W. Lafrentz, Professor of Auditing; Henry R. M.
Cook, Professor of Practical Accounting; Leon Brummer, Professor of Practical
Accounting [Lockwood, 1938, p. 142].
13
These presentations cannot be found in any library in the U.S.; thus, the
exact
are not
known for this article.
Published bydates
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March 15, 1887.14 As early as 1886, he had been an advocate for a
national organization of accountants [Kittredge, 1886a, pp. 5758].
Kittredge became Certified Public Accountant No. 121 by
waiver in New York in 1899. He became a member of the New
York State Society of CPAs in March 1898, as well as a member of
its Board of Directors for the years 1900 to 1903. In his obituaries
in both Commerce, Accounts and Finance and the Dayton Daily
Journal, Kittredge was given credit for contributing to the passage
of the first CPA law in 1896. "It was largely owing to Mr.
Kittredge's efforts that the law was passed making the Regents'
Degree of CPA. in New York State, now so greatly sought after by
accountants" [Commerce, Accounts and Finance, 1903, p. 16].
The Dayton Daily Journal [1903] stated that, "he was also prominent in the movement which resulted in the New York law providing for certified public accountants..."15
As a member of the IA and the NYSSCPAs, Kittredge was on
the Examining Board for the New York State CPA examination for
the year July 1899 to June 1900, and he served on a committee
which promoted the organization of the School of Commerce,
Accounts and Finance of New York University. Kittredge taught
there in 1900 and 1901, and he was listed in its catalogues for the
academic years 1901-1902 and 1902-1903. Throughout his career
as an editor, he also practiced as an accountant. At the time of his
death, he was the president of the public accounting firm,
Account, Audit & Assurance Company.16
In early 1900, Kittredge was requested by the American
14
During 1887, the IA had committed itself to a scheme of degrees. The membership was divided into three classes: "Associates," described as the junior order;
"Members," described as the rank and file; and "Fellows," described as those w h o
were chosen for their outstanding achievements and their eminent abilities. This
was the highest class in the IA [Kittredge, 1887b].
15
However, this opinion is in conflict with George Wilkinson and Norman
Webster, w h o both wrote extensively on the passage of the first CPA exam
[Wilkinson, 1903, 1928a, 1928b; Webster, 1954]. Wilkinson did not mention
Kittredge in his articles. In his 1928 article, he attributed the passage to Henry
Harney, president of the IA, and members of the AAPA. Webster [ 1954], in writing
on the first 20 years of the AAPA, attributed the passage of the New York CPA Law
to Melvil Dewey, secretary of the New York State Regents; Richard F. Stevens, president of the AAPA; Richard M. Chapman and Francis Gottsberger, member and
chair respectively of the American Association's Committee on Legislation and
Affairs; and Charles E. Sprague, member of the IA. Apparently, neither author credited Kittredge with contributing significantly to the passage of the first CPA law in
1896.
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Bankers' Association to prepare suggestions on the subject of a
national bank-clerks' association. 17 His report was submitted to
the Committee o n Education of t h e American Bankers
Association. It is interesting to note that the work of the British
Bankers' Institute was described in the report, but this model was
not used because of the differences between the U.S. and the U.K.
One of Kittredge's objectives for the Institute of Bank Clerks (IBC)
was to have lectures at all chapter meetings, as had been the case
with the IA which he had helped establish 20 years earlier. It was
obvious that Kittredge's experiences in accounting were very
helpful in establishing the IBC.
CONCLUSION
There were many individuals w h o helped shape the early
accounting profession in the U.S. during its infancy in the late
19th century. Among his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , few can m a t c h
Kittredge's contributions as an editor, author, teacher, innovator,
practitioner, organizer, and CPA examiner. As one w h o recognized the importance of cost accounting in manufacturing firms
and developed a card-ledger system, he may be one of our first
accounting systems persons. It is important to consider the contributions of American accountants writing in periodicals in the
U.S. during the late 19th century for a more complete historical
understanding of the development of cost accounting.
For at least two years, June 1886 to July 1888, the periodicals
Kittredge edited were the only accounting journals in the U.S. Yet,
he took an interdisciplinary approach and included other business disciplines, such as marketing (especially advertising) and
business law, in his journals to provide not only a technical but a
general business education to his readership. His journals served
as educational materials for both experienced accountants and
aspiring young accountants. With articles written by highly
l6

The company was an advocate of what Kittredge called the "Going Profit
and Loss Statement and a Perpetual Balance Sheet System." It consisted of vising
a Boston or skeleton ledger, then used exclusively by banks, with charge and credit tickets used as vouchers for entries. The company published a book explaining
this system [Kittredge, 1900b].
17
Kittredge was active in the American Institute of Banking (originally called
the American Institute of Bank Clerks), which was established in 1900 by the
American Bankers' Association. This was the first effort to raise the standard of
character and efficiency among bank clerks. Kittredge was secretary of this
organization from its conception and published the official journal of the
Institute,
The Bulletin
Published
by eGrove,
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respected and recognized accountants, as well as question and
answer sections, these periodicals served as communication vehicles and information outlets for the profession. They also promoted the science of accounts advocated by the IA.
Kittredge was highly active in organizing the IA, the premier
accounting organization of the 1880s and 1890s. As an editor, h e
promoted many other accounting organizations through his journals. He was instrumental in the development and success of the
American Bankers' Association. Kittredge was influential in promoting the theory and practice of accounting as well as the
accounting organizations that helped pave the way for the modern profession. In short, he was a 20th century accountant, even
though most of his life was lived in the 19th century.
Webster was probably correct w h e n he expressed the belief
that, as time passes, newspapers and journals become better
known than their editors. The work becomes greater than the
individual w h o created it [Webster, 1940, p. 11]. Leafing through
early accounting journals from the last two decades of the 19th
century, accounting historians and enthusiasts are able to piece
together the history of accountancy in the U.S. Yet, precious little
attention is paid to the editors of these journals w h o , at times,
almost single-handedly willed their very existence.
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APPENDIX A
List of Articles and Books Written by Anson O. Kittredge18
The
Date of
Publication
Oct. 26, 1880

Nov. 9, 1880

Book-Keeper

Title

Brief Annotation

"Foundry Book-keeping"

Description of system w h e r e there is
no copying or transcribing, and nominal accounts are grouped together
Illustration of journal forms to aid in
the process of posting transactions

"Foundry Book-keeping"

The Office
Date of
Publication
Nov. 1886

Dec. 1886

Title

Brief Annotation

"System of Cost Records: FW"

"System of Cost Records: FW"

Aug. 1888

"How Shall Office Be Warmed"

Sept. 1888

"How Shall Office Be Warmed"

Oct. 1888

"How Shall Office Be Warmed"

Nov. 1888

"How Shall Office Be Warmed"

Nov. 1890

"Story of English Syndicate"

accounting systems for a manufacturing Company; discussion is primarily
on time tickets for workers
accounting systems for a
manufacturing Company; discussion is
primarily accounting for material and
labor cost
ideas to improve working conditions
in an office
ideas to improve working conditions
in an office
ideas to improve working conditions
in an office
ideas to improve working conditions
in an office
ideas, formation, and ramifications of
the English Syndicate, an agency
which acts as a promoter between
parties conducting business

Business
Date of
Publication

Title

Oct. 1891

"Bookkeeping Without Books"

Oct. 1892

"Newspaper Accounting"*

Nov. 1892

"Newspaper Accounting"

J a n . 1893

"Newspaper Accounting"

Mar. 1893
Aug. 1893

"Newspaper Accounting"
"Business Management"

Brief Annotation
system of bookkeeping using removable indexes instead of books
introduction to a series of articles dealing with newspaper accounting
accounting for advance subscription
payments
accounting for newspaper subscription lists
viewing advertising contracts
discussion on importance of executive
ability and the advantages of a wellorganized office

18

Articles listed with and asterisk (*) are included in American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1921, p. 968.
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Nov. 1893

"Trade Papers From Editor's
Point of View"

J u n . 1895

"Columnar Journal"

Jul. 1895
Nov. 1895

"Columnar Journal" *
"Bookkeeping Adaptations"*

Jul. 1896

"Business Office as Training School"

Jul. 1896
Jul. 1896

"Is Bookkeeping Progressive"
"Toledo and Her Chamber of Commerce"

Aug. 1896

"Business Environments"

141

influence of the editor in trade journals and the growing importance of
the technical side of the journals
advantages of the columnar principle
and separate cash books
illustration of the columnar principle
definition, objectives, and differences of
different types of bookkeeping systems
inadequacies of real-world training in
business schools and how office experience is one of the best trainers
analysis of accounting as a science
discussion of Credit-men's Association
and municipal reform efforts
discussion of the importance of maintaining a positive business environment

Accountics
Date of
Publication

May 1897
Jun. 1897
Aug. 1897
Oct. 1897
Nov. 1897
Dec. 1897
Feb.1898
Oct. 1898
Oct. 1898
Dec. 1898
Jan.1899
Feb. 1899
Mar. 1899
Apr. 1899
Jul. 1899
Apr. 1899
Nov. 1899
Dec. 1899
Feb. 1900
Feb. 1900
Mar. 1900
May 1900
Jun. 1900
Apr. 1900

Title

Brief Annotation

"The Ledger"
"The Ledger"

origin and definition of the word ledger
reasons for much of the change in
accounting methods
"The Ledger"
differences in ledgers in various industries
auditing system employed at the Pope
"Branch House Auditing"
Manufacturing Company
auditing system employed at the Pope
"Branch House Auditing"
Manufacturing Company
discussion of thickened leaves in the
"Balance Sheet Ledger"
balance sheet ledger
description of a horizontal account ledger
"Improvements in the Boston Ledger"
which allows for carrying balances foward
advantages of using more than one
"Merchandise Account"
merchandise or trading accounts
advantages of introducing a system of
"Uniform Bookkeeping"
uniform bookkeeping
Kittredge's beliefs towards business
"Modern Accounting"
schools
"Evolution in Accounting and Cost Keeping"' perpetual balance sheets and income
statements
"Evolution in Accounting and Cost Keeping'" depreciation accounts, trusts, partnerships and capital
"Evolution in Accounting and Cost Keeping'" principle underlying cost a c c o u n t i n g general factory expenses
review of Dutch and French accounting
"Some of the Accounting Literature of the
literature
Netherlands"
Association news
"National Association of Credit Men"
Association news
"National Association of Credit Men"
notes on various Credit Men's
"Credit Men's Affairs"
Associations
notes on various Credit Men's
"Credit Men's Affairs"
Associations
difference between an accounting sys"Application of Advanced Methods"
tem and a bookkeeping system
Association news
"What Credit Men are Doing"
examination of the merchandise
"Application of Advanced Methods"
account and its closing
Association news
"What Credit Men are Doing"
Association news
"What Credit Men are Doing"
division of expense items into factory
"Application of Advanced Methods"
and commercial expenses
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May 1900

"Application of Advanced Methods"

Jun. 1900

"Application of Advanced Methods"

differences between accounting and
bookkeeping objectives, and the interpretation of cost accounts
accounting systems used in cotton
mills

Commerce, Accounts
Title

Date of
Publication

Jan. 19, 1901
Jan. 26, 1901
Apr. 27, 1901

May 1901
J u n . 1901

J u l . 1901

Oct. 1901
Dec. 1901
Dec. 1901

Mar. 1902
May 1902
Aug. 1902

Sept. 1902
Oct. 1902
Jan. 1903

and Finance
Brief Annotation

"University Lectures —Theory of
Mercantile Accounts"
"University Lectures—Theory of
Mercantile Accounts"
"Cotton Mill Accounting"*

definitions of a balance sheet, profit
and loss statement
classifications of accounts into the
balance sheet
preparation of balance sheet and
income statement, as well as p r o p e r
classifications of accounts for a cotton
mill
"University Lectures—Theory of
problems with the coverage of financial
Mercantile Accounts"
statements
"Credits and Collections"
discussion of the Cleveland Convention
of the National Association of Credit
Men
"Business Organization and Administration" classification of businessmen into
those w h o manage and those w h o
carry out orders
"Business Organization and Administration" philosophical differences between
bookkeeping and accounting
"The Balance Sheet"*
"Street Railway Accounting"*
discussion on reserve accounts, cash discounts, and standard system for material
and supplies
"Ledger Rulings"*
definition and types of ledgers
"Business Organization and Administration" discussion on important of a company's
administration
"Reason Why"*
explanation for changes made to
reorganize the accounting system of
a company
use of a suspense account for pre"Utility of Reserve Accounts"*
paid insurance and depreciation
discussion of reserves on balance
"Items in Suspense and Reserves"
sheets
origin and types of trust companies, and
"The Investigation and Audit of Trust
the importance of its balance sheets
Companies"
Articles in Other Periodicals

Name of Journal
Accountant
Street Railroad Journal

Date of
Publication
Nov. 21, 1896
Feb. 1896

Street Railway

Journal

Dec. 1898

Street Railway

Journal

Feb. 1898

Metal

Worker
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1885

Title
"Accounting in the States"*
"Open Questions Before the
Committee on a Standard System of
Street Railway Account"*
"Theory of Reserve and Suspense
Accounts"*
"Open Questions before the
Committee on a Standard System of
Street Railway Accounting"
"A System of Cost Records for
Foundry Work"
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Books Written by Kittredge on Accounting
Kittredge, A. O. and Brown, J.F. (1897), The Self-Proving Accounting System (New York and
Toronto).
Kittredge, A.O. (circa 1886), A System of Cost Records for Foundry Work (New York: Kittredge
Co.).
The following books were listed in Bentley, H.C., Bibliography of
Works on Accounting by American Authors, Vol. 1: 1796-1900.
Kittredge, A. O., Balance-Sheet Accounting, New York
Title deposited, 1897
Kittredge, A. O., Branch House Auditing, New York
Title deposted 1897
Two copies deposited, 1898
Kittredge, A. O., Credits and Accountancy, New York
Title deposited, 1897
Kittredge, A. O., Up-to-date Business Methods and the Balance Sheet
System of Accounts, New York
Title deposited, 1897
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THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
2001 VANGERMEERSCH MANUSCRIPT AWARD

In 1988, The Academy of Accounting Historians established an annual manuscript award to encourage young academic scholars to pursue
historical research. An historical manuscript on any aspect of the field of
accounting, broadly defined, is appropriate for submission.
ELIGIBILITY AND GUIDELINES
FOR SUBMISSIONS
Any accounting faculty member, w h o holds a full-time appointment
and w h o received his/her masters/doctorate within seven years previous
to the date of submission, is eligible to be considered for this award.
Coauthored manuscripts will be considered (if at least one coauthor
received h i s / h e r masters/doctorate w i t h i n the last seven years).
Manuscripts must conform to the style requirements of the Accounting
Historians Journal. Previously published manuscripts or manuscripts
under review are not eligible for consideration.
Six copies of each manuscript should be submitted by June 15, 2001
to the chair of the Vangermeersch Manuscript Award Committee:
Professor Richard K. Fleischman
Department of Accountancy
John Carroll University
University Heights, OH 44118
USA
A cover letter, indicating the author's mailing address, date masters/doctoral degree awarded, and a statement that the manuscript has
not been published or is not currently being considered for publication
should be included in the submission packet
REVIEW PROCESS AND AWARD
The Vangermeersch Award Committee will evaluate submitted
manuscripts on a blind review basis. The author will receive a $1,000
(U.S.) stipend and a plaque to recognize his/her outstanding achievement
in historical research. In the case of coauthored manuscripts, the junior
faculty member(s) will receive(share) the cash award and all authors will
receive a plaque. The winning manuscript will be published in the
Accounting Historians Journal after an appropriate review. The award
will be given annually unless the manuscript award committee determines that no submission has been received that warrants recognition as
an outstanding manuscript. The award will be presented at the Academy's
2001 annual business meeting.
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Beth B. Kern
INDIANA UNIVERSITY SOUTH BEND

THE ROLE OF DEPRECIATION AND THE
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT IN TAX POLICY
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON FINANCIAL
REPORTING
DURING THE 20TH CENTURY
Abstract. Since the inception of the modern income tax, the
investment tax credit and depreciation have been some of the
most modified provisions. This paper traces the history of
major changes in depreciation and the investment tax credit
along with the tax policy justifications given at the time the
changes were made. In addition, the influence of tax depreciation on financial reporting is also discussed. An historical
perspective of these two major provisions in tax should be
helpful to policymakers and researchers attempting to assess
the effectiveness of these policies.

INTRODUCTION
All machinery is on an irresistible march to the
junk heap, and its progress, while it may be
delayed, cannot be prevented by repairs.
This
obvious economic fact is of momentous import to
accounting, although full recognition has not
been given to it in general practice... It implies
that, in valuing all fixed assets, account must be
taken of the lapse of time, and even in the case of
machinery giving no evidence either of use or misuse, the bare fact that it is a year nearer its
inevitable goal is an item of which technical
account must be taken [Hatfield, 1927, p. 130].
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A depreciation deduction has been a part of modern U.S.
income tax since its inception. It is at the nexus of several tax policy objectives that at times compete against and at other times
complement one another. Since its debut with the corporate
excise tax in 1909, the law regarding depreciation has been
amended at least once in every decade. The tax policy motivations for these changes are attributed to any of the following:
proper income measurement, raising revenue, encouraging capital formation, or ensuring a neutral tax system. Since so many tax
policy goals can be ostensibly served by the deduction, it is not
surprising that the law has changed so many times during the
20th century.
An historical perspective on the role of depreciation would
not be complete without including a discussion of a related provision, the investment tax credit (ITC). The primary purpose of ITC
is to spur capital formation. When capital formation is an important tax policy goal, there are often changes to depreciation, ITC,
or both. The potential for depreciation and ITC to alter capital formation has drawn the attention of a wide variety of academicians.
Despite years of study, the results from empirical research are far
from conclusive.1 Notwithstanding the lack of conclusive evidence about their effectiveness, tax policymakers have used
depreciation and ITC as a means to alter investment spending.
The purpose of this paper is to document the changes in depreciation and ITC, the tax policy motivations behind these changes,
and the context for the changes that have occurred since the modern U.S. income tax began. By understanding the context for past
legislation, both researchers and policymakers can better understand past, current, and potential changes.
The history of the role of depreciation in the income tax can
be defined into five time periods: 1909-1953, 1954-1961, 19621980, 1981-1985, and 1986 to the present. The legislation of 1954,
1962, 1981, and 1986 represented major shifts with regard to tax
policy and its relationship to depreciation or ITC. The discussion
below documents the changes and the tax policy motivations for
each change that occurred during each time period. In addition,
economic and other relevant factors are also addressed.

1
See Chirinko [1986, 1993] for critical analyses of empirical research related
to investment spending.
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THE EARLY YEARS: 1909-1953
An allowance for depreciation has been included as a deduction for determining taxable income since the inception of modern corporate and individual income taxes. 2 The corporate excise
tax enacted as part of the Tariff Act of 1909 permitted "a reasonable allowance for depreciation of property, if any." The Revenue
Act of 1913 permitted "a reasonable allowance for exhaustion,
wear and tear of property arising out of its use in a business." The
early rationale for the depreciation deduction is contained in the
Bureau of Internal Revenue's Regulation 74, Article 202 in which
it posited that the necessity for a depreciation deduction arises
from the fact that certain business property is subject to exhaustion. Depreciation's role was primarily that of income determination. With its inclusion of depreciation in the income tax base,
the government was actually taking a bold step that differed from
much of financial reporting practice of the day.3 In commenting
about financial reporting practice in the early part of the 20th
century, Hatfield [1927, p. 140] offered the following summary:
Present practice unfortunately does not always
correspond to current principle. Corporations
are still apt to look upon the charge for depreciation as being an act of grace rather than of necessity, and the allowance is frequently less in the lean
than in the prosperous years. But the improvement since . . . 1908 has been very marked. At that
time any recognition of depreciation was relatively u n c o m m o n in the accounts of American corporations, and the relatively few companies that
showed depreciation in prosperous years grew

2
The U.S. first enacted an income tax in 1861 to fund the Civil War. This tax
did not m e n t i o n d e p r e c i a t i o n . D e p r e c i a t i o n w a s specifically e x c l u d e d as a
deduction for the 1894 income tax which was ruled unconstitutional. Thus, a
depreciation deduction was not provided for in the calculation of taxable income
prior to 1909. The corporation excise tax enacted in 1909 was a tax on corporate
income. The inception of the modern-day individual income tax began with the
ratification of the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution on February 25, 1913,
and the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913 on March 1, 1913.
3
Grant and Norton [1949, p. 249] noted that, "it is significant that the first
recognition of annual expense of depreciation for tax purposes occurred in the
same year in which depreciation was first recognized by the Supreme Court
[Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Company, 212 U.S. 1 (1909)] as an element in the
regulation of public utility rates."
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faint-hearted when business was poor. But an
examination of the balance sheets during the trying period after the Great War shows that many of
them made charges for depreciation even though
that resulted in a net deficit. This closer adherence to correct accounting principles was doubtless stimulated by the provisions of the income-tax
law.
Saliers [ 1923] offered a similar summary, noting that firms refused
to allow for depreciation expense early in the 20th century. In his
view, corporations in 1922 were still varying their depreciation
deductions with their earnings. By 1932, Paton [1932, p. 578]
noted:
Depreciation accounting has by no means attained
an ideal state, but there is now almost universal
agreement as to the general significance of depreciation and the importance of recognizing the
phenomenon in some appropriate manner. The
cost of plant assets which have a limited useful life
must evidently be taken into consideration, in
some other way if not in the form of systematic
accruals, if costs of production are to be accurately calculated, periodic income determined on a
sound basis, and the integrity of investment maintained. The income tax regulations have no doubt
been more potent in bringing about this condition
than the admonitions of accountants or the arguments of academicians.
Thus, it appears that early efforts to define taxable income by
including depreciation had an impact on financial reporting practice in the early part of the 20th century. Apparently, however,
financial managers exercised a considerable degree of discretion
with regard to the amount of depreciation, if any, that was
expensed on their income statements for financial reporting. For
the first third of the 20th century, they also had a great degree of
latitude with regard to how much depreciation they deducted for
income tax purposes.
In 1920, the Treasury first issued Bulletin F, leaving the determination of the amount of depreciation to the taxpayer based on
his judgment and experience, with final approval by the

Published by eGrove, 2000

157

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 13
Kern: Depreciation and the Investment Tax Credit

149

Commissioner. Thus, taxpayers had a considerable degree of freedom in determining their depreciation deductions. During the
1924-1931 time period, depreciation allowances increased substantially.
By 1931, claimed depreciation deductions exceeded corporate
taxable income [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, 1934]. In 1931, the Treasury issued a revised Bulletin F. It
attached a preliminary study that gave "probable useful lives" for
over 2,700 different kinds of industrial assets. Determining a
depreciation deduction remained at the taxpayer's discretion,
however. The deduction would not be disallowed unless the government could demonstrate "by clear and convincing evidence"
that the deduction was "unreasonable." By 1934, the House Ways
and Means Committee considered substantial across-the-board 25
percent reductions in depreciation allowances for the 1934 to
1936 time period. It estimated that the government would receive
an additional $85 million in tax revenue per year from the recommended changes.
The Treasury Department, however, opposed an arbitrary
reduction. It believed that the matter could best be resolved by
administrative rather than legislative action. Treasury Secretary
Morgenthau proposed that the Treasury require taxpayers to furnish supporting schedules, require depreciation to be limited to
an asset's useful life, and switch the burden of proof for a reasonable deduction to the taxpayer. Rather than mandating depreciation deductions through legislation, the choice was made to handle it administratively through guidelines drafted by the Treasury.
In 1934, the Treasury Department issued Treasury Decision
4422, 1934 CB 58 (TD 4422). TD 4422 outlined the Treasury's
change in policy as Secretary Morgenthau had proposed. TD 4422
required taxpayers to furnish a schedule showing their calculation
of depreciation e x p e n s e to substantiate their d e d u c t i o n s .
Taxpayers were allowed to allocate the cost of an asset over its useful life using the straight-line or units-of-production method.
Until 1934, the burden of proof fell on the Internal Revenue examiner to demonstrate that a taxpayer had misstated income by
improperly calculating his depreciation expense by clear and convincing evidence. This policy was changed in 1934, shifting the
b u r d e n of proof from the government to the taxpayer.
In 1942, the Treasury Department issued a second revision of
Bulletin F. Bulletin F recommended useful lives for over 5,000
assets. The Treasury's estimates of useful lives, however, were
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
158

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2000, Vol. 27, no. 2
150

Accounting Historians Journal, December 2000

based on surveys conducted during the Great Depression of the
1930s w h e n businesses tended to replace their obsolete assets less
frequently. Thus, the useful life estimates listed in Bulletin F's revision w e r e generally longer than an asset's actual useful life and
longer than in the 1931 version of Bulletin F. This disparity resulted in tax depreciation deductions being less than what was considered economic depreciation. This policy continued until 1954.
During this time a taxpayer could also use the "facts and circumstances" method, whereby assets were assigned useful lives
based on the taxpayer or industry's general experience. However,
if the taxpayer chose to define an asset's depreciable life using
Bulletin F rather than the "facts and circumstances" method, he
avoided controversy in an audit. Thus, many assets were depreciated using either the straight-line or units-of-production method
over the assets' useful lives as defined in Bulletin F. It was not until
1954 that the tax laws were revised to bring tax depreciation
more in line with what was considered economic depreciation.
A SHIFT IN TAX POLICY PERSPECTIVE: 1954-1961
Until 1954, Congress viewed depreciation solely as a deduction necessary for proper income determination. The deduction
was an allowance which reflected the "exhaustion, wear and tear
of property used in a trade or business" [IRC §167(a)]. The
enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, however,
marked a major shift in depreciation's role in tax policy. For the
first time Congress considered using tax depreciation as an economic incentive for stimulating investment. It also marked the
first time Congress, rather than the Treasury, decided the allowable means for calculating the deduction.
The tax law change in 1954 allowed businesses to use any
method of depreciation as long as it was both consistently applied
and did not exceed twice the straight-line rate of depreciation.
Congress believed that the pre-1954 depreciation system acted as
a barrier to investment. It also believed that the pre-1954 "tax
depreciation methods might depress business capital expenditures below the level needed to keep the economy operating at
high levels of output and employment" [U.S. Congress, House,
Committee on Ways and Means, 1954, p. 22]. Thus, the 1954 tax
changes were designed to provide incentives for investment.
At the same time, however, Congress was also concerned
about the effect these changes would have on income determination. The n e w methods of depreciation would:
Published by eGrove, 2000
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...concentrate deductions in the early years of service and [would result] in a timing of allowances
more in accord with the actual pattern of loss of
economic usefulness. With the rate limited to
twice the corresponding straight-line rate and
based on a realistic estimate of useful life, the proposed system [would conform] to sound accounting principles [U.S. Congress, House, Committee
on Ways and Means, 1954, p. 23].
Thus, Congress wanted to stimulate investment while remaining
within economic and accounting principles. With the 1954 law,
Congress sanctioned the use of the double-declining balance
method. This was the first time Congress opted to decide what
depreciation methods should be allowed. Up until this time,
depreciation was handled administratively through the Treasury
Department.
In 1958, the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958 introduced first-year depreciation for the first time. This allowed small
businesses to deduct up to 20% of the cost of tangible personal
property. 4 The purpose of this provision was to assist small business by increasing the amount of funds available to them via a
reduction in tax liability [Congressional Record, 1958, pp. 17,085,
17,090]. A variation of this election, known as the immediate
expense election, remains today 5
THE 1960s AND THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
Investment Tax Credit Enacted (1962): The Revenue Act of 1962
(RA62) represents a landmark in terms of tax incentives for investment. ITC was first introduced in RA62.6 President Kennedy
advocated enacting the credit to stimulate capital formation. He
believed higher levels of capital formation would raise productivity, keep people employed, and alleviate a serious balance of pay-

4

T h e maximum eligible cost was $10,000 for unmarried taxpayers ($20,000
for married taxpayers) for a maximum deduction of $2,000 and $4,000 respectively.
5
T h e deduction is no longer a percentage of allowable cost, but is an election
to deduct the full cost of property up to $20,000 in the year 2000 (increasing to
$25,000 for the years 2003 and thereafter).
6
A credit, as opposed to a deduction, is a dollar for dollar reduction of a taxpayer's tax liability. The first ITC was 7% of the cost of personalty in the year of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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ments problem [U.S. Congress, House, 1961, p. 3]. Congress
echoed his sentiments by stating that the objective of the credit
was "to encourage modernization and expansion of the Nation's
productive facilities and thereby improve the economic potential
of the country, with resultant increase in job opportunities and
betterment of our competitive position in the world economy"
[U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1962, p. 11].
Stimulating investment was to be accomplished through two
major tax revisions. These were the Treasury's revision of depreciation guidelines and ITC. Congress believed that realistic depreciation rules did not provide sufficient incentive to spur economic growth. An additional incentive in the form of an ITC would
stimulate investment in two ways. First, it would reduce the net
cost of acquiring depreciable assets. Second, it would increase the
cash flow available for investment 7 [U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Finance, 1962, p. 11].
Congress also considered the possibility of using more accelerated methods of depreciation in lieu of a credit. This idea was
discarded, however. Congress believed the credit was "preferable
to higher depreciation charges because the latter tends to distort
income accounting" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Finance, 1962, p. 12]. It seems clear that Congress did not wish to
deviate materially from accounting and economic concepts of
income in order to stimulate investment.
ITC Suspension (1966-1967): In 1966, the U.S. faced problems
with inflation. Therefore, President Johnson initiated a comprehensive plan which called for reducing government expenditures
for low-priority programs and temporarily suspending tax incentives for investment [U.S. Congress, House, 1966, pp. 4-7].
Congress noted that the bill was:
...part of an overall program designed to moderate
the pace of the economy to a level more compatible with the rate of increase in our physical capacity to produce, to begin the return to price stability and to relieve distortions among various sectors
of the economy which arise from widely different

7

The reasoning behind this argument is that a firm would have a pool of available funds for investment. The 7% credit for new investment would augment this
pool so that more investment could be made.
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rates of growth. By removing certain tax incentives for investment in machinery, equipment and
buildings, the bill will ease inflationary pressures
in those sectors w h e r e demands for output are
straining present productive capacity The action
also will have the effect of reducing pressures
tending to raise interest rates and will promote an
increased flow of credit into the home mortgage
market. Moreover, the bill can be expected to produce a short-run improvement in the Nation's balance-of-payments position as demand for output is
brought into balance with the existing capacity to
p r o d u c e the o u t p u t [U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Finance, 1966, p. 4].
Thus, ITC and accelerated depreciation on real property were
temporarily suspended from October 10, 1966 to December 31,
1967.
The suspension ended up being short-lived. On June 13, 1967,
President Johnson signed H.R. 6950 [P.L. 90-26], lifting the suspension effective March 10, 1967. At the time ITC was reinstated,
interest rates were dropping and housing starts were up. It
appeared as if the economy was rebounding and the suspension
no longer necessary
ITC Abolished (1969-1971):
In 1969, problems with inflation
reappeared. Once again, Congress believed that ITC directly contributed to inflationary pressures and wide fluctuations in investment. Eliminating the credit would help reduce inflation and help
keep the rate of change in investment on a more steady path [U.S.
Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1969, p. 178].
Although Congress considered suspending the credit as it had
done a few years earlier, the idea was rejected on two grounds.
First and foremost, Congress believed that during the prior suspension period (1966-1967), businesses had simply postponed
their acquisitions until after the suspension was lifted. In the
view of Congress, it was "undesirable to repeat that experience"
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1969, p.
179]. Second, suspension and subsequent restoration of the credit were administratively difficult.
Therefore, Congress voted to repeal ITC. At the time the credit was repealed, Congress had no plans for bringing it back any
time in the future. In fact, it believed that:
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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...It [might] well be that the normal incentives of
potentially greater profits in the context of a stable growth, full employment economy will provide the investment needed without resorting to
special devices to stimulate investment which, on
occasion, appear to give rise to investment booms
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, 1969, p. 180].
DEPRECIATION FROM THE EARLY 1960s TO
THE REVENUE ACT OF 1971
Revenue Procedure 62-21: Although the depreciation rules did
not change as frequently during the 1960s as those associated
with ITC, depreciation did not escape controversy. In 1962, the
next major change with regard to depreciation occurred. That
year the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Revenue Procedure
62-21, 1962-2 CB 418 (Revenue Procedure 62-21). Bulletin F had
defined useful lives on an asset-by-asset basis. Revenue Procedure
62-21 took a different approach by grouping assets by industry of
use. The guideline lives were based on statistical data and assessm e n t of technological trends for each industry in the U.S.
[Revenue Procedure 62-21, p. 463]. The n e w guideline lives
placed a greater emphasis on the economic life of an asset rather
than its physical life [Revenue Procedure 62-21, p. 464]. As a
result, write-off periods for assets could be reduced 30 to 40%. A
taxpayer could only use the n e w guideline lives, however, if they
were consistent with the actual retirements and replacement
practices of his business. This could be demonstrated by a reserve
ratio test. 8
The reserve ratio test was used to form ranges of depreciable
lives based on a taxpayer's actual usage. Taxpayers could only continue to use the g e n e r o u s guideline lives u n d e r Revenue
Procedure 62-21 if they conformed to actual service lives as determined by the reserve ratio test. This test effectively obligated taxpayers to retire property within the guideline life periods in order
to continue to use guideline lives.
Although the IRS initially expected that the guideline lives

8

The reserve ratio was calculated by dividing accumulated depreciation by the
gross (undepreciated) basis of an asset within a class. This ratio was then used to
form a range for depreciable lives no greater than 20% or no less than 10% of a
benchmark
life based
Published
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under Revenue Procedure 62-21 [p. 464] would alleviate controversy, implementation of the reserve ratio test proved controversial. Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 CB 503 (Announcement 71-76)
criticized the reserve ratio test on the basis that one could not
determine if guideline lives had been violated until an asset was
disposed [Announcement 71-76, pp. 503, 511]. In addition, a survey indicated that 87% of IRS agents found the test unworkable
and impractical [Announcement 71-76, p. 512]. The reserve ratio
test was abandoned with the enactment of the Revenue Act of
1971.
Along with the controversy surrounding the IRS's implementation of Revenue Procedure 62-21 during the 1960s, Congress
also made a few innovations to tax law associated with depreciation. With the Revenue Act of 1962, Section 1245 depreciation
recapture was introduced for the first time. This provision converts the character of a gain from the sale of personalty that is
attributable to prior depreciation into ordinary income. Congress
wished to prevent using depreciation to convert ordinary income
into capital gains [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance,
1962]. The Revenue Act of 1964 extended depreciation recapture
to buildings with Section 1250 recapture, subsequently made
more stringent with the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
The Revenue Act of 1971: In the early 1970s, the U.S. faced high
unemployment, inflation, and little growth in GNP and investment. The business tax incentives that were enacted in 1971 were
designed to be "large enough to stimulate the economy and yet
not so large that they [would] create a n e w wave of inflationary
pressure" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1971, p.
7]. The major business tax incentives were a revision of the
depreciation rules and a reinstatement of ITC.
The Revenue Act of 1971 introduced the Class Life Asset
Depreciation Range System (ADR). ADR provided n e w guidelines
for defining an asset's useful life. These guidelines effectively
replaced the Revenue Procedure 62-21 guidelines that had been
used until that time. Like Revenue Procedure 62-21, an asset's useful life was defined by its industry of use rather than by type of
asset.9 The number of asset classes, however, was increased from
75 to 132.
9
TheTreasury Department was given authority to prescribe depreciable lives
based on anticipated industry norms [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways
and Means, 1971].
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ADR provided an additional feature not present in Revenue
Procedure 62-21. Taxpayers were able to select an asset's useful
life from a range of lives. The range was 20% less than to 20%
greater than those provided by Revenue Procedure 62-21. The
Revenue Act of 1971 still allowed taxpayers to define useful lives
using the "facts and circumstances" method. Congress expected,
however, that the ranges of lives provided by ADR would make
administering the depreciation rules simpler. They believed that
ADR would reduce the n u m b e r of disputes which were likely to
arise because of the particular facts and circumstances of the taxpayer's situation [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance,
1971, p. 48].
ITC also reappeared under the guise of a jobs development
investment credit. 10 The credit was reinstated for several reasons.
First, the credit was expected to improve the economy by creating
additional jobs through increased expenditures in machinery and
equipment. Second, Congress expected the credit to reduce
inflation this time because "an increased flow of goods into the
market is the best long run assurance w e can have of keeping
prices down." Third, n e w investment in productive facilities
would help make them more efficient. Therefore, the U.S. would
be more competitive in foreign markets and the balance of payments would be improved [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on
Ways and Means, 1971, pp. 5-6].
TAX REDUCTION ACT OF 1975
In 1975, the U.S. faced its highest levels of unemployment
since 1941. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 was designed to
restore economic growth and to move toward full employment. A
key component of the Act was a temporary increase in ITC.
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 increased ITC from 7% to 10%
for qualified property acquired before January 1, 1977. Congress
expected the tax revisions "would help revive the economy and
increase employment without adding significantly to inflationary
pressures." Once again, Congress believed that the increase in the
tax credit would create more jobs, increase productivity, reduce
inflation, and improve the U.S. balance of p a y m e n t s [U.S.
Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1975, p p . 7-11].
10
The form of the "jobs development investment credit" was similar to ITC that
was abolished in 1969. It allowed a credit of 7% of the cost of personalty in the year
acquisition.
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The Tax Reform Act of 1976 extended the "temporary"
increase in ITC until December 31, 1980. The Revenue Act of 1978
made the "temporary" increase permanent, effective January 1,
1981.
THE BEGINNING OF THE
ACCELERATED COST RECOVERY SYSTEM (ACRS): 1981-1985
ACRS: The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) represents
a major turning point in the evolution of depreciation and tax policy with the first appearance of the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS). Until ERTA, Congress was concerned that tax
depreciation rules conformed to sound accounting and economic
principles. Under ERTA, this function of the depreciation deduction no longer seemed important. In fact, ACRS was so different
from what accountants and economists typically referred to as
depreciation that the deductions were called "cost recovery"
instead of depreciation. With ERTA, simplifying tax rules and
encouraging investment seemed far more important than conforming to accounting practice for financial r e p o r t i n g .
Under ACRS, personalty was categorized into one of four
"recovery classes." Assets were grouped according to the n u m b e r
of years over which their original cost was recovered. Of the four
personalty recovery classes, only the three-year and five-year classes were frequently used. The ten-year and fifteen-year classes
were reserved for a relatively few specialized assets. Under ERTA,
all depreciable realty had a 15-year recovery period.
There were several reasons for enacting ACRS. First, Congress
concluded that prior depreciation and ITC provisions required
revisions because they did not provide the investment stimulus
that was considered essential for economic expansion. Second,
Congress believed that the prior law was unnecessarily complicated. Third, the real value of depreciation deductions had
declined because of inflation. It was hoped that ACRS would
compensate for this problem by giving assets shorter lives [Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1981, p. 73]. A fourth reason
mentioned in several hearings was to help the U.S.'s balance of
payments problem by increasing the nation's competitiveness in
international trade via increased productivity from investment in
more modern equipment. In addition to major revisions in depreciation, ERTA modified ITC making it more compatible with
ACRS.
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Post-ERTA Modifications: 1982 to 1985: During the four years following ERTA, a series of three different pieces of legislation gradually rolled back some of ERTA's generosity. First, the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) required either a
reduction in depreciable basis or a reduced ITC.11 In addition,
when ERTA was originally enacted, more accelerated cost recovery schedules were planned to begin in 1985 and 1986.12 TEFRA
repealed the planned accelerations in depreciation deductions.
Second, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 lengthened the recovery period for realty from 15 to 18 years. In addition, special limitations for passenger cars were enacted.13 Finally, the Imputed
Interest Act of 1985 further lengthened the realty recovery period
from 18 to 19 years.
All three pieces of legislation were enacted during a time
when cutting federal budget deficits was a primary concern [U.S.
Congress, House, 1982; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Finance, 1985]. The modifications in TEFRA were based on a concern that the combined effect of ITC and the accelerated depreciation in ACRS had been too generous [U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Finance, 1982, p. 126]. In 1984, Congress was concerned that real-estate depreciation had led to excessive tax shel11

TEFRA required a taxpayer to reduce the depreciable basis of property by
one-half of ITC taken. Taxpayers could elect to depreciate the full depreciable
basis of property if they reduced ITC taken. Under this election, property eligible
for the 10% ITC only received an 8% credit. Property eligible for a 6% ITC received
a 4% credit.
l2
The ACRS schedules, as enacted in 1981, were developed to approximate
150% declining balance in the early years of an asset's life with a switch to straightline for later recovery years. Under ERTA, the schedules were to change in 1985 to
approximate 175% declining balance in the early years of an asset's life with a
switch to sum-of-the-years' digits for later years. In 1986, the schedules were to
change once more reflecting the use of 200% declining balance with a switch to
sum-of-the-years' digits.
13
T h e Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 limited ACRS deductions to $4,000 for the
first year and $6,000 each year thereafter for passenger automobiles. In addition,
ITC was limited to $1,000 ($667 if the taxpayer elected to reduce ITC to be able to
depreciate the full cost of the asset rather than reducing the depreciable basis by
one-half of ITC). Congress believed that ITC and ACRS should be used to stimulate
capital formation rather than to subsidize what it perceived to be "the element of
personal consumption associated with the use of very expensive automobiles''
[U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 1984, p. 1387]. In addition,
there was a perception that taxpayers tended to overstate the proportion of business use of automobiles. It was Congress' belief that the ACRS and ITC limits
would assist with compliance in this regard [U.S. Congress, House, Committee on
Ways
and Means,
1984, p. 1387].
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ters to the detriment of more productive investments [U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, 1984]. When ERTA was
enacted in 1981, the role of depreciation in income measurement
was not a concern. By 1985, this concern had resurfaced w h e n the
Senate Finance Committee felt that "the useful life of most real
property exceeds 18 years and that an increase in the cost recovery period for real property would more correctly measure the
income from real property" [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on
Finance, 1985, p. 15].
1986 TO PRESENT
Tax Reform Act of 1986: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) is
the final major shift in depreciation and tax policy. TRA86
repealed ITC and made additional modifications to ACRS, resulting in MACRS. Cultivating investment as a policy goal was not
abandoned, but the means of doing so w e r e considerably
changed.
TRA86 was enacted to increase the fairness, efficiency, and
simplicity of the tax system [Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation, 1986, p. 6]. Congress wished to reduce the role taxes
play in investment and consumption decisions. Rather than targeting specific forms of investment, Congress believed that the
"surest way of encouraging the efficient allocation of all resources
and the greatest possible economic growth was by reducing statutory tax rates" [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1986, p.
98].
TRA86 repealed ITC. As opposed to the 1969 repeal, the current repeal has been far more long-lived as ITC has not reappeared. See Table 1 for a summary of ITC changes. Congress
believed that ITC "discriminated against long-lived investment and
was used as a tax shelter device" [Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation, 1986, p. 10]. Instead of targeting investment for a
defined set of assets, capital formation incentives under TRA86
were provided by lower tax rates and accelerated depreciation.
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TABLE 1
Changes in the Investment Tax Credit and Rationale for Change
Legislation

Change

Congressional Rationale

Revenue Act of 1962

Investment tax credit enacted

Stimulate capital formation

H.R. 17607 [Public Law 89-800]

Investment tax credit suspended
effective 10/10/66 to 12/31/67

Ease inflation and relieve
distortions across sectors in
the economy

H.R. 6950 [Public Law 90-26]

Investment tax credit
suspension lifted effective
3/10/67

Economic pressure appeared
to have lifted

Tax Reform Act of 1969

Investment tax credit repealed

Ease inflationary pressures

Revenue Act of 1971

Investment tax credit reinstated

Creating jobs

Tax Reduction Act of 1975

Temporary increase in the
investment tax credit from
7% to 10%

Revive economy and
increase employment

Tax Reform Act of 1976

Temporary increase extended
to 12/31/80

Stimulating investment

Revenue Act of 1978

Temporary increase made
permanent effective 1/1/81

Stimulating investment

Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982

Reduction in depreciable basis
or reduced credit

Combined effect of ACRS and
investment tax credit was
perceived to be too generous

Tax Reform Act of 1986

Investment tax credit repealed

Enhance neutrality of tax system by
repealing a provision that discriminated against investment in longer-lived
assets

In addition to repealing ITC, Congress modified ACRS. MACRS
was designed to "provide for more neutral depreciation treatment
across diverse assets" [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation,
1986, p. 10]. Congress once again returned to the notion that
recovery periods should more closely reflect the actual useful
lives of assets.
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993: The Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993 was enacted during a time w h e n reducing budget
deficits was a primary goal. In it, Congress lengthened the nonresidential realty recovery period from 31.5 to 39 years. With this
legislation, Congress turned full circle toward having depreciation
reflect "proper" income measurement with regard to depreciable
real property. It felt that depreciation deductions had been larger
than the actual decline in the value of property. In order to
measure more accurately the economic income derived from
using nonresidential realty, the recovery period was increased to
Published by eGrove, 2000
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39 years [U.S. Congress, House, Budget Committee, 1993, pp. 625626]. With this change the recovery period for buildings returned
to an amount close to what it was prior to ERTA. With the use of
component depreciation14 and the facts and circumstances methods of depreciation, depreciable lives for buildings was effectively 36 to 37 years [Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 1981,
p. 20]. The changes in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 are
the most recent changes in depreciation. See Table 2 for a summary of depreciation changes over time.
TABLE 2
Changes in Depreciation and Rationale for Changes
Legislation or Administrative
Action

Change

Congressional Rationale

Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909

Depreciation first appeared

Revenue Act of 1913

Depreciation appeared as part of
the first income tax under the
16th Amendment

Bulletin F first issued (1920)

Determination of depreciation
expense remained taxpayer
determined

(Administrative action)

Bulletin F first revised (1931)

Determination of depreciation
expense remained taxpayer
determined but an attachment
provided examples of useful lives
for over 2,700 different assets

(Administrative action)

TD 4422 (1934)

Required taxpayers to furnish a
schedule supporting their
depreciation deduction; limited
depreciation to an asset's useful life;
shifted the burden of proof to the
taxpayer to demonstrate that
depreciation was properly
determined

(Administrative action)

Bulletin F 2nd revision (1942)

Treasury Department recommended
useful lives for over 5,000 assets
based on studies conducted during
the Depression

(Administrative action)

Internal Revenue Code of 1954

Congress allowed businesses to use
any depreciation method as long as
it did not exceed twice the straightline rate

Stimulate investment while
remaining within accepted
economic and accounting
principles

Small Business Tax Revision Act
of 1958

Immediate expense election
first introduced

Assistance to small businesses

Revenue Procedure 62-21

Provided guideline lives based on
an industry-by-industry basis rather
than an asset-by-asset basis

(Administrative action)

Revenue Act of 1962

Section 1245 recapture introduced
for the first time

Raising revenue (recapture
provisions designed conversion of
ordinary income to capital gains)

"Component depreciation allowed a taxpayer to depreciate the parts of a
building over differing useful lives rather than depreciating the entire over a uniform life.
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TABLE 2 (cont.)

Legislation or Administrative
Action

Change

Congressional Rationale

Revenue Act of 1964

Recapture (Section 1250) extended
to buildings

Raising revenue (recapture provisions
designed conversion of ordinary
income to capital gains)

Tax Reform Act of 1969

Section 1250 recapture tightened

Revenue raising

Revenue Act of 1971

Class Life Asset Depreciation Range
System introduced (ADR)

Encourage investment

Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(ACRS) introduced

Investment stimulus, simplifying
law, and compensating for inflation
effects

Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982

Depreciable basis reduced if
full investment tax credit taken

Perception that 1981 provisions
were too generous

Deficit Reduction Act of 1984

Real property lives extended from
15 to 18 years

Deficit reduction

Imputed Interest Act of 1985

Real property lives extended from
18 to 19 years

Deficit reduction and bringing useful
lives for realty closer to actual useful
lives

Tax Reform Act of 1986

Modified ACRS introduced
extending recovery periods for
personalty and realty (residential
realty lives extended to 27.5 years
and nonresidential extended
to 31.5 years)

Enhance neutrality in tax system

Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993

Extended recovery period for
nonresidential realty to 39 years

Better measurement of economicincome

CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the 90 years since the inception of the modern income tax,
tax policy and depreciation have come nearly full circle. Until
1954, depreciation's role was primarily one of proper income
determination. In 1954, Congress first entertained the notion that
depreciation could be used to further other tax policy goals,
specifically encouraging capital formation. From 1954 to 1981,
income measurement and economic motivations were the primary tax policy considerations. The investment credit, initially
enacted in 1962, was turned off and on during this period, justified entirely on economic grounds. ERTA's enactment in 1981
marked a major turning point in depreciation policy. For the first
time, the role of depreciation in income determination was
ignored. Encouraging investment and simplifying the tax rules
were the primary motivations behind the law. Soon after ERTAs
enactment, revenue-raising concerns became important and
Congress began to lengthen depreciable lives over a series of legislative acts. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 abandoned the notion of
targeting investment in certain types of assets. The neutrality of
the tax system became important. ITC was repealed, and ACRS
Published by eGrove, 2000
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was modified based on neutrality considerations. By the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress had come full circle with the
desire to have better income measurement. Encouraging certain
forms of investment was no longer paramount.
Despite Congressional use of depreciation and ITC to further
economic goals, the empirical evidence about the effectiveness of
these tax policy tools is quite mixed. There is no consensus about
the effectiveness of these measures. Since depreciation is based
on w h e n an asset is placed in service, taxpayers are left with a
hodgepodge of regulations as a complex legacy of Congressional
policymaking. For the time being, the current rules for n e w acquisitions are relatively simple and have returned to useful lives that
are closer to what they were before ERTA's enactment. History
indicates, however, that as economic pressures change, depreciation and ITC are particularly vulnerable to modifications. Each
change adds another layer of complexity for taxpayers. The
impact of taxes on investment has been, and is, clearly an important issue that warrants further study to assist policymakers in
shaping the law.
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BIBLICAL BASIS OF FORTY-YEAR
GOODWILL AMORTIZATION

Abstract: Current U.S. GAAP mandates amortizing goodwill
over no more than 40 years. Although many commentators suggest that 40 years is an arbitrary time span, there is a Biblical
basis for 40-year amortization. The Bible refers to 40 years as
the life of a generation. Since amortizing goodwill over no
more than 40 years corresponds to amortizing it over no more
than one generation of talented employees or customers, the
process is not completely arbitrary

Goodwill is an asset because it represents future economic
benefits, often attributable to a talented w o r k force or a
favorable customer following. Under current GAAP, Accounting
Principles Board Opinion No. 17, "Intangible Assets" (APB 17),
goodwill acquired after October 31, 1970 must be amortized over
a period not to exceed 40 years. 1
Acknowledgments: The author acknowledges librarian Rita Ormsby (Baruch
College - CUNY) for tracing down several citations. He also acknowledges the
helpful comments and suggestions of Stephen H. Bryan (Wake Forest University),
Harry Z. Davis (Baruch College - CUNY), Jack W. Lynn (Michigan Association of
CPAs), Jan Sweeney (Stern School -NYU), Eric B. Wisnia (Temple Beth Chaim),
four anonymous reviewers, and editor Richard K. Fleischman. Any errors, of
course, are the responsibility of the author alone.
Submitted December
Revised March
April
Accepted May

1999
2000
2000
2000

1
In 1999, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 1999, para. 42) proposed
to reduce the maximum goodwill amortization period to 20 years.
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Both the APB and subsequent commentators have suggested
that the 40-year goodwill maximum amortization period is a completely arbitrary time span. There is a Biblical basis, however, for
this amortization period. The Bible suggests that the life of a generation does not exceed 40 years. To the extent that goodwill is
attributable to a talented work force or a favorable customer following, amortizing goodwill over no more than 40 years corresponds to amortizing it over no more than one generation of talented employees or customers. Accordingly, this 40-year period is
not a completely arbitrary time span.
NATURE, RECOGNITION, MEASUREMENT,
AND AMORTIZATION OF GOODWILL
In accounting for goodwill, it is useful to distinguish among
its nature, recognition, measurement, and subsequent amortization.2
Nature of Goodwill: FASB Concepts Statement No. 6 [1985, para.
25] defined an asset as probable future economic benefits
obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of a past
transaction or event. Three essential characteristics of an asset
were noted [FASB, 1985, para. 26]:
(a) It embodies a probable future benefit that involves
a capacity, singly or in combination with other
assets, to contribute directly or indirectly to future
net cash inflows.
(b) A particular entity can obtain the benefit and control others' access to it.

2

Unfortunately, many commentators have defined goodwill without distinguishing among its nature, recognition, and measurement. For example, Cooper
and Ijiri [1983, p. 238] defined goodwill as:
1. The current value of expected future income in excess of a normal
return on the investment in net tangible assets; not a recorded or reported amount
unless paid for.
2. The excess of the price paid for a business as a whole over its book
value, or over the computed or agreed value of all tangible [and identifiable intangible] net assets purchased.
The first definition defines goodwill in terms of its measurement (i.e., its current value) and then summarizes the recognition rule that goodwill is not recorded or reported unless paid for. The second definition also defines goodwill in
terms of its measurement as an excess.
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(c) The transaction or other event giving rise to the
entity's right to or control of the benefit has
already occurred. 3
In its 1999 Exposure Draft, "Business Combinations and
Intangible Assets," the FASB [1999, paras. 180-185, 190] concluded
that goodwill meets the asset definition in SFAC No. 6:
(a) Goodwill is an asset because it embodies future
economic benefits.
(b) The economic benefits are nebulous but are
reflected by the premium an enterprise commands over the sum of the fair value of its component parts.
(c) Control over the benefits is provided by the
acquiring enterprise's ability to direct the policies
and management of the acquired enterprise.
(d) The past transaction or event is the transaction in
which the controlling interest was obtained by the
acquiring enterprise.
Recognition of Goodwill: Under GAAP, goodwill is recognized
w h e n it is purchased. Purchase usually occurs w h e n there is a significant change in ownership. A change in ownership results in a
n e w accounting entity, which in turn necessitates a n e w basis for
net assets purchased, including the recognition of goodwill. For
publicly owned corporations, the most c o m m o n change in an
accounting entity results from a purchase-type business combination. Goodwill usually is recognized in business combinations
under purchase accounting. It is also recognized by subsidiaries
issuing separate company financial statements under push-down
accounting following a significant change in ownership, and may
be recognized incident to the admission or withdrawal of a partner from a partnership. The measurement and amortization of
goodwill are separate issues.

3

SFAC No. 6 also noted that an asset commonly has other features that help
identify it; for example, an asset may be tangible, exchangeable, or legally enforceable, but these features are not essential characteristics of assets, and their absence,
by itself, is not sufficient to preclude an item's qualifying as an asset. That is, an
asset may be intangible, nonexchangeable, and the entity's rights to obtain its benefits may not be legally enforceable.
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Measurement of Goodwill: Under APB 16 [1970, para. 87], goodwill is measured as the excess of the price paid for a business as a
whole over the fair value of its identifiable net assets. That is,
goodwill is measured as the excess of the cost of an acquired business over the fair value of the tangible and identifiable intangible
assets acquired less liabilities assumed. 4 Because goodwill is measured as an excess or residual, accountants have long; understood
[e.g., Canning, 1929, pp. 42-43] that reported goodwill is a master
valuation account. That is, the amount reported for goodwill is
intertwined w i t h the a m o u n t r e p o r t e d for all o t h e r assets
acquired and liabilities assumed. Given the cost of an acquired
business, the lower the amounts reported for the identifiable
assets acquired (and the greater the amounts reported for the liabilities assumed), the greater the amounts assigned to goodwill,
and vice versa.
Amortization
of Goodwill:
Presumably, the recognition and
measurement of goodwill as an asset presuppose that it is an asset
in the first place. The amortization of goodwill is a separate issue.
This paper is concerned mainly with the rationale for the maxim u m 40-year amortization of goodwill under APB 17, not the
nature, recognition, or measurement of goodwill.
PRACTICE PRIOR TO APB OPINION NO. 17
Before APB 17, the accounting for goodwill was prescribed
by Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, "Restatement and
Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins" [ARB 43, ch. 5]. Under
ARB 43, goodwill was considered a type (b) intangible asset with
indefinite life. As a type (b) intangible asset with indefinite life,
goodwill cost was either:
(1) capitalized until a limit on its useful life or a loss of
value was evident, at which time it was amortized
or, if worthless, written off as an extraordinary
loss; or
(2) amortized to expense at the discretion of management even though no present evidence pointed to
a limited term of existence or a loss of value.
4

In an Exposure Draft, the FASB [1999, para. 21] reaffirmed this approach to
measuring purchased goodwill.
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Criticism of the accounting for goodwill under ARB 43 centered on the acceptability of alternative accounting methods.
Some companies amortized goodwill over a short arbitrary period
to reduce the amount of the asset as rapidly as practicable. This
practice was criticized because it understated income during the
amortization period and overstated income in subsequent periods. Other companies retained goodwill as an asset until evidence
of loss of value was apparent, and then recorded a material reduction in a single period. This practice was criticized because it overstated income before the loss was recognized and understated
income in the period of write-off.5
APB OPINION NO. 17: RATIONALE FOR
REQUIRED AMORTIZATION
Under APB 17 [1970, para. 27], goodwill acquired after
October 31, 1970 was to be amortized by systematic charges to
income over its useful life. (Goodwill acquired before October 31,
1970 continued to be subject to the accounting requirements of
ARB 4 3 ) Useful life was estimated over a range with u p p e r and
lower limits w h e n fixed existence was not determinable, but the
amortization period was not to exceed 40 years. APB 17 [para. 29]
also noted that w h e n the indeterminate life of an intangible asset
such as goodwill was likely to exceed 40 years, the asset was to be
amortized over 40 years, not an arbitrarily shorter period.
APB 17 [para. 23] required amortization of goodwill on w h a t
it termed an arbitrary basis. It [paras. 22-23] reasoned that even
w h e n there was no evidence of limited life or decreased value,
amortizing goodwill on an arbitrary basis might recognize
expense and asset decrease prematurely, but delaying amortization until a loss was evident might recognize expense and asset
decrease after the fact. A practical solution, APB 17 [para. 23]
concluded, was to set minimum and maximum amortization periods. It based this conclusion on the observation that few, if any,
intangible assets last forever, although some might seem to last
indefinitely. Amortizing goodwill was necessary, according to
APB 17 [para. 23], because goodwill inevitably disappears at some

5
At various times, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) urged the
APB to make the accounting for goodwill more uniform. According to minutes of
the September 10-13, 1969 APB meeting [APB, 1969, p. 3], the SEC made known to
the APB that it favored mandatory amortization of goodwill over a period of about
33 years.
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future date. Since that date is indeterminate, the amortization
period is arbitrary.
OTHER LITERATURE
Various writers have commented on the arbitrariness of 40year amortization of goodwill under APB 17. For example, Kieso
and Weygandt [ 1998, p. 596, emphasis added] noted that the 40year amortization requirement was based on the premise that only
a few, if any, intangibles last forever: "Sometimes, because useful
life is difficult to determine, a 40-year period is employed because
it is practical, although admittedly arbitrary."
Similarly, Hendriksen and Van Breda [1992, p. 645, emphasis
added] noted that "[t]his 40-year period is arbitrary and can be
defended only on the basis that it is long enough so that the
income of no period is significantly affected. The effect is to neutralize or sterilize the allocation of goodwill with respect to the
information presented to investors and creditors."6
BIBLICAL BASIS
Although the APB and various commentators suggested that
the 40-year amortization period is completely arbitrary, the Bible
suggests that 40 years is a time period of special significance and
that the life of a generation does not exceed 40 years.
Significant Time Span: The Bible [New World Bible, 1984] is
replete with references to 40 years as a time period of special significance. Isaac and Esau married at 40 [Genesis, 25:20, 26:34]. A
man was full-grown at 40 [Exodus, 2:11; Acts, 7:23; cf. Joshua, 14:7;
Samuel, 2:10]. At age 40, Moses defended his oppressed brethren
and struck the Egyptian taskmaster [Acts, 7:23 ] 7 After another 40
6
Hendriksen and Van Breda [1992, p. 645, emphasis added] also noted that
"[n]ot every one has agreed with the 40-year term for the amortization of goodwill.
For instance, banking authorities and the SEC require banks and thrifts to write
off unidentified intangibles, such as goodwill, over a period not to exceed
25 y e a r s . . . The Australian Accounting Research Foundation has proposed a maximum of 20 years for goodwill. Businesses, on the other hand, have argued that 50
to 100 years would be more appropriate. Since no theory exists to guide the
choice, whatever period is selected is inherently arbitrary."
7
Forty years is also a time span of special significance in several other civilizations. Forty years is the age w h e n Buddha began preaching and the beginning of
old age in Japan [see "Properties," n.d.]. In ancient Rome, it took 40 years of hard
fighting in Latium and Etruria to restore Rome's power after Rome was sacked by
and then ransomed from a marauding Gallic tribe in 390 BC. In modern Turkey, to
see someone "once in 40 years" means to see someone "rarely" [Cooper, 1987, p. 18].
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years, an angel appeared to Moses in the wilderness of Mount
Sinai in a flame of fire in a bush [Acts 7:30]. Saul reigned as king
for 40 years [Acts 13:21]. The 40-year reigns of David, Solomon,
and Joash [2 Samuel, 5:4; 1 Kings, 2:11, 11:42; 1 Chronicles 29:26;
2 Chronicles, 9:30, 24:1] are proof of divine favor. The lame man
that Peter raised up and made to walk as a divine sign was more
than 40-years-old [Acts: 3: 7, 23].
Eighty (or two times 40) years were ripe old age [II Samuel,
19:34-35; Psalms, 90:10]. Moses was age 80 w h e n he was summoned by the Lord to be His messenger to tell Pharaoh to free the
Israelites [Exodus, 7:7]. Eighty years was the term of Joseph's service to Pharaoh [Genesis, 41:46, 50:26]. One hundred twenty (or
three times 40) years was maximum life span [Genesis, 6:3]. Moses
was age 120 w h e n he died [Deuteronomy, 34:7].
Life of Generation: The Bible [New World Bible, 1984] is also
replete with references to 40 years as the approximate life of a
generation. 8 Most prominent is the 40-year period the ancient
Israelites spent in the Sinai w i l d e r n e s s [Exodus, 16:35;
Deuteronomy, 2:7, 8:2, 29:5; Joshua, 5:6; Nehemiah, 9:21; Psalms,
95:10; Amos, 2:10, 5:25; Acts 7:36, 7:42, 13:18; Hebrews, 3:9, 3:17]
until a corrupted generation died out [Numbers, 14:33, 32:13].
The generation was corrupted by reports of ten of 12 spies w h o
spent 40 days scouting the land of Canaan. Ten of the 12 spies
reported that the inhabitants of Canaan were too strong for the
Israelites to conquer. Based on these unfavorable reports, most of
the Israelites lost faith in the Lord's promise to give them the Land
In Islam, the Koran is replete with references to 40 years as a period that is
especially meaningful. Forty years is the age at which man attains his full strength
[Shakir, 1983, 46:15], and the age at w h i c h Mohammed received his call
[Bridgewater, 1967, p. 1397]. It is also the age of Mohammed's first wife at marriage [Gibb, 1974, p. 280], and the age at which Abu Baqr converted, assuming that
he converted three years after Mohammed received his call.
8
The Bible itself repeatedly refers to 40 years as the approximate life of a generation. On the other hand, average life span in Biblical times no doubt reflected
high childhood mortality. Assuming two linear distributions, if average life span in
Biblical times was 40 years and half the population lived an average of ten years,
average life span of those surviving childhood (X) would be 70 years; hence, the
Biblical reference [Psalms, 90:10] to three score and ten as average life:
. 5 0 0 + .5(10 yrs.) = 40 yrs.
.5X + 5 yrs. = 40 yrs.
.5X = 35 yrs.
X = 70 yrs.
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of Canaan notwithstanding His delivering them with signs and
miracles from Egypt. Initially, the Lord proposed to strike the
Israelites with pestilence and disown them because they lost faith
in Him despite His signs and miracles as he brought them forth
out of the land of Egypt. But Moses pleaded with the Lord, seeking the Lord's forbearance for the Israelites, and the Lord relented.
The Lord decreed, however, that not one Israelite over age 20 who
lost faith would enter the Promised Land. Rather, He decreed that
those that lost faith should wander and die in the Sinai over a 40year period. Only after this 40-year period would their children
leave the Sinai and enter the Promised Land. Thus, this 40-year
period corresponds to the time the ancient Israelites spent in the
Sinai wilderness until the corrupted generation died out.
Forty years is also the time span Ezekiel prophesized that the
land of Egypt would be desolate and the Egyptians dispersed
among the nations as punishment for their ill treatment of the
Israelites and for Pharaoh's arrogance [Ezekiel, 29:1-11].
Presumably, this 40-year period corresponds to the time the
ancient Egyptians would spend scattered among the nations until
that corrupted generation also died out.
Similarly, 40 years of peace followed the victory of Othniel and
the Israelites over the Mesopotamians [Judges 3:9-11] and the victory of Gideon and the Israelites over the Midians [Judges 8:28].
On the other hand, there was 40 years of Philistine
oppression of the Israelites in punishment for their evil
ways following the death of Abdon [Judges, 13:1].
And there was 40 years of misrule by Eli culminating in the defeat
of the Israelites and capture of the covenant ark by the Philistines
[1 Samuel, 4:1-18]. These 40-year rules of the tribal chieftains
[Judges 3:11,8:28,13:1; 1 Samuel, 4:18] represent roughly one generation each. The 80 years of peace following the victory of the
Moabites [Judges, 3:30] represents roughly two generations. The
Bible counts the 480 years from the Exodus to the building of the
temple [1 Kings 6:1] as 12 generations in 1 Chronicles [6:3-8].9
9

T h e r eare several interpretations of 1 Chronicles [6:3-8] as to why the period
from the Exodus to the building of the temple spans 12 generations. One interpretation is that Aaron, Eleazar, and Phineas were alive at the start of the Exodus;
hence, these generations should be excluded from the other enumerated generations, leaving 12 generations. Another interpretation is that the n u m b e r of generations from the Exodus to the building of the temple is counted by excluding the
first and the last generations, leaving 12 generations. Still another interpretation is
a rabbinic c o m m e n t a r y [Metzudas David, n.d., of 1 Chronicles (5:29-34) of t h e
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Thus, the 40-year period is not a completely arbitrary time
span. Forty years corresponds to the maximum life of a generation. Moreover, a 40-year period is distinguishable from other
round-numbers of years. For example, 30 years is less than one
generation, and 50 years is more than one generation. Thus, the
40-year period in Israel's history was of real-world significance.
The source and significance of the 40-year period in JudeoChristian civilization stems from this Biblical basis.
APPLICABILITY TO GOODWILL AMORTIZATION
Goodwill is an asset because it represents future economic
benefits, often (although not always) due to a talented work force
or a favorable customer following for some given products and
services. The cost of goodwill should be amortized over its
expected useful life.
To the extent that goodwill is attributed to a talented work
force or a favorable customer following, its maximum useful life
cannot exceed the remaining service lives of its work force or the
remaining lives of its customers. That is, to the extent that goodwill is attributed to a talented work force or a favorable customer
following, its maximum useful life cannot exceed one generation
of talented employees or customers. 10
As noted above, the Bible is replete with suggestions that the
life of a generation is 40 years. Two former APB members recollected vague connections of the APB 17 40-year maximum rule
and the Israelites' 40-year sojourn in the Sinai desert. In a telep h o n e conversation, Sidney Davidson said that "he heard the

Hebrew version of the Bible], which (redundantly) included the same enumeration of generations as found in 1 Chronicles [6:3-8] but was not included in
the King James version of the Bible. This commentary stated explicitly that the
high priesthood passed from father to son for 12 generations from the Exodus to
the building of the temple.
10
To the extent that goodwill is attributable to other unrecorded intangible
assets, more of the purchase price should be allocated to these assets and less to
goodwill. Any remaining goodwill may be attributable to other factors, such as
ongoing research and development projects, brand names, marketing campaigns,
or favorable asset configurations. To the extent that goodwill is attributable to
other factors, it should be amortized over the useful lives of these other factors,
usually less than 40 years. But this paper focuses on the correspondence of the 40year maximum amortization period u n d e r APB 17 and one generation of employees or customers. These other factors are not germane to this correspondence as
a rationale for the 40-year amortization rule under APB 17.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13

182

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2000, Vol. 27, no. 2
174

Accounting

Historians Journal, December 2000

story" that the APB considered the Israelites' 40-year sojourn in
the Sinai desert in its deliberations on goodwill amortization, but
does not recall the source of the story or the APB member who
introduced it into the deliberations. Similarly, Charles Horngren
suggested that the APB 17 40-year maximum rule and the
Israelites' 40-year sojourn in the Sinai desert might have been
some side comment during the APB's deliberations, but he did not
know the source of the side comment. Thus, the 40-year amortization rule under APB 17 has links to the Biblical suggestion that a
generation is 40 years.
Indeed, Philip Defliese, APB chairman when APB 17 was
issued, was quoted by an anonymous reviewer as noting that, ". . .
the 40-year amortization period was to correspond to the assumed
working life of the youngest employee at the time of acquisition .
... that any goodwill attributable to employees must die out by the
time the last one leaves ...." Thus, even the former APB chairman
viewed the 40-year amortization period as corresponding to the
maximum service period of one generation of employees.11
CONCLUSION
To the extent that goodwill is attributed to a talented work
force or a favorable customer following, its maximum useful life is
approximately one generation of employees or customers. As first
suggested in the Bible and then elsewhere, the life of a generation
is approximately 40 years. Accordingly, the 40-year maximum
amortization period of APB 17 has a real-world significance suggested initially in the Bible. It is not a completely arbitrary time
span.

11
Admittedly, in a rapidly changing business world, the average period individual employees work for a single employer is growing shorter, as is the average
life cycle of products and services for which there is a favorable customer following. But the maximum 40-year amortization rule of APB 17 was developed in the
late 1960s and finalized in 1970, a far less rapidly changing era. In this less rapidly
changing era, the average period individual employees worked for a single employer frequently was their entire career, often 40 years or thereabouts. Similarly, in
the less rapidly changing era of the late 1960s, the average life cycle of products
and services was longer, suggesting a longer time span for a favorable customer following. The 40-year amortization period may well correspond to maximum useful
lifebyofeGrove,
goodwill2000
in a less rapidly changing era of the late 1960s.
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PUBLISHING PATTERNS IN SPECIALIST
ACCOUNTING HISTORY JOURNALS IN THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1996-1999
Abstract: While accounting researchers have explored international publishing patterns in the accounting literature generally, little is known about recent contributions to the specialist
international accounting history journals. Specifically, this
study surveys publishing patterns in the three specialist, internationally refereed, accounting history journals in the English
language during the period 1996 to 1999. The survey covers
149 contributions in total and provides empirical evidence on
the location of their authors, the subject country or region in
each investigation, and the time span of each study. It also classifies the literature examined based on the literature classification framework provided by Carnegie and Napier [1996].

INTRODUCTION
Academic interest in the publishing patterns of leading international journals in accounting and finance has been strong for
many years. The focus has understandably been on journals published in the English language, which inevitably injects cultural
bias into such investigations [see, for example, Carmona et al.,
1999]. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence generated by such
studies provides bases for assessments of scholars' research track
records and career advancement prospects. It also influences
decisions made on competitively sought research funding. At the
time of writing, the authors are unaware of any empirical study
that has specifically examined publishing patterns of internationAcknowledgments: The authorsare grateful to t h e m e m b e r s of the
Accounting History Research Interest Group, Deakin University, and to participants at a research seminar held at the Cardiff Business School for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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ally refereed journals that specialize in accounting history. Such
specialist journals in the English language are small in number
and, thus, pose a sample suitable for a longitudinal study.
Accounting history is a growing and influential field of study.
The three dedicated journals in the field published in English are
the Accounting Historians Journal (AHJ) (U.S.); Accounting,
Business and Financial History (ABFH) (U.K.); and Accounting
History (AH) (Australia/New Zealand). As the New Series (NS) of
AH appeared in its current form for the first time in 1S>96, the current study will span the four years from 1996 to 1999. AHJ was initially published in 1974, while ABFH initially appeared in 1990.
ABFH was published twice yearly to 1993, from which time its
publication rate increased to three issues per annum. AHJ and the
NS of AH have appeared twice yearly since their inceptions.
Of course, not all contributions to the accounting history literature appear in specialist, international history journals. Many
key articles on accounting's past appear in general journals on
accounting, such as Abacus, Accounting and Business Research,
and British Accounting Review. In addition, accounting history is
prominent in journals in the sociological, interpretative, and critical traditions, particularly Accounting, Organizations and Society,
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal; and Critical
Perspectives on Accounting. Key works in accounting history also
appear in other outlets, such as New Works in Accounting History,
published by Garland. As a result, this study of publishing patterns
in specialist, international accounting history journals profiles a
section, albeit an influential one, of the accounting history literature during the designated period. Further research, that examines the international publishing patterns of all journals that feature accounting history, is a topic ripe for future investigation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next
section reviews recent contributions to the literature on international publishing patterns generally rather than in accounting history specifically. There follows the presentation of the empirical
results of the study and, in the following section, a discussion of
these results. The final section offers concluding comments and
outlines suggestions for further research.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Jones and Roberts [2000], in their study on international publishing patterns by means of an investigation of leading U.K. and
U.S. journals, identified a number of themes in forerunner studies
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on leading journals. These authors outlined the key themes or
interests they discerned as follows: interest in the prestige of individual journals; interest in evaluating both individual and institutional productivity; interest in aspects of publication and productivity, such as the quality of doctoral programs; factors contributing to published outputs; measures of research productivity; time
delay in doctoral productivity; bibliometric distributions; and promotion, among other themes. As they pointed out, the vast majority of data are concerned with U.S. and U.K. journals with very little direct attention being paid to non-U.S. and non-U.K. journals
[Jones and Roberts, 2000, pp. 1-2].
The overwhelming conclusion of the prior studies is that U.S.
and U.K. institutions dominate the leading journals [see, for example, Heck and Bremser, 1986; Heck et al., 1986; Heck et al., 1990;
Jones and Roberts, 2000]. In a study of the international content
of U.S. academic accounting journals published between 1980 and
1993, Prather and Rueschhoff [ 1996] found that the percentage of
total articles in selected U.S. journals that reflected non-U.S. or
international content was generally low but had increased during
the study period. However, a notable exception was AHJ as for the
study period, international content was found in 42.44 per cent of
the total articles in AHJ, constituting 40.68 per cent of total pages
[Prather and Reuschhoff, 1996, p. 7].
Jones and Roberts [2000] studied the contents of five leading
U.S. journals and five leading U.K. journals for the calendar years
1996 and 1997. In particular, the study investigated the nationalities, as discerned by institutional affiliation, of the authors w h o
had published the 702 articles in these ten journals. The U.S. journals selected were: The Accounting
Review, the Journal of
Accounting and Economics, the Journal of Accounting
Research,
The Journal of Finance, and the Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis. The U.K. journals chosen were Accounting
and Business Research; Accounting, Organizations and Society,
Financial Accountability and Management; the Journal of Business
Finance and Accounting; and Management Accounting
Research.
It was found that authors publishing in the U.K. journals w e r e
mainly from U.S. and U.K. institutions, with just over one-third of
them coming from other countries. However, for the top U.S. journals, only ten per cent of the authors hailed from outside the U.S.
These findings led the authors to conclude, "accounting academia
is very parochial" (p. 15).
In their study on articles published in 13 "well-respected"
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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accounting journals during the period 1992 to 1997, Carmona et
al. [1999] found that an overwhelming majority of European contributions to these journals were written by scholars affiliated
with British institutions of higher learning. In attempting to
explain this finding, Carmona et al. [1999, p. 479] pointed out that
"the European setting is composed of a complex w e b of cultures,
languages and research traditions whose characteristic traits are
not always tracked by publications in well-regarded, English-written accounting research journals." The authors also suggested that
this finding also "posits considerable doubts on the extent to
which it is correct to form the notion of European accounting
research" (p. 463) [see also Zambon, 1996, p. 409].
Rodgers and Williams [1996] rendered an example of a study
analyzing contributions to a single journal, The
Accounting
Review, over the extended period 1967-1993. By examining patterns of research productivity in The Accounting Review, the
authors set out to provide a partial history of the stratification
process in U.S. academic accounting. Rodgers and Williams [ 1996]
found that articles in The Accounting Review w e r e dominated by
authors from a relatively small n u m b e r of "elite" U.S. institutions.
Lee [1997] subsequently extended the work of Rodgers and
Williams [1996] to determine w h e t h e r the existence of an U.S.
"elite" was a p h e n o m e n o n confined to The Accounting
Review.
Lee [1997] examined the composition of the editorial boards of
six major accounting research journals from 1963 to 1994. Three
of these journals were U.S.-based; namely, Journal of Accounting
Research, The Accounting Review, and the Journal of Accounting
and Economics, while the other three emanated from elsewhere,
Abacus (Australia); Accounting and Business Research (U.K.); and
Accounting, Organizations and Society (U.K.). The major finding
of Lee's study was that a perceived U.S. "elite" was not restricted to
The Accounting Review, but was a prominent feature of all the
journals examined, "irrespective of journal age, geographical location, or scholarly focus" [Lee, 1997, p. 12]. According to Lee [1997,
p. 27], such dominance has implications for the manner in which
accounting knowledge is produced and tends to restrict somewhat the extent of academic contributions in accounting to
resolving practical problems facing the accounting profession
[Lee, 1997, p. 27].
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METHOD
Publication data were derived from the three specialist
accounting history journals published in the English language
from 1996 to 1999. It is recognized that the inclusion of journal
articles written in English overlooks contributions to specialist
journals not published in English. Nevertheless, this approach is
consistent with that adopted in recent studies of accounting literature and thereby provides a basis for the comparison of results.
The unit of analysis is the individual article. This study
includes research articles, replies, and notes/comments, but
excludes editorials, tributes, book reviews, and reports on conferences held. This approach is broadly consistent with that adopted
in similar studies [e.g., Zivney et al., 1995; Carmona et al., 1999]
except for the inclusion in the current study of commentaries on
research. Two such "comments" by Goldberg [1997] and Burrows
[1999]1 both appeared in AH and have been recognized as contributions in this study for two reasons. First, the comments related
primarily to the accuracy of assertions made in two books on the
history of aspects of accounting in Australia authored by Burrows
[1996] and Linn [1996] respectively. Second, the two comments
concentrated on the nature and limits of oral evidence in historical research. Consequently, the comments were deemed to be key
contributions to the literature with wide interest to accounting
history scholars.
A total of 149 contributions were identified for examination
and constituted the sample for this study. These contributions
were analyzed on the following grounds:
(i)

location of authors (country or region/institution)

(ii)

country or region studied

(iii)

time period studied.

The literature was then categorized according to the literature
classification framework provided by Carnegie and Napier
[1996].
The location of the author(s) was taken to be the nation1

These two comments comprised the total number of articles published in
these specialist journals during the survey period that were written by authors
affiliated with the University of Melbourne.
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ality of the institution or organization with which the author(s)
was affiliated on publication. Consistent with prior research, the
data are presented and analyzed based on the number of publications, adjusted for the number of authors involved rather than on
the basis of numbers of pages or other factors [see, for example,
Heck et al., 1990; Borokhovich et al., 1995; Carmona et al., 1999].
For example, where three authors were involved from institutions located in three different countries or regions, each author
was allocated a 0.33 weighting to represent his/her respective
contribution at face value.
Nine country or region classifications were used to represent
both the location of the author and the host country of the study.
These are detailed as follows: U.K., U.S., Australia, France, Canada,
Asia, New Zealand, Spain, and "Other." The "Other" classification
was used to capture those countries that were less frequently represented. This categorization provided a clear basis by which articles published in each journal could be analyzed and insights on
the propensity of scholars to conduct accounting history research
beyond their country of origin and/or to collaborate with scholars
in other countries.
The host country for each study was identified on examining
further each article making up the research sample. Contributions
were considered to relate to a particular country or region where
that subject country or region could be specifically identified. On
occasions, studies were concerned with more than one country
and were weighted accordingly (e.g., studies focusing on three different locations were weighted on the basis of a 0.33 allocation for
each). Where studies were not clearly set in any specific country,
most often in the instance of a contribution on historiography, a
classification code of "N/A" was applied. Analyzing the subject
country or region has implications for highlighting the "international" nature of the field of accounting history, particularly when
considered in light of the location(s) of the author(s) concerned.
Contributions were also analyzed according to the historical
time span of the respective studies. Specifically, an article concerned with accounting thought, practice, or regulation in both
the 19th and 20th centuries was weighted on the basis of an allocation of 0.5 for each period, unless it was clear that the prime
focus was on only one of these centuries. Most often, the time
period was conveniently identified by authors in the abstract, keywords, and/or introduction. Where this was not the case, such
contributions were examined further to deduce the necessary
Published by eGrove, 2000
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information. Where pieces could not be assigned to a specific
time period, a classification code of "N/A" was adopted.
In order to gain insights into the themes and approaches
adopted by researchers in the contributions comprising the sample, the literature classification framework provided by Carnegie
and Napier [1996] was applied. In order to explore and evaluate
accounting history literature as the n e w century approached,
Carnegie and Napier [1996] identified broad t h e m e s and
approaches by which the literature could be classified.2 These
themes and approaches are outlined below:
•

studies of surviving business records of firms

•

utilization of accounting records in business history
biography

•

prosopography

•

institutional history

•

public sector accounting

•

comparative international accounting history

While this classification framework was found to encompass
most of the contributions comprising the sample, a further category, "historiography," was adopted in this study. Contributions
were classified as historiography to the extent that their main
focus was to discuss, debate, or comment on the "body of techniques, theories and principles associated w i t h historical
research" [Parker, 1997, p. 114]. For the purpose of this study, historiography articles were not specifically assigned a particular
time span and were, accordingly, accorded the N/A classification
code.
RESULTS
Of the 149 components of the sample, 66 were published in
ABFH, 47 in AHJ, and 36 in AH Particulars on the locations of their
authors are presented in Table 1. This table provides information
on both the number and percentage of total contributions by
authors correlated to their country or region.
2

The literature classification framework provided by Carnegie and Napier has
also been applied by Carnegie and Potter [2000] in a survey of the Australian
accounting history literature that was published between 1976 and 1999.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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3.33
7.09

14.5
40.28
51.33
34.45

No.
%

No.
%
No.
%^

AHJ

AH

3.5
9.72
41.50
27.85

33
70.21

5
7.63

U.S.
1
1.53
5
10.64
2.5
6.94
8.50
5.70

12
18.32
0
0.00
0
0.00
12.00
8.05

5.5
8.40

2
4.26

14.5
40.28
22.00
14.77

Canada

France

Australia

1
2.13
1
2.78
3.00
2.01

0
0.00
3.00
2.01

1
1.53

N.Z.

2
4.26

1
1.53

Asia

0
0.00
1.67
1.12

0.67
1.43

1
1.53

Spain

0
0.00
5.50
3.69

0
0.00

5.5
8.40

Other*

36
100
149
100

47
100

66
100

Total

*Includes contributions form authors located in Africa (1), Greece (1), Netherlands (1), Germany (1), West
Indies (1), and South Africa (.5).
^Percentage is calculated based on the 149 total contributions identified for the study.

Total

33.5
51.15

No.
%
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184

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2000, Vol. 27, no. 2
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2000

193

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 13
Carnegie and Potter: Publishing Patterns in Accounting History

185

Particular patterns are discerned from the results in Table 1.
First, U.K. and U.S. authors appear to be prominent in number
across the three specialist journals. U.K. authors provided a total
of 51.33 (34.45%) of the 149 contributions in the sample.
Americans authored 41.5 (27.85%) of the contributions, while
Australians supplied a total of 22 (14.77%). When the results are
analyzed by individual journal, the prominence of authors within
each, by country or region, becomes more easily seen. U.S.
authors were responsible for 33 (70.21%) contributions to AHJ,
not surprisingly since AHJ is a U.S.-based journal, published by the
Academy of Accounting Historians (AAH) [Coffman et al., 1989].
AHJs author constituency broadly reflects the extent of U.S. membership in the AAH (67.9%), even though total membership of the
Academy, comprising both individuals and institutions, is spread
across 29 countries.3 For the U.K.-based ABFH, British authors
were most prominent, contributing 33.5 items (51.15%), while
French authors were responsible for 12 contributions (18.32%).4
Of the three journals it is apparent that AH, the journal of the
Accounting History Special Interest Group of the Accounting
Association of Australia and New Zealand, is generally less
"parochial," although ABFH, as discussed subsequently, was found
to publish works from more countries or regions than both AHJ
and AH. Both Australian and U.K. authors were prominent in AH,
with scholars from these locations making equal contributions
(40.28%) for a combined total of 29.
Contributions were, of course, made either by single authors
or by authors working collaboratively. The total number of contributors to each journal were ABFH (86), AHJ (70), and AH(50). 5
This translates to an average number of authors per contribution
as follows: ABFH (1.30), AHJ (1.49), and AH (1.39). Since accounting history is increasingly recognized as a maturing field of
inquiry [Fleischman et al., 1996; Parker, 1999], with many cross3

Information on the geographical dispersion of the AAH membership was
obtained from the Academy's website, accessed on May 26, 2000. Coffman et al.
[1998] provided information on the membership trends for the AAH during the
period 1989 to 1998.
4
It is to be recognized that Vol. 7, No. 3 of ABFH was a special issue, focusing
on French accounting history. It is comprised of six articles written by French
scholars. This single issue constituted 50% of total contributions by French authors
in the research sample across these three specialist journals.
5
These figures are provided to indicate the extent of collaboration in contributions identified in each journal and have not been adjusted for authors involved
with more than one contribution during the period under examination.
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border research opportunities awaiting researchers [Carnegie
and Napier, 1996, 2000; Carnegie and Potter, 2000], further analysis was conducted to establish the propensity of accounting historians to collaborate with authors located in other countries or
regions. Specifically, an analysis of contributions was undertaken
to establish the total number that were published by sole authors
and the total number co-authored. These patterns of authorship
were then analyzed by journal and on a per-country basis. The
results are outlined in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Patterns of Authorship
ABFH

No.
%

Single author
49
74.2

Multiple authors
17
25.8

Total
66
100

AHJ

No.
%

27.
57.4

20
42.6

47
100

AH

No.
%

23
63.9

13
36.1

36
100

Exploration of the "international" nature of accounting history was undertaken through further analysis of the contributions
written by multiple authors. Table 3 outlines the results of this
analysis.
TABLE 3
Analysis of Jointly
Written Contributions
ABFH

AHJ

U.S.

U.K.

Aust.

Can.

N.Z.

U.S./Aust.

No.

2

7

2

0

0

0

%

11.8

41.2

11.8

0.0

0.0

17

1

0

1

85.0

5.0

0.0

2

2

15.4

15.4

No.

%
AH

No.

%
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U.K./Aust. U.K./Other Aust./Other Total
3

2

1

0.0

17.6

11.8

5.9

100

0

0

0

1

0

20

5.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5.0

0.0

100

4

1

1

1

0

2

0

30.8

7.7

7.7

7.7

0.0

15.4

0.0

17

1
100
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The table demonstrates a marked reluctance by researchers to
collaborate with authors located outside their country of origin.
Only ten contributions (6.6%) featured authors collaborating
from different countries or regions (U.S./Aust. 1; U.K./Aust. 3;
U.K./Other 5; Aust./Other 1). As outlined in Table 3, only one contribution was identified w h e r e an American author collaborated
with a colleague from another country or region. ABFH and AH
demonstrated a stronger propensity to publish cross-border contributions during the study period.
The vast majority of contributions were written by individuals
employed in academic positions or by individuals w i t h close and
ongoing affiliations with academic institutions such as emeritus
appointments. ABFH generated the most nonacademic authors
with six in total; for AHJ and AH only one nonacademic author
contributed to each journal. Of the authors connected with
academe, data were collected to establish "dominant institutions"
in accounting history based on the contributions comprising the
sample. Table 4 provides information on those institutions most
frequently featured. As indicated in Table 4, a total of 46.5 of the
149 contributions (31.2%) were written by individuals connected
with one of only nine institutions of higher learning.

TABLE 4
Institutions Offering Most Contributions
Institution
Cardiff
Newcastle
Deakin
Exeter
LSE
La Trobe
Sheffield
Edinburgh
Wollongong
TOTAL

Location
(U.K.)
(U.K.)
(Aust.)
(U.K.)
(U.K.)
(Aust.)
(U.K.)
(U.K.)
(Aust.)
No.
% of total
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No. Contributions
6
6
5.5
5.5
5.5
5
5
4
4
465
31.2
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Table 5 provides particulars of these dominant institutions
based on placements in each journal. For each of the journals
examined, a relatively small number of institutions contributed a
sizeable percentage of the total contributions published. Based
on the results in Tables 1 and 5, the dominant institutions for
ABFH are largely U.K.-based, with the journal proving an attractive
publication outlet also for researchers from France and Australia.
Dominant institutions for AHJ are generally in the U.S., although
Newcastle, an U.K. university, was the most dominant supplier of
contributions for the period of study. These tables also show that
authors from institutions in Australia and U.K. were key contributors to AH.
What is not evident from Tables 1 and 5 is the number of academic institutions represented by contributions identified in each
journal for the period. Although more contributions were published in ABFH (66) than in AHJ (47) and AH (36), articles in AHJ
represented a greater diffusion of institutions of higher learning,
amounting to 45 in total, than was the case for ABFH and AH with
34 and 24 respectively. While Table 3 indicates a general reluctance on the part of U.S. authors to collaborate with scholars from
other countries, there is a strong propensity for American authors
to collaborate with colleagues from other U.S. academic institutions. The geographical concentration of authors is also reflected
in the subject country/region results outlined in Table 6.
Of these three journals, the extent of subject countries or
regions under examination was found to be the largest for ABFH
with contributions on 16 countries or regions. This result compares with AHJ and AH with eight and five respectively. Of the
total contributions, a total of 56.08 (37.64%) dealt with U.K.
accounting history, while U.S. accounting history was the subject
matter in 32.33 (21.7%) studies. These results may be compared
with the location of authors presented in Table 1, wherein it was
revealed that British authors contributed 51.33 (34.45%) and
American authors 41.5 (27.85%) of total publications. The data
presented in Tables 1 and 6 were then analyzed together in order
to assess, where possible, the frequency with which authors studied accounting history in venues other than the country or region
of their origin. While the number of contributions from British
authors equates to articles on British topics, the key points to note
pertain to authors located in both the U.S. and Australia. Table 1
indicates that while 41.5 contributions (27.85%) came from U.S.
authors, only 32.33 (21.70%) contributions concerned U.S.
accounting history. This disparity can be explained by two factors.
Published by eGrove, 2000
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Institution
LSE
Cardiff
Exeter
Sheffield
Université de Paris
Deakin
Kent
La Trobe
Newcastle
TOTAL
% of total p e r jnl.

ABFH

Location
(U.K.)
(U.K.)
(U.K.)
(U.K.)
(France)
(Aust.)
(U.K.)
(Aust.)
(U.K.)

Number
4.50
4.00
4.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
26.50
40.15

Institution
Newcasle
Case Western
Georgia State
Maine
New Mexico
British Columbia
Michigan

AHJ
Location
(U.K.)
(U.S.)
(U.S.)
(U.S.)
(U.S.)
(Can.)
(U.S.)

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
17.49
37.21

Number
3.00
2.83
2.83
2.50
2.33
2.00
2.00

TABLE 5
Dominant Institutions per
Journal
Institution
Deakin
Edinburgh
La Trobe
Wollongong
Cardiff
Melbourne
Sheffield
Warwick

AH
Location
(Aust.)
(U.K.)
(Aust.)
(Aust.)
(U.K.)
(Aust.)
(U.K.)
(U.K.

20.50
56.94

Public
3.50
3.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
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Total

AH

1.33
3.70

32.33
21.70

56.08

37.64

No.

%^

%

18.83
52.32

No.

8.51

%

53.19

25.00

4.00

No.

AHJ

9.09

4.33

10.33
6.93

4.75

12.03
7.08

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.75
4.17

Australia

0.00

0.00

10.33
15.65

50.39

France

U.S.

6.00

%

U.K.

33.25

4.03

6.00

8.34

3.00

3.00
6.98

0.00

0.00

Canada

3.36

5.00

2.78

1.00

4.26

2.00

3.03

2.00

Asia

3.75
2.52

1.34

2.00

0.00
0.00

1.50
4.17

2.13

1.00

1.52

1.00

Spain

2.13

1.00

1.89

1.25

N.Z.

7.66

0.00
11.41

0.00

8.51

4.00

11.23

7.41

Other*
N/A

10.07

16.67
15.00

6.00

14.89

7.00

3.03

2.00

149
100

100

36

47
100

100

Total
66

190

* Includes studies with an emphasis on: India (1), South Africa (.25), Croatia (.33), Africa (1.5), Greece (1),
Netherlands (1), Germany (1), West Indies (1), and Italy (.33) for ABFH; and Mexico (1), India (1), and the
Middle East (2) for AHJ.
^ Calculation represents percentage of 149 total contributions identified for this study.
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First, several articles by U.S. authors examined accounting history
in other areas, including Asia, the Middle East, and the U.K.
Second, several contributions were given the classification code
of "historiography" and were thus deemed not to be country or
region-specific. Table 1 also shows that Australian authors were
responsible for 22 contributions (14.77%), yet only 7.08 of them
(4.75%) related to Australian accounting history. Further analysis
reveals that several contributions from Australian authors, particularly those published in AH, were classified as "historiography,"
while several pieces by Australian authors concerned accounting
history in other countries or regions. Of particular note from
Table 6 is the relatively few number of efforts that center on Asia
(5), Spain (2), and Italy (0.33), which can possibly be explained, at
least in part, by language constraints facing authors in these locations.
In order to discern any trends in the time horizons of accounting historians contributing to particular journals, data were collected pertaining to the time periods examined in the 149 contributions. The results are presented in Table 7.
While the time period selected for examination by accounting
historians is often determined by the availability of surviving
records, certain patterns are evident in the Table 7 information.
Most studies (108.65 contributions, 72.92%) were concentrated in
the 19th (38.4 contributions, 25.77%) and 20th (70.25 contributions, 47.15%) centuries. The 18th century seemed to hold considerably less interest for accounting historians, but this may be
explained by a lack of primary evidence during an era marked by
revolutions across the globe, with implications for the contents of
archives, then and now. As outlined in Table 7, studies pertaining
to the 20th century were most frequently found in ABFH and AHJ
with 34 and 26.25 respectively. Contributions relating to the 19th
century were most common for AH, with 13.5 contributions
(37.5%).
Table 8 presents the results of classifying the articles using the
framework provided by Carnegie and Napier [1996].The table
reveals a concentration on institutional history, with business history and studies of surviving records of firms also frequently published. While factors influencing the selection of research activities can be complex,6 part of the interest in institutional history is
6

For example, Sikka et al. [1995, p. 114], writing in the context of accounting
research in general, argued that research activities are "political" to the extent that
they support or challenge traditional frameworks or ideas and prioritize certain
values or concerns.
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TOTAL
% of total

AH

%

No

%

No

%

No.

0.25
0.53

2.00
4.26

0
0.00
3.50
2.35

3.00
6.38

2
5.56
9.50
6.37
1
2.78
2.08
1.39

17th cent.
0.83
1.26

16th cent.
1.50
2.28

Pre-l6th cent.
4.50
6.85

4.5
12.50
14.91
10.01

3.25
6.91

18th cent.
7.16
10.91

13.5
37.50
38.40
25.77

7.25
15.43

19th cent.
17.65
26.90

10
27.78
70.25
47.15

26.25
55.85

20th cent.
34.00
51.80

5
13.89
10.00
6.71

5
10.64

N/A
0
0.00

36
100
149
100

47
100

Total
66
100
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ABFH
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Total
% of total

AH

AHJ

ABFH

8
17.02

7
19.44
37
24.83

18
38.30

12
33.33
45
30.20
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7.5
11.36
6
12.77
1
2.78
14.5
9.73

8
17.02

6
16.67
30
20.13

Bio. #

Surviving
business records
16
24.24

5
13.89
10
6.71

5
10.64

0
0.00

Historiog.

3
8.33
8.5
5.70

2
4.26

3.5
5.30

CIAH#

2
5.56
4
2.68

0
0.00

Public
Sector
2
3.03

0
0.00
0
0.00

0
0.00

0
0.00

Prosop.

Accordingly, this study was classified as b o t h biography (0.5) and comparative international accounting history (CIAH).

36
100
149
100

47
100

66
100

Total

William Butler Yaldwyn and his role in the transfer of accounting technology to and within the southern hemisphere.

#It is to be noted that one contribution, by Carnegie and Parker [1996], examined both the life, career, and works of

%

No.

%

22
33.33

No.

%

15
22.73

Bus. History

No.

Institutional

TABLE 8
Classification of the
Study
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explained by the relatively recent emergence of historical studies
concerned with various aspects of professionalizing activities in
accounting. 7 In addition, several studies related to developments
in accounting regulations and regulatory processes w e r e also
placed in the "institutional" classification. Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the contributions classified as "institutional history"
pertained to countries w h e r e the accounting profession, the capital market, and associated regulatory systems and processes are
generally well developed. Several biographical and historiographical studies were also published, particularly in the later years of
the study period. Also of note in Table 8 are the 8.5 contributions
that focused on accounting history in more than one country or
region. Of these, seven are examples of "diffusion" studies, which,
according to Carnegie and Napier [2000, p. 5], are directed at
examining "how accounting techniques, institutions and concepts
are transferred through a range of different mechanisms." As Table
8 indicates, wide scope seems to exist for accounting history
scholars to develop the field, especially in biography, prosopography, public-sector accounting history, and CIAH studies.
DISCUSSION
The results outlined in the preceding section appear to indicate the existence of a relatively insular international accounting
history research community dominated by a small n u m b e r of institutions and authors. Authors from the U.K. were more likely to
publish in the U.K.-based ABFH, U.S. authors generally published
in AHJ; while U.K. and Australian authors were prevalent, in equal
portions, in the Australian/New Zealand-based AH. W h e r e
accounting history contributions were undertaken by more than
one author, collaboration was more likely to occur with colleagues located within the same country or region. While this outcome, of course, is determined to some extent by practical considerations such as time, the selection of appropriate research topics, and the accessibility of archival material, there appears to be a
general reluctance on the part of accounting history researchers
to collaborate with colleagues in other countries or regions.
The geographical patterns of authorship w e r e also reflected

7

For example, Vol. 9, No. 1 of ABFH, guest edited by Stephen Walker, was dedicated to the professionalism of accounting. This special issue of six articles yielded five studies on institutional history, while the other contribution was considered to fall within the domain of CIAH.
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in the subject countries or regions in the case of each journal. The
subject countries or regions chosen for studies on accounting's
past were relatively few in number. U.K. accounting history studies were the most frequent, followed by contributions pertaining
to accounting's past in the U.S. In comparison to the U.K. and the
U.S., relatively few contributions were concerned with accounting history in Australia and even less so with New Zealand, Asia,
and Spain. Such low numbers may not reflect the general state of
accounting history research in these locations, particularly
Australia [see, for example, Carnegie and Potter, 2000]. There was
a paucity of research examining accounting history in more than
one country, which is also reflected in the relatively low n u m b e r
of studies assigned the CIAH classification.
In general, authors seemed more likely to concentrate their
research on the 19th and 20th centuries. When the studies w e r e
classified using the Carnegie and Napier [1996] framework, it
became evident that the majority, that is 112 in number or 75.16%,
were captured by three of their thematic classifications—institutional history, business history, and studies of surviving business
records. The emerging number of contributions on historiography is reflected in Tables 7 and 8 and explains, to a large extent,
why 6.71% of total contributions were classified "N/A" for the
study period. Interestingly, there were no historiography articles
in ABFH during this period. Analysis of the information contained
in Table 8 indicates that several avenues exist for further research
in areas such as biography, prosopography, public-sector accounting history, and CIAH [see Carnegie and Napier, 1996, 2000;
Carnegie and Potter, 2000].
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This study has investigated publishing patterns in three dedicated, internationally refereed, accounting history journals in the
English language based on a total of 149 contributions published
between 1996 and 1999. These contributions were analyzed
according to the location of authors, subject country or region,
and the investigation time period. These contributions were then
arranged according to the literature classification framework
developed by Carnegie and Napier [1996].
While accounting historians lay claim to belonging to an international scholarly community, this does not appear to be reflected
by the contributions published in three specialist accounting
journals during the period of this study. ABFH, AHJ, and AH each
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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boast editorial boards comprising leading accounting historians
located in a variety of different countries. There are also several
"international" accounting history research conferences each
year. For instance, each of these journals is associated with a particular accounting history conference. 8 Further, the World
Congress of Accounting Historians has been held every four years
at different locations around the globe. 9 Notwithstanding these
events, contributing authors represent relatively few countries or
regions, and even collaborative efforts most often involve authors
from the same country or region. Of the 149 contributions identified in this sample, only nine examined aspects of accounting history in multiple countries.
Several worthwhile avenues for further research arise from
this study. First, as noted in earlier sections, the sample selected is
limited to specialist accounting history journals in the English
language during a four-year period. Opportunity exists to perform
a similar analysis on a larger sample that would also capture the
discipline in general accounting journals, as well as in sociological, interpretative, and critical journals. This extension would
enhance claims as to the breadth of international publishing patterns in accounting history and would allow for more in-depth
comparisons to be made with the results of similar studies conducted on accounting literature in general.
Research could also be undertaken to explore and elucidate
various specific patterns identified in this study. While this article
has articulated certain publishing patterns in contributions to
three accounting history journals, future research is encouraged
to explore why these patterns arise.10 Such research might elucidate why historical researchers located in different countries are
p r o n e to publish their outputs in locally based journals and
w h e t h e r this inclination is, in any way, linked to perceptions of
journal quality. Researchers might also delve further into the reasons for a broad focus in accounting history o n the 19th and 20th
centuries, and why certain categories of research remain totally or
8
For example, the second Accounting History international conference will be
held in Osaka, August 8-10, 2001. The Cardiff Business School hosts the annual
ABFH conference, while the Academy of Accounting Historians also holds an
annual research conference in North America.
9
A World Congress will be held every two years, on a trial basis, from 2000 forward.
10
Similar calls were made by Carmona et al. [1999] on examining publishing
patterns in the European Accounting
Review.
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virtually ignored.
The results of this study provide insights into recent international publishing patterns in a section of accounting history literature in recent years. We are yet to discern w h e t h e r these patterns
are typical of the larger body of accounting history literature or to
grasp with confidence why such patterns arise. Further research
is likely to assist in elucidating these matters.
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REVIEW OF BOOKS:
A RETROSPECTIVE GLANCE
James Ole Winjum, The Role of Accounting in the
Economic Development of England; 1500-1750
Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New
Deal
Hanns-Martin W. Schoenfeld, Cost Terminology
and
Cost Theory: A Study of its Development
and
Present State in Central Europe
Doris Langley Moore, Lord Byron Accounts
Rendered
What is the role of book reviews in the Internet era? Such was
the query of a colleague u p o n learning of my appointment as
Book Review Editor of the Accounting Historians Journal (AHJ).
When w e are able to download books and journals, as well as create and read online reviews at our favorite Internet bookstore,
does the published book review serve any purpose? Not wanting
to eliminate my position at its outset, I decided that a useful way
to answer this question would be to revisit and re-examine previous book reviews in AHJ.
BOOK REVIEWS IN AHJ
Since its inception in 1977, AHJ has published approximately
300 book reviews of newly published and reprinted works. A
quick glance at the works reviewed, their authors and reviewers,
indicates the breadth of publishing in accounting history and provides a who's w h o of members of the discipline. We find books
and reviews by Zeff, Winjum, Schoenfeld, Wells, Kawahara,
Katano, and Woolf. Many individuals have contributed to both
sides of the ledger, authoring and editing volumes, as well as
reviewing them. Themes appear and re-appear, such as doubleentry bookkeeping, standard costing, financial reporting, and
accounting theory. The reviews demonstrate the global dispersion of the discipline, with works emanating from Asia and the
Pacific Rim, Europe and the U.K., Scandinavia, and North America.
AHJ replaced The Accounting Historian, with its first three
volumes reproducing its predecessor. The following section samhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
ples the book reviews contained in these three volumes. The
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selections are a personal choice, not a statistical sample. They
cover the broad range of topics and geography contained in the
cohort of 22 reviews. After excerpting these reviews, I provide a
brief summary of key points. The latter illustrate the continued
value of the review vehicle to highlight ever-important topics in
accounting history research and historical research more generally.
EXCERPTS FROM AHJ, VOLUME 1, NUMBERS 1-4, 1974
James Ole Winjum, The Role of Accounting in the
Economic
Development
of England; 1500-1750 (Center for International
Education and Research in Accounting, 1972, 252 pp.)
reviewed by Marc J. Epstein (pp. 36-37)
Though Yamey, Edey, and Thomson provided an
introduction and overview to the development of
accountancy in England..., n o c o m p r e h e n s i v e
study has been made of the development of
accounting in this period in England. Further,
though the Sombart thesis is a well accepted
notion, a rigorous test of that thesis had not been
conducted. James Winjum successfully completes
both tasks...Central to the entire study is the test of
the Sombart thesis that double-entry bookkeeping
was 'both a manifestation of the spirit of capitalism in its formative decades as well as a propulsive
agency furthering a significant economic and cultural development.' Through an examination of
extant accounting treatises and textbooks and
m e r c h a n t accounts of England (1500-1750),
Winjum finds the proof necessary to support the
thesis...
Over the last few years, discussion has continued
on the validity of the Sombart thesis. The contribution of this test of the thesis is obvious. It is also
i m p o r t a n t to note the research m e t h o d o l o g y
employed. Winjum's study provides the results of
extensive investigation into both treatises and
original records and provides a thorough discussion of the previous support of the thesis by influPublished by eGrove, 2000
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ential scholars. 'Scissors and paste history' is clearly not being used here in this carefully researched
study...
The book is a major contribution to the literature
of accounting history generally and English economic and accounting history specifically...The
book is highly recommended as evidence of quality accounting history research.
Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New Deal (Yale
University Press, 1970, 270 pp.)
reviewed by Hugh Hughes (pp. 39-40)
The New Deal, broadly perceived as a reform
movement, has been the subject of previous comprehensive studies. As Parrish notes in the introduction, he is concerned with illuminating 'a portion of the larger debate;
the relationship
between American businessmen and reform.' He
attempts to identify the reformers, their motivations, and the consequences of reform....
This is no Cinderella tale which Parrish relates - it
is a study of legislation incessantly attacked by
detractors w h o in some instances do manage to
dilute or eliminate what appear to have been
worthwhile reforms. The personal papers are particularly helpful here in shedding light on the feelings and frustrations of both advocates and foes of
these measures and of the philosophies motivating them.
An important feature of the book is that it is not
primarily concerned with the accounting professor or accounting practices. Accountants... are but
one of a number of parties w h o m Parrish attempts
to place in perspective, and it is this perspective
that today's accounting practitioner or professor
should find of most benefit...
To the accounting historian, the book is signifihttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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cant for this same perspective, for the evolutionary study of a government institution of primary
importance to accountants, and for its methodologyEXCERPTS FROM AHJ, VOLUME 2, NUMBERS 1-4, 1975
Hanns-Martin W. Schoenfeld, Cost Terminology and Cost Theory:
A Study of its Development and Present State in Central Europe,
Monograph 8 (Center for International Education and Research in
Accounting, 1974, 177 pp.)
reviewed by M.C. Wells (pp. 74-76)
This monograph contains a comprehensive and
readable account of the development of various
theories of p r o d u c t i o n costs by p r o m i n e n t
German writers. For those of us w h o are incompetent in any but our own language, it is a long
overdue introduction to a highly developed and
rather specialized field...
Of particular interest to accounting historians will
be Schoenfeld's description of the origins of various cost theories, the background of the German
Uniform Chart of Accounts and his evaluation of
European theory development. Throughout that
development, the close connection between cost
accounting and economics is clearly drawn.
Schoenfeld has adopted the role of reporter, not
advocate. His monograph is a work to be taken
seriously and studied closely by all w h o profess an
interest in cost accounting practices and theories.
Although the emphasis on German literature is
somewhat narrower than the title implies, the
English language literature has been considerably
enhanced by this addition.
EXCERPTS FROM AHJ, VOLUME 3, NUMBERS 1-4, 1976
Doris Langley Moore, Lord Byron Accounts
Row, Publishers, 1974, 511 pp.)
Published by eGrove, 2000
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reviewed by Hans Johnson (pp. 92-94)
Lord Byron is remembered today for his literary
genius and controversial life style. Lord Byron
Accounts Rendered is the author's second biographical study of the poet. In her latest effort,
Moore has tapped a previously unused wealth of
d o c u m e n t a r y evidence pertaining to Byron's
financial affairs. Antonio Lega Zambelli, Lord
Byron's trusted aide, kept meticulous records of
incomes and expenditures...Such is the volume of
documentation that author Moore comments, 'we
have Byron's domestic economy so minutely yet
unconsciously reflected that there can scarcely be
anything comparable in the annals of famous
men...'
Accounting historians interested in the biographical use of personal financial information will find
the book beneficial as an example of research
technique and synthesis of complex evidential
material. Moore's approach is chronological with
interpretation of important events and personalities based u p o n her study of the Zambelli records.
The author, being very knowledgeable on the life
of Byron, carefully weaves personalities, places
and events together with monetary exchanges in
such a m a n n e r as to reveal interesting n e w
insights...
SUMMARY
Although the sample of reviews is small and constrained,
these reviews and the source books provide the accounting historian with insights that remain relevant long after their initial publication.
The reviews provide glimpses that enable t h e
reader/researcher to determine the overall theme of the original
work, its potential relevance to his or her own research, and hopefully motivation for the reader to explore further. Reviews can
provide a starting point from which to obtain a form of triangulation for research of a similar nature. Finally, the review reveals the
reviewer and the perspective that he or she has adopted.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss2/13
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Even if the review does not prompt one to seek out the original source, certain themes evident in these reviews strike a chord
with accounting historians:
•Accounting in its context — the reviews all demonstrate that
accounting cannot be studied outside of its context, be it economic, political, social, or cultural.
• Accounting as part of everyday life — the account of Byron is
a good example of this feature of accounting, a role and the power
of which are increasingly recognized in our accounting history
research.
• The linkage of accounting to other disciplines — this linkage
is evident, be it economics (as with cost accounting in Germany)
or the influence of political economy (as in terms of the New
Deal).
•The importance of sound methodology — the reviews all
note the careful attention to methodology, sources, documentation, and evidence.
• Perspective — as we write history, we adopt a perspective.
Recognizing this point of view is necessary in order to write convincingly.
Whether we write books or launch our research on an
Internet site, these points remain a relevant and requisite part of
our accounting history craft.
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Third Asian Pacific Interdisciplinary Research
in Accounting Conference
15-17 July, 2001
The University of Adelaide, South Australia
IN ASSOCIATION WITH
ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY

JOURNAL

CALL FOR PAPERS
After its first two conferences in Sydney (1995) and Osaka (1998), APIRA now moves
to Adelaide in 2001. The premier food and wine city of australia, centre of a thriving
arts and film industry, and a top-rated convention city in the Asia Pacific, Adelaide is
home to the editorial offices of AAAJ. Following the large international contingent at
Osaka, we are expecting APIRA Adelaide to be the largest conference of its type ever
mounted in Australia.
We seek papers addressing the relationships between accounting, auditing and
accountability and their social, economic, institutional and political environments..
Our scope includes:
Social and Environmental Accounting; Accounting and Gender and/or Feminist
Theories; Accounting and Accountability in the Public Sector; Non-profit
Organizations' Accountability; Accounting Policy and Standard Setting; Corporate
Regulation and Accountability; Accounting Professions; New Forms of Accounting
and Auditing; Professional and Business Ethics; Accounting and the Public Interest;
Critical, Explanatory, Oral and Visual Approaches to Accounting History; Critical
and Ethnographic Case Studies of Accounting in Action; Accounting a n d
Management Planning and Control; Accounting and Technology; Accounting and
Culture; Accounting and the Home; Methodological and theoretical Issues;
Accounting Communication
Three paper copies of completed papers must be sent to Professor Lee Parker at the
AAAJ editorial office (below) no later than 1 December 2000. All papers will be refereed. Refer to website address above for further submission requirements and
details.
EMERGING SCHOLARS' COLLOQUIUM
A forum for doctoral students, new faculty and emerging researches will be held on
14 July, immediately prior to the conference. Attendance is strictly limited and will
be by application. Refer to website for further details
ALL ENQUIRIES TO:
APIRA 2001 website: http://www.commerce.adelaide.edu.au/apira/
Email:
aaaj@commerce.adelaide.edu.au
Postal:
APIRA 2001, School of Commerce,
The University of Adelaide, Adelaide,
South Australia 5005
Conference organiser: Ms Gloria Parker Tel 61-8-8303
Conference Chair: Professor Lee D. Parker
Conference Committee:
Professor James Guthrie,
Macquarie Graduate School Management
Professor Richard Laughlin
Kings College, University of London
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Professor Jesse Dillard
University of New Mexico
Professor Hiroshi Okana
Osaka City University
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Accounting, Business & Financial History
Since the commencement of the 1979 economic reform programmes
accounting in China has been subject to many changes. Considerable
efforts have been made to advance our understanding of current practice
of Chinese accounting. However, the history of accounting thought and
practice may be significant in terms of understanding present attitudes
exhibited within the profession. Chinese accounting has a long history. It
once took the lead in the world in ancient times and made a great contribution to the development of world accounting. It is with the intention
of extending knowledge in the important field that a special issue of
Accounting, Business & Financial History is to b e published on
"Accounting history: Chinas Contributions and Challenges."
Economic reforms in China over the past two decades have been accompanied by structural advances, legislative activities and the provision of
institutional and professional guidelines for accounting. These reflect
requirements for international recognition of the discipline together
with other forces of the modern era. However, patterns of accounting
development in China over thousands of years encompassing the dynasties, western influences and revolutionary edicts have accommodated the
cultural environments in which practice has occurred. The competence
of Chinese accountants in this context. The special issue of Accounting
Business Financial History will address the subject of Chinese financial
history and it's development, the sub-editors for the issue will be Maxwell
Aiken, La Trobe University Melbourne and Wei Lu, Monash University,
Melbourne. Papers on all aspects of Chinese accounting history are welcome. Possible topics include, but are not limited to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The influence of Chinese philosophies on accounting
Government accounting
Auditing
Bookkeeping
Culture and accounting
The development of certified public accountants
Chinese innovations in management accounting
International influences on accounting

This special issue is to be published in the first quarter of 2002. Papers
will be subject to the usual review process. Submissions should be made
no later than the 31 January, 2001 to: Dr. Wei Lu, Department of
Accounting and Finance, Monash University, Caulfield Campus, PO Box
197, Caulfield East, Victoria 3145, Australia.
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